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EVALUATING UKRAINIAN
POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT:

A Case Study of Ukrainian
Elections 1994-2002
Clifford Blair
ABSTRACT

Perhaps the key problon observed in the deIJelopment of Ukrainian democracy, as it relates to the
party ~vstem, is thefractionalization and non consolidation ofpolitical parties. This research willfill
all existing need ~y generating more complete ellidence of the weakness ofinstitutional approaches to
this problem ill Fastern Europe. It will also prolJide substantiation for future broad consideratioll of
elite-motiuator explanations in other post-socialist countries. Traditionally, the favored approach in
studies of par~y systems has been heavily biased towards institutional explanations. Recent studies,
however, haw shown this paradigm to be unsatisfoctory when applied to post-socialist states in Fastern
Eitrope and particularly to the former US.S.R., but thusfor with a very limited number of cases.
These studies htllJC also tended to rely 011 cultural explanations in the absence of institutional theories,
but without good discussion of what culture can and cannot explain. Tn contrast, the role of elites has
receilled almost no consideration. Scholars that haul' discussed relelJant elite behalJior halle not made a
case linking these elite actions to the party ~ystem's failure to consolidate. This essay attempts to augment
criticisms of the institutional approach by demonstrating the inadequacy ofthis approach in Ukraine,
using added data about two Ukrainian parliamentary elections under different institutional
arrangements. It then makes an argument that an elite-moti/'ator paradigm provides a better
explanation of the /ili/ure of Ukrainian parties to consolidate. This is based on the behavior of
political elites in three of the most recent elections: the 1999 presidential election and the 1998 and
2002 parliamentary elections. The research shows that institutional changes in the Ukrainian parliamentary t,lection procedure failed to improlJe the ~ystem and also findr evidence that the political elite
rationally perpetuate many of the problems to their own aduantage.

I

n 1996 Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy
Carter, wrote about what he considered the "three major geopolitical events of the
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twenrieth century." They were, first, the tall of European empires after World War I; second,
the developmenr of the Iron Curtain-predicted by Winston Churchill-after World War
II; and third, the emergence of an independenr Ukrainian state after the Cold War (1996,
3-8). The next year Brzezinski offered further explanation for this surprising statement. He
described Ukraine as one of five "pivots" that geographically define the balance of power
in Eurasia-"the chessboard on which the struggle for global primae}' continues ro be
played" (1997, 31-47). Just this year in high-level meetings, Ukrainian and European
leaders broached the idea of Ukraine joining the European Union in the next ten ro twenry
years.] With its possible membership in the European Union and acceptance by the global
communiry of nations at stake, the international significance of democratic consolidation
in Ukraine should not be underestimated. This is particularly true in light of the f.1.ct that
it is uncertain whether the former Soviet republic will complete its evolution ro democracy
in the way that Western nations envisioned twelve years ago when the Soviet Union collapsed. Ukraine is an importanr case study not only for these reasons, but also because it
offers the opportunity to develop hypotheses about democratic consolidation that can be
applied in other post-socialist countries.
THE ROLE OF PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

Although the role of mature parties is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause for democratic
consolidation, without "well-organized and programmatically coherent political parties ...
it may prove more difficult to form an effective government" (Schmitter and Karl 1991,84).
More specifically, a significant aspect of the development of a parry system requires that all
of the major parties agree to work within the constitutional framework established by a
developing democracy (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 15-16). This includes a general agreement
among parties about the general policy direction of the country so that changes in the
governing parry do not equate to radical transformation of basic policies key to continued
democratic consolidation.
Since economic reform often occurs simultaneously with political reform, especially in
post-socialist countries like the European eastern bloc, political reform includes a general
consensus on economic restructuring. Diamond writes, "The consolidation of democracyso intimately linked to structural economic reform-requires the negotiation of some kind
of agreement or 'pact' among competing political parries and social forces on: (1) the
broad direction and principles of structural economic reform, which all parties suppOrt,
no matter which one(s) come to power" (1990, 113). As Andrew Wilson, perhaps the
preeminent scholar of independent Ukraine, and Arthur Bilous wrote in their very early
study of Ukrainian political parties:
Ukraine appears to have an anarchic and ineffective part)' system. A large number of
small, ill organised and fractious political parries seemingl)' promote instabiliry rather
than stabiliry, and hinder rather than help the tasks of building a stable civil society
and market economy.... The fear must be that if such parties cannot exercise much
influence on the development of society, they are helping to create a political vacuum
that may well be fIlled by some kind of revived authoritarianism. (1993,693)
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In this essay the definition of "party nonconsolidation" takes in many of the negative
characteristics described above, while "party consolidation" denotes the presence of their
positive alternatives. For example, longevity is an important attribute of parties in a consolidated party system: these parties are generally affected only in a limited way by changes in
leadership and are able to endure changes in government and society. Parties in a consolidated system develop coherent party programs or platforms that are usually practical and
devote effort to enacting these programs. Such parties regularly compete in elections
with the goal of controlling government in order to be able to do so.
Linz and Stepan have further written about the role of political parties in civil society.
"A consolidated democracy requires that a range of political parties not only represent
interests but seek by coherent programs and organizational activities to aggregate interests"
(1996a, 274). This is particularly true of post-socialist countries-like Ukraine-that in most
cases were totalitarian states. Because of the lack of civil society and a legacy of totalitarianism,
the development of parties to buttress nascent civil society makes party systems in such
states an even more important question than in states that do not suffer from the heritage
of totalitarianism.
While this is not to suggest that development of the party system is the only factor
affecting democratic consolidation, nor the most important, this research is particularly
significant because it will help us to better understand the chances for continued democratic
consolidation in post-socialist countries and also give greater insight into the party aspect of
political restructuring that must occur during democratic transitions. In conjunction with
other case studies from Eastern Europe, this study of Ukraine will lead to increased understanding of the situation in that region in both practical and theoretical terms.
THE WEAK SYSTEM: A BRIEF loOK AT THE PROBLEMS
WITH UKRAINIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

A brief background about the situation of the party system in Ukraine will provide a clearer
understanding of some of the significant challenges that are faced in the democratic
consolidation process. Throughout Europe in the early 1990s, center and center-left parties
enjoyed electoral success throughout Europe, exemplified by Tony Blair and his "third
way." In Ukraine, centrist parties have also been politically successful in the decade since
independence; however, Andrew Wilson described the Ukrainian political center as a
"black hole" and'a "quagmire" (2002b, 172). These comments are typical of analyses of
the situation by other scholars cited in this essay, which include the following quotations
of Ukrainian observers and politicians:
The various centrist factions ... "CUI only be distinguished by their amorphousness
and an absence of direction in terms of their political and economic orientation. For
this reason, this agglomerate of forces can sooner be described as a gray void than as a
political center.... " Rukh chairman Viacheslav Chornovil described these centrist
factions as a "parliamentary sludge." "Sometimes they side with the leftists and sometimes with the rightists. They represent what might be called a situational majority,
which, unfortunately, does not want to be constructive, and which, in the event of any
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weakening, disappears .... " Within the amorphous ceorer (often termed the "bolota,"
or "swamp") cenain imerest groups exist (clan, regional, economic, and so on). These
centrists, or "pragmatists," as they prefer to be described, "often act not only independently of, but also coorrary to decisions by, the individual factions to which these
deputies formally belong .... '" This amorphousness weakened party and factional
unity in Ukraine and increased the opportunity for splinter groups to form. (D'Anieri,
Kravchuk, and Kuzio 1999, 160)

The illegitimacy of the left and the natural limitations of the right have produced an
ersatz center that is synthetically strong, but in reality fractionalized and not consolidated.
The illegitimacy of the left is perpetuated both by the more apolitical.ceorer and by the
obstructionism of the left itself. The natural limits of the right are exacerbated by abuse
of political power, also by the apolitical center, to ensure their continued nonviability as
major political players (see Table 1). As Wilson writes, this "opaque ceorrist 'non-party'
nature of Ukrainian government has produced a similar recipe [to the one party rule in
Italy or Japan) for stagnation, corruption and the growing abusc of the pOWl'r of the state"
(2002a, 173).

Table 1: The Spectrum of Ukrainian Political Parties
Political Spectrum Left

Center

Right

Main Parties

Communist Party (CPU)
(Symonenko); Socialist
Party (Moroz)

Our Ukraine (Yuschenko); Rukh factions now part of
()ur Ukraine and United
United Ukraine
(Kuchma'); SDP(U)
Ukraine
Medvedchyuk)'

Problems/
Weaknesses

Unrefi)rmed;
seen as illegitimate. not
potential partners in
governlnenr

Incoherent, lack of p.uty
platfclrIns; personalitvbased

Nationalist agenda wirh
limited regional appeal; old
plattlmll essentially fiilly
implemented

2002
Parliamentary
Election Results
(PR seats/SMD
seats) ,

79/9

1461120

tiL "

As in Russia, political parties in Ukraine have not yet reached developmental maturitythey are temporary phenomena, often founded solely on the popularity of their leader and
thus severely limited in their longevity, if not also in t111'ir platform and appeal. This is
especially true of the political center, whereas the right-of-center parties are the best
organized and the left-of-center panies the strongest e1ectorally in Ukraine. Thus far, the
centrist panies have not been forced to develop a coherent platform (other than to be
nominally "reformist") nor engage in serious competition in order to retain control of the
government.
The observation that the leftist parties are "illegitimate" can be explained as follows:
Although parties of the left poll up to 40 percent of voters, unlike French Socialists, British
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Labourites of old, or reformed Communists in Poland, Ukrainian Socialists and Communists
are "not regarded as safe custodianls] of state power" (172-73). This has meant that no leftof-center party is an actual competitor for government. That even the leftists recognize
their ineffectiveness is demonstrated by what Wilson describes as the genuine surprise of
Communist leader Petro Symonenko when President Leonid Kuchma suggested appointing
a leftist prime minister (2002b, 193).
Part of the reason for the left's continued illegitimacy is its own obstructionism. As
Wilson notes, "Nonconstructive opposition to the government in Kiev is actually a position
of considerable psychological comfort to the Communists" (2002b, 193). He observes,
"The Ukrainian Communists are even more unreformed than their Russian counterparts ...
[and the party] also remains one of the most left-wing parties in the post-Soviet world"
(189-90). One of their most destructive influences has been opposition to economic
reforms. The parliament elected in 1998, with a Communist plurality but not majority,
was particularly obtrusive. In January of 1999 a bid to abolish the presidency failed by only
t\vo votes. "This was a distinctly anti-presidential and anti-governmental Parliament ...
[and] it continued to be a distincdy ornery Parliament" (Harasymiw 2002, 291)." Changing
this situation will require more than just systemic reform or the effect of time on democratic consolidation it will also require inrernal transformation by the parties themselves.
Whereas a Communist electoral victory was certainly not a complete impossibility in
1999 or earlier, the right is natllrally limited in its electoral appeal by its nationalist program.
"The permanent government of the corporate centre is paradoxically the result both of the
[electoral] weakness of the right and the [electoral] strength of the left" (Harasymiw 2002,
173). The political event that has perhaps most shaped independent Ukraine was the socalled "Grand Bargain" bet\Veen the Rukh nationalists and the National Communist
defectors under former president Kravchuk. The Grand Bargain came about namely because
of the weakness of the nationalists. "The Ukrainian nationalists, uncomfortably aware of
their own minority status, have supported non-party, supposedly 'centrist' corporate government from the outside (with a few key ministries for themselves), so long as it has been
sufficiently 'Ukrainian'" (Harasymiw 2002, 173).
Two major problems with the right's nationalist platform limit the electoral strength of
the right-wing parties. First, their Ukrainian nationalist ptogram is highly regionalized:
"voters in Galicia and parts of central Ukraine will back it come what may ... [bur] this
guaranteed support represents a maximum of only 20-25% of the electorate" (172). In
addition, the nationalist movements are not just unpopular east of central Ukraine, but the
southeastern oblasts might very likely refuse even to accept any nationalist government.
"The very stability of the state would be threatened if the national question were to be
reopened" (206). Just as Wilson predicts that "Ukraine would split and one half would
fight" (2002b, 316) if reintegration with Russia was attempted, the same would occur if
the more extreme elements among the nationalists came to power.
The second problem is that the nationalist platform has essentially run out its logical
course. The first t\Vo presidents of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma and Leonid
Kravchuk, enacted 1110st of the official projects that the nationalists set out to undertake in
the area of nation building. The right "has begun to lose momentum, as its political agenda
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has seemingly been implemented by centrist proxy" (174). The only remaining nationalist
agenda is necessarily extreme and would most likely lead to severe crises like those previously
discussed. As Wilson wrote early on, "The right was never able to build any momentum.
Despite the hope constantly expressed that it could expand in the key target area of central
Ukraine and build on pockets of support in the east and south, the results of parliamentary
elections in J 994 and J 998 showed that it could not, with support for the national democrats ... even falling in some places" (I79). Without new and innovative platforms, the
right will continue to decline in electoral strength and will be more and more subject ro
the whims of the messy center. In other words, at present the prospects for rapid party
consolidation are not promising.
PARTY THEORY IN THE POST-SOCIALIST WORLD: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

In analyzing the development of party systems in Ukraine and elsewhere, traditionally, an
institutional approach has held sway in the field of comparative politics. Recent research,
however, has shown that such an approach has only limited applicability to the problems
of party consolidation and institutionalization in newly democratizing countries of Southern
and Eastern Europe. The nonconsolidation of the party system in the face of institutional
reforms, however, makes these arguments unconvincing explanations for why parties in
Ukraine have not coalesced. In place of these institutional explanations, however, most
comparative political scientists have relied on cultural explanations while ignoring the elitemotivator approach. While there is certainly a place for culrural factors in studies of party
consolidation and institutionalization, and evidence to support such explanations, these
approaches have generally succumbed to some of the problems typical of cultural methodologies (Ross 1997, 60-67). Particularly noticeable is the lack of consideration of elitemotivator factors. This research will support recent conclusions about the institutional
approach, specifically in relation to Ukraine and then, in its place, provide arguments in
favor of an elite-motivator method of explaining party consolidation (or the lack thereof)
in Ukraine.
One of the earliest and still most respected works on party systems is Maurice
Duverger's Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (J 963).
Other significant works that have continued the institutional program include William
Riker's chapter on Duverger's law in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences
(Grofman and Lijphard 1986) and Giovanni Sartori's work, including Parties and Party
Systems (1976). These authors focus on institutional constraints on party activity. They assign
particular importance to electoral law and the institutions of representation in legislative
systems. Applications of the institutional paradigm to post-Socialist cases in Eastern Europe
and former Soviet Union have shown it to be an ineffective explanation tor the unsuccessful
development of strong party systems in those countries. For example, in the context of the
former Soviet Union, the general expectation is that the introduction of a proportional
representation system will lead to a reduction in the number of parties, rather than an
Illcrease.
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Several studies have applied the institutional approach specifically in research on
Ukrainian politics. These include D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio's Politics and Society
in [Jlm/ine (1999), in which the authors provide cultural as well as institutional explanations
for the weakness of the party system in Ukraine (150). They also note the effect of regionalism (153), which Douglas Rae studied generally in an institutional context in Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (1971). D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio's conclusions, however,
focus exclusively on institutional elements; and thus their study misses important implications
of elite actions, which will be shown below (1999, 163). Sarah Birch-a specialist on
Ukrainian elections, takes a similar approach in her study of changes in electoral law
in Ukraine, under the assumption that such laws are the primary explanatory variable of
party system operation (Birch et al. 2002). In a chapter in Contemporary Ukraine (Kuzio
1998), Birch attempts to discount rationality as an independent variable by showing that
voter choice is extremely limited largely because of problems with regionalism (l42).s She
concludes, based on an institutional approach, that Ukraine can be described as a "protoparty system" that "is not conducive to further party.'system development" (150). Again,
nonconsolidation of the party system in the face of institutional reforms makes these
arguments unconvincing explanations as to why parties in Ukraine have not coalesced as they
have in the Baltic states or in Poland. Because the rejection of rationality-based explanations
has focused heavily on voter rationality, the problems resulting from overlooking
elite-motivator explanations become even more obvious when evidence of the impact of elite
actions is taken into consideration.
In the earlier literature, Matthew S. Shugart is alone in proposing a multifaceted
approach to party system evaluation. His chapter in Liberalization and Leninist Legacies,
edited by Beverly Crawford and Arend l.ijpharr (1997), describes how rational politicians
acting within transitional structures and institutions create the long-term institutions that
affect party systems (7.3-74). Shugart does not rule out culture as an important explanatoty
variable (74); however, he provides no in-depth discussion of such factors. Without a
discussion of what a cultutal approach can and cannot explain, an automatic reversion to
cultural explanations does not increase understanding of the democratic consolidation
process.
A radical shift away from the dominance of institutional approaches, which even
called into question the inviolability of Duverger's law, was effected by Gary W. Cox in
his 1997 book Making Votes Count." Cox makes an observation about DlIverger's law that
is particularly applicable to Ukraine. He cites a "powerful national executive" as a key
factor for institutionalizing political parties (182-93). In Ukraine, however, neither Leonid
Kravchllk nor Leonid Kuchma have found it necessary to formally affiliate with a political
party, thus presenting one possible explanation for Ukraine's weak party system. Krzysztof
Jasiewicz continued Sartori's and Cox's work in a 1992 article, "From Solidarity to Fragmentation." Jasiewicz studied party fragmentation in Poland that did not accord with the
expectations of an institutional approach.
Others who showed that perhaps an institutional methodology cannot "travel" to
Southern and Eastern Europe include Marko Bojcun (1995), who studied the 1994
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Ukrainian parliamemary elections, and Robert Moser, whose "The Impact of Parliamemary
Electoral Systems in Russia" (1997) looked at the discrepancy between what might be
expected under an institutional model and what was observed in the behavior of Russian
political parties.
The first to make a study of political party systems specific to Ukraine after the collapse
of the Soviet Union was Andrew Wilson (I 993).'" He considered three theoretical
approaches to understanding the weakness of the party system: strucrural "bottom-up,"
structural "top-down," and political culture approaches. Due to the fact that this study was
made ten years ago (before the Communist Party had recovered from irs ban) and that
Wilson draws no conclusion as to the relative value of these three approaches, another
look at the Ukrainian political system is merited."
Robert Moser's more recent article "Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in
Postcommunist States" (1999) provides rhe best evidence for questioning an instirutional
approach to srudying party systems in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. He
hypothesizes that the applicability of Duverger's law and other institutional paradigms
"will be mitigated by the [degreel of institutionalization of the party system" (360). Moser
makes his case using a quantitative analysis comparing party results in the two-tiered
parliaments of Russia, Poland, Lithuania, and Hungary. (Each of these country's parliaments includes members elected using a proportional-represemation system-the PR
tier-and members elected from single-member districts-the SMD tier.) Moser includes
Ukraine in the study, but only the 1994 parliamentary election before a proportional
representation system was introduced. Perhaps this is imended as a comrol variable; however, Moser offers no such explanation; and hence Ukraine figures only marginally imo his
comparison of tiers (see Moser's T.1ble 3).12 In light of Ukraine's importance among former
Soviet republics, it seems that this oversight could potentially cast doubt on Moser's conclusions, particularly as this leaves only Russia representing non-Baltic former Soviet states.
While Moser provides sufficient theolY and evidence to show that traditional institutional
explanations cannot be applied to consolidating democracies of the post-socialist world, he
offers no in-depth explanation of his new indepcndem variable-party institutionalization.
Instead he discusses causal factors afTecting party insrirurionaliLarion. all of which are
basically cui rural in nature. Essentially Moser has rejected the established instirutional
explanations and left nothing in their place except for a few sentences about cui rural elemems
of post-Soviet societies (373). This oversight is exacerbared by Moser's rejection of any elitemotivator explanations for mass or elite party behavior. Rationality in voting habits has
never been in favor, due to the major limitations on voter choice mentioned previously in
Birch's studies. The only reason to reject rationality in elire or party behavior-except as a
consequence of the impossibility of voter rationality-is Moser's quantitative evidence
about party fractionalization. In the case of Ukraine, it seems that Moser's conclusions
are based on an insufficient understanding of the data used in his study. This work will
attempt to evaluate whether Moser's conclusions about institutional explanations are
appropriate.
The work of Andrew Wilsoll, which has covered all of the parliamentaty and presidential
elections since Ukraine's independence (2002b), provides ample reason to conclude that
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Moser's inferences about the rationality of political actors ought to be questioned. His
study of the most recent presidential election (2002a) particularly shows that there is reason
to believe that eI ite-motivator factors are the most pertinent explanatOlY variables at the elite
level. This research aims to fill the gaps in Moser's data and analysis to add Ukraine to the
list of countries that do not follow the expectations outlined by an institutional approach
to party systems and also to support an explanation of the weak party system in Ukraine
based on elite-motivator explanations.

METHODOLOGY

The research is designed as a case study of four Ukrainian elections (three parliamentary
and one presidential), looking at various approaches of explaining the development of the
Ukrainian parliamentary system. The first part of the study evah\ates changes in indicators
of party fractionalization and consolidation during two parliamentary elections (1994 and
1998), held under different institutional arrangements. These two elections were chosen
because they represent two different institutional arrangements, thus allowing the opportunity for analyzing institutional factors with variance in the independent variable. Statistical
results and analysis have been provided in an attempt to bolster the quantitative research
previously done in the field. The measures of party fractionalization I will use include
an effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties (calculated, respectively, by comparing the proportion of the vote and proportion of parliamentary seats received by each
party)" and the least-squares index of disproportionality (calculated according to the
difference between the previous two measures).l4
The second half of the study is a qualitative analysis of three elections (the parliamentary
elections of 1998 and 2002 and the presidential election of 1999) with the purpose of
testing to what degree the rational actions of political elites (to further their own ends)
perpetuate the party fractionalization and nonconsolidation represented in the first half
of the study. The purpose of this parr of the study is to show that the elite-motivator
approach-considered independently, or as a more specific subset of cultural explanationscan be used as an alternative to the institutional descriptions that have proven insufficient
in explaining the development of political parties. These three elections were selected
because they are most recent and thus provide the most accurate picture of the current state
of party politics in Ukraine.
Several limitations will affect the conclusions presented by the research and will be
addressed. As a case study, the research is subject to the recurrent problems connected with
case studies and small-n size in general, along with problems of case selection. This
includes the possibility of lurking variables, as well as the fact that analysis over time is
difficult due to the short history of independence of Ukraine (twelve years). One significant
advantage of the choice of Ukrainian cases, however, is the benefits of comparing multiple
elections in a single country and the future possibilities of combining this case study with
others as part of a larger project with multiple case studies.
Although an attempt has been made to include statistical indicators, such data from two
parliamentary elections does not pretend to make this study quantitative. The research relies
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heavily on qualitative data and analysis-concrete conclusions from the research will have
limited explanatory value outside the area of focus. Without a larger sample size, including
cases from a variety of world regions, it is unclear the degree to which the conclusions
developed from this research should be applied to all post-socialist states, the Eastern European
region, or generally. Without comparing cases with more signifIcant variations in the status
of elite actors, more general conclusions cannot be drawn about the causal relationship of
elite-motivator explanations and party fragmentation. Additionally, it is impossible to
determine to what degree the status of elite actors in Ukraine is tied to cultural factors and
thus to what degree elite-motivator explanations ought to be distinguished from more general
cultural explanations. While a single case study is only a beginning, an in-depth study can
contribute with other studies to develop a more complete theoretical understanding of the
regIOn.

THE CAsE AGAINST AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH:
THE

1994 AND 1998

UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

In his 1994 study of electoral systems, Arend Lijpharr wrote that when a country undergoes a change in its electoral arrangements "many potentially important explanatory variables
can be controlled in the sense that they can be assumed not to differ or to differ only
marginally: the same country, the same political parries, the same voters, and so on" (78).
This potential is reduced in Ukraine, as it might be in any newly democratizing country,
in that the political system has been less stable than in an established democracy. This is
particularly true in regards to political parries, which have come and gone with regularity.
Nevertheless, the comparison of nyo Ukrainian parliamentary elections, under different
institutional arrangements (see Table 2), presents a unique opportunity to evaluate the
explanatory power oran institutional approach to understanding the Ukrainian parry system.
Table 2: Electoral Arrangements in Three Parliamentary Elections
Election

System Type

Single-Member Districts

1994

-rwo-round singlemember districts

450; two rounds, absolute
N/A
majority required in second
round

1998-

Mixed SMD/PR

225

present

Proportional
Representation Seat
Allocation

22,); party lists (distributed by Hare quota)

PR Threshold

N/A

4%

Source: Birch, Sarah, Frances Millard, Marina Popescu, and Kieran Williams. 2002. Embodying

democracy: Electoral system desigll ill post-Commullist Europe. New York: l'algrave Macmillan. 144.

One of the primary failures of the institutional approach in Eastern Europe is its
prediction that single-member district systems have fewer parties than proportional
representation systems. In former Soviet republics, single-member district seats have traditionally been associated with electoral unaccountability and a proliferation of parties.
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Therefore, "proportional representation [is] seen ... as the system most likely to generate
accountable majority government. ... Though this may seem strange to comparative students
of electoral systems, it made sense in the post-Soviet context, where party-list voting combined
with a relatively high threshold of representation worked as an engine of party consolidation"
(Birch 2002, 153). In Ukraine, as the electoral system moved away from single-member
districts towards a proportional representation scheme, the expectation would be that the
number of political parties would decrease; that is, parties would become less fractionalized,
and the parties would become more consolidated, because of the large number of unaffIliated
deputies elected from single-member districts. As this comparison will show, however,
institutional explanations are disappointingly ineffectual.

THE

1994 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The first set of institutional arrangements under which Ukrainian elections were held (the
1994 election) were developed by a national legislan,1re that was elected before Ukraine
declared independence, "literally in a different country," as Birch put it (2002, 147). In the
years since independence, over three dozen political parties had developed; however "most
were little more than coteries of elites, with severely underdeveloped grassroots support
bases and little ideological distinctiveness" (147). Several factors played a role in the
development of the electoral retorm that would regulate the next set of parliamentary elections. Although elections were not scheduled to be held until 1995, parliament's legitimacy
was undercut by the hlCt that it was elected under the Soviet system. Additionally, the state of
the economy had continually worsened since the collapse of the U.S.S.R., leading to further
frustration with post-independence governance. Another factor that Birch notes as significant
was the reconstitution of the Communist Party (banned after the August Coup) and the
Russian parliamentary crisis of the previous year, which featured Yeltsin shelling a confrontational, left-dominated parliament into submission and calling for new elections
under a mixed PR-SMD system (146-47). All of these factors were important in the
process leading to electoral retorm.
The primary debate in the Verkhovna Rada about the proposal for electoral reform
centered around whether or not to introduce some element of a proportional representation
system, and if so, to what degree. In this dispute, the leftists-Socialists and newly
enfranchised Communists-unaffiliated deputies, and pro-presidential forces generally
opposed the establishment of a proportional representation element. They argued that the
country was not ready for this type of reform because Ukrainian parties were weak. Those
in favor of a mixed or entirely proportional system were the right and center-right parties.
Their argument was that a proportional representation system would help to strengthen
the parties and encourage the Rada to organize itself around parties.
A key element of the debate was the nominating procedures for candidates. This was
a question of the old local patronage systems versus the new, national or regional parties.
"The distinction between PR and the majoritarians was also viewed in terms of the
corruptibility of the latter. The right saw the single-member system as a means for the old
nomenklatura-the so-called 'party of power'-to maintain control of politics through
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their patronage networks .... A law which down played party affiliation had the added
advantage of allowing the 'party of power' to win seats without having to resort overtly to
a label designating a discredited ideology" (149). In the Soviet Union, nominations for
candidates had generally been made by workplace-based groups. If parties were to be effective
players in the legislature, they would have to be given at least the opportunity to nominate
candidates, if not complete control of the process.
In Shugart's study of party strength, he writes: "The concept of a strong party implies
a party that is capable of presenting a coherent face to the voters so that they can asses its
collective fitness for government ... Electoral laws atTecr ... how much authority is placed
in the hands of party leaders to determine the rank and file's electoral prospects." One of
his four indicators of party strength is whether or not the party controls who may run as a
member of the parry and in what order they are elected (1997, 44-45). In the end, the
left-wing forces saw allowing parties to nominate candidates (as well as continuing the traditional methods) and indicating the party affiliation of single-member district candidates'
on the ballot as sufficient steps to promote party consolidation (Birch 2002, 149). As
discussed previously, in the process of democratic consolidation, the role of party consolidation has been shown to be important, ·especially in countries without a tradition of
strong civil society.
Four plans were put to a vote in the Rada: a pure single-member district version, a 350
SMDIlOO PR version, a 50-50 mixed version, and a pure proportional representation version.
Although Communist and Socialist leaders had demonstrated willingness to compromise,
even to the point of allowing the 50-50 version, the pure single-member district version
received a majority of votes, with the 50-50 and pure proportional-representation versions receiving less than a third as many votes. With the scheduled elections just over four
months away, the subsequent drafting was rushed and, as a result, some unintentional
elements wound up in the final draft. First, an absolute majority, not just a plurality, was
required for victory in the second round of voting." Second, the incredibly diftlcult process
for candidate nominations by parties is most probably explained by the fact that those
requiremems were originally intended to apply to party lists in a mixed or proportional
represelllation system (Birch 2002, 150-51). Whereas any ten voters could consti[Ute a
group to nominate a candidate, and there were no requirements for workers' collectives
to nominate a candidate, party regional conferences (the only forum in which parties
could nominate candidates) had to be attended by 50 delegates or two-thirds of local party
members (Birch 2000, 82).
The results of these apparent mistakes were disastrous. Out of the 450 districts, only
49 were able to meet the strict majority requirements, and the successive election the next
month produced only 289 more, meaning that by the opening of the parliament, only
about three-quarters of the seats had been filled. Elections to till the remaining seats
continued well into 1996 (nearly two years later), umil a moratorium on elections was
passed to give a weary electorate a respite. The effects of the overly burdensome requirements
for candidates to be nominated by parties meam that only about ten percent of candidates
were nominated by parries, compared with over sixty percent by citizen groups and about
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a quarrer by workers' collectives (Birch 2000, 82), Over half of the deputies elected were
unaffiliated, although all but twenty joined various parries once the session began
(Harasymiw 2002,258-59). 'The most striking difference berween the candidate corpuses
of 1990 and 1994 was the overall decline in political identification .... Candidates ...
were far less likely to be party-aHiliatd" (Birch 2000, 89).'"
The effect on party consolidation-so important in democratic consolidation-was
apparent (see '[able 3). "The Soviet-era majoritarian system was left largely unchanged, and
those alterations that were made proved detrimental to the development of organized
multi-party competition" (82). The legislation "undeniably hindered the development of
cohesive political parries" (Birch 2002, 151). These effects continued to be observed long
after the convocation of parliament began. By 1996, the nine party groups that existed in
1994 had become rwelve and the number of unaHiliated deputies had almost doubled. The
Agrarian Party, Interregional bloc, and the Unity Party all suffered splits. At the end of the
parliamentary convocation in 1998, there were once again nine parry blocs-different,
however, from the original nine-and the caucus of the unaHiliated had doubled yet again
(Harasymiw 2002,268).
Table 3: Measures of Party Fractionalization, 1994 Election

IPR Tier

ISMD Tzer

Case

Effective
Number of
Eletoral
Parties

Effccti\'e
,,"umber of
Parliamentary
Parties

Least-Squares Index Effective
of
Number of
I )isproportionality Electoral
Parties

1994

N/A

0!/A

N/A

2.1681

Effective
Least-Squares Index
Number of
of
Parliamentary Disproportionality
Parties

1.4691

0.2907

1998

THE

1998

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

The badly needed changes to the 1994 electoral law were delayed until just two months
before the subsequent parliamentary elections in I 998-four years later. Parliament in the
interim had been preoccupied with passing the country's first constitution in the era of
independence. "The new constitution effectively entrenched the institutional status quo,
but its adoption ended years of jockeying for power and wrangling over the design of the
state" and allowed parliament to redirect its attention to electoral reform (Birch 2000, 102,
104). During this period, the same problems that had plagued the previous convocation continued: parliamentary flCtions appeared and disappeared, but the quagmire of the center
remained muddled. "Factions formed, dissolved, and reformed to such an extent that by
1998 the political structure of the assembly bore only a vague resemblance to the party
aHiliations of the deputies elected four years earlier.... The region between [the Communist
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and Rukh strongholds] was one of continued flux as aspirant leaders strove to attract followings from among the weakly-aligned centrist mass of the parliament" (102).
Birch outlines several factors that led to broad support for reform. Some parties, such as
the Socialist and Rural parties had both failed to meet expectations in the 1994 election; other
parties, such as the Communists, taking their cue from the 1993 Russian elections, saw the
potential windfall that the introduction of a proportional-representation element might
bring. The left-wing parties also realized that, as institutions, they had more in common with
the institutionalized parties of the right than the unaffiliated deputies (2002, 153).
Furthermore, there was general recognition that the large number of parties and unaffiliated deputies made parliament ineffective. The situation was exacerbated by Kuchma's
hostility towards parliament, which added a sense of urgency for parliament to become
a decisive body. Kuchma's relationship with parliament is characterized at its extreme by
the parliament's attempt early in 1999 to abolish the presidency and by Kuchma's second
inaugaration in 1999, which he decided to hold in a concert hall rather than in parliament.
As a result, nearly 160 deputies did not attend, as a sign of protest (Harasymiw 2002,

291,294).
In addition to the obvious changes to the electoral system that nearly all agreed needed
to be made after the interminable by-elections that resulted from the previous electoral system in 1994, there was also a feeling action should be taken to strengthen the party
system so that parliament would operate in a more effective manner. The general consensus
was in favor of a mixed system such as had been used in Russia in 1993 and 1995. The primary points of disputation were whether some lesser type of turnout requirement should be
retained, what percentage of the seats should be elected by proportional representation, and
how high the threshold for parties should be in a proportional-representation system.
Early on in the process, five proposals were considered by parliament. There were three
bills similar to the draft presented by a working committee of the Legal Policy and Judicial
Reform Committee, which proposed that half of the seats be elected from a national
proportional-representation list with a three percent threshold. The other proposal was for
a pure proportional-representation system, also with a three percent threshold. Proponents of
proportional representation maintained that single-member district seats were too easily
bought, while their opponents claimed it would not be any more difficult to buy an entire
national list. One of the alrernate versions of the working group's proposal received the
most votes, and a compromise with broad support was worked out with only one major
revision: a four percent threshold. This bill passed with little opposition in March of 1997
(Birch 2002,155-56).
Backing for the proposal, however, quickly disappeared as presidential supporters
instigated active opposition. Kuchma was "wary of increased party organization by either
his left-wing or his right-wing rivals. He therefore opposed a proportional law, especially
one with a threshold that would exclude his centrist allies and magnify the seat share of the
large parties" (154). The better organized parties also threatened to withdraw support, as
they naturally favored a higher threshold level. Some members of smaller parties, centrists,
and unaffiliated deputies continued to favor a purely single-member district arrangement.
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These members' position intensified when they realized that a proportional-representation
system with a low threshold would not pass.
This led to the bill's failure in nine successive votes, the introduction of two alternate
proposals by presidential supporters, and finally by a presidential veto with a proposal for
fifteen amendments when the bill finally did pass. After parliament accepted twelve of the
president's proposed amendments, Kuchma finally acquiesced and signed the bill on October 22. This was not the end of obstacles to electoral reform, though. In February of 1998,
with the parliamentary campaign already well underway, the Constitutional Court "delivered
a scathing ruling, declaring the law was unconstitutional on more than forty counts." The
Court ruled, however, that because it was so late in the process, the elections could proceed
under the law (I '56-57).
In Birch's analysis of the new law, she notes several important advantages. "The law
provided an incentive for political entrepreneurs ro form parties, .rather than relying on the
local fidaoms to gain scats .... At the same time it recognized the geographical heterogeneity
of Ukrainian politics by allowing political organizations with concentrated regional support
the opportunity to win seats locally without having to demonstrate national strength."
Birch also notes, however, that the introduction of a proportional representation element
with a relatively low threshold encouraged a number of new parties to form. Seventeen
new parries formed between the 1994 and 1998 elections, and ten formed just in the year
preceding the 1998 election (2000, 104).
In hindsight, the adoption of a four percent threshold rather than the five-percent level
more standard in proportional-representation systems may have been fortuitous. Of the
eight parties that cleared the four-percent threshold, four received less than five percent of
the proportional representation vote. Three of these four were centrist parties, meaning
that a five-percent threshold would have left two parties on the left (CPU and Socialists),
one on the right (National Democrats), and only one centrist party (Social Democrats) to
represent the political spectrum. As Wilson and Birch write, "the elections came within a
whisker of producing an artificially polarized assembly" (1999, 1041). D'Anieri, Kravchuk,
and Kuzio, however, disagree. They cite the four-percent threshold as one of the new
electoral law's weaknesses that undermine the consolidation of parties because of a low
incentive for parties to combine in order to pass the threshold requirement (I999, 156).
The effect of introducing a proportional-representation element into the electoral system
appears to be small. In qualitative terms, parties were no more consolidated than under the
previous arrangements. In parliament, "factions formed, dissolved, and reformed to such an
extent that by 1998 the political structure of the assembly bore only a vague resemblance to
the parry affiliations of the deputies elected four years earlier" (Birch 2000, 102). The failure
of right-wing parties to consolidate is evidenced by their poor showing in the
proportional-representation list. After the deputies were seated, the lack of consolidation
was manifest by the fact that it took nineteen rounds to elect a speaker (105, 107). In
quantitative terms as well, the lack of change is clear (see Table 4). The effective number
of electoral parties was essentially unchanged, while the single-member districts tier experienced an increase in electoral parties, contrary to expectations. Least-squares measures of
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disproportionality, difficult to calculate due to the large number of independents, also
showed little difference.
The results of institutional change in electoral arrangements, specifIcally the introduction
of a proportional-representation element, demonstrate the weakness of the institutional
approach to studying Ukrainian political party development. Traditional expectations that
proportional-representation would increase the number of parties do nor hold-as we
would predict based on other post-socialist countries. The alternate expectation (under an
institutional paradigm) that such electoral reform would produce party consolidation also
does not hold. Having demonstrated the inability of institutional explanations to describe
these developments in the Ukrainian parliamentary system, we now turn to an e1itemotivator paradigm for further explanation.
Table 4: Measures of Parry Fractionalization, 1998 Election
SMD Tier

PR Tier
Case

Effective
Numher of
Electoral
Partics

1994 N/A
1998

10.7473

Effective
Numher of
Parliamentary
Partics

least-Squares Index Effective
of
Number of
I)isproportionaliry Electoral
Parries

Effective

N/A

N/A

L1681

1.4691

0,2907

4,9549

0.2907

2, 9896

3,2;'96

0,0271

I,cast-Squares

Number of
Index of
Parliamentary f) isp "'p') rrin n al iry
Parric\

THE CASE FOR AN ELITE-MOTIVATOR APPROACH:
THREE ELECTIOl'lS UNDER KUCHMA

(1998, 1999,2002)

The problems with the Ukrainian system of political parties can be described in two general
categories: first, a lack of parry consolidation important in the process of democratic
consolidation and, second, continued party fractionalization. The data previously introduced
provides ample evidence for fractionalization, while much has been written qualitatively
about the nonconsolidated nature of Ukrainian political parties. It is sufficient here to
mention the problems outlined in the brief overview of political parties presented earlier:
the illegitimacy of the left, the electoral weakness of the right, and the resulting incoherence
in the center. Due to the illegitimate left and the weak right, the center parties are essentially
guaranteed the leading role in government. "The Ukrainian centre 'parties' have therefore
governed by default and their long free ride has not been good for Ukraine" (Wilson
2002b,206).
Stagnation, corruption, and abuse of power are three major problems engendered by
such a situation. Examples of these three woes include the stagnation of political and
economic reforms by oligarchs seeking to preserve a status quo beneficial to themselves;
corruption in the political process by centrist party members who are not forced to court
the public in the fair and open forum of a democratic market of ideas; abuse of power by
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incumbents to preserve the illegitimacy of the left and the electoral weakness of the right.
So long as this situation continues it will be difficult for true reformist-liberals or centrist
parties-those that will promote the democratic consolidation of Ukraine-to be successful
in Ukrainian politics.
While others have concluded that voters and elites alike suHer from a lack of rational
behavior-based on evidence that institutional factors cannot adequately explain these
observed problems-a closer look at the machinations of the political elite will show that
the status quo is intentionally, and rationally, preserved for the benefit of those incumbents
in power. Three elections will illustrate these points: the 1999 presidential election provides
an example of elite behavior that promotes nonconsolidation, while the 1998 and 2002
parliamentary elections offer evidence that elite actors deliberately promote party fractionalization to achieve their own ends. 80th of these results, in turn, negatively impact the
course of Ukrainian democratic consolidation.
Those in the center and on the right have prolonged the unreformed state of the left
because they find it beneficial as a campaign issue. They have perpetuated the distrust of
leftists as legitimate partners in government, and this is one of the major obstacles to the
consolidation of a party sy5t(:m in Ukraine. This is especially true in comparison with other
post-socialist countries where the former Communist Party has transformed itself into a
viable political movement. Centrists and rightists know that as long as they can continue
the present situation they are guaranteed at least one issue on which they can run. "The
centre has even come to prefer the maintenance of a left-wing bogey to keep the range of
governing options narrow and disguise their own lack of will for real reform" (Wilson
2002b, 206).'

THE

1999 PRESIDENTIAL El.ECTION

The "red-scare" tactic was especially obvious 111 Kuchma's 1999 re-election campaign.
"Kuchma obviously preferred to face a real ogre on the left. ... Both Vitrenko [of the
ultra-leftist Progressive Socialist Party] and Symonenko, leader of the Communists, were
discretely supported as alternatives to the potentially more [electable and thus] threatening
'Ukrainian Kwasniewski,' Oleksamlr Moroz .... The left had to be kept in its ghetto. Any
potential breakout to the center had to be headed oW' (200). It was even reported that the
Kuchma campaign was responsible for a grenade attack against Vitrenko and the subsequent blame for the attack heaped on Moroz's supporters. "The media [controlled by the
President and his supporters] seemed to favor Vitrenko over Moroz [and] observers, both
journalistic and official . . . were of one opinion about the campaign-it was dirty"
(Harasymiw 2002, 323). As Bohdan Harasymiw wrote, "Whom or what did Kuchma
represent? In short. as the campaign revealed, it was power, and the political parties fragmentation worked in his favour" (323).
The sinister nature of these tactics was exacerbated by incumbent spending power and
absolute control of the mass media. "During the campaign the government-controlled
mass media were grossly one-sided in favour of Kuchma. The taxation authorities and
other police harassed the independent media outlets" (323). The anti-party tactics were
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apparent as early as the 1994 presidential campaign (see note 1 1) and were again evident
in the 2002 parliamentary elections. In 2002, Vitrenko was resurrected "after her cameo
performance in the presidential election ... [and] was once again omnipresent-this time
with only few of her own advertisements but with plenty of talking-head time on official
television" (Wilson 2002a, 96). This final example shows that the tactics of preserving the
nonconsolidation of the left spilled over from the 1999 elections to the 2002 elections. From
a consideration of presidential campaigns, we now turn to a discussion of parliamentary
elections. If the 1999 presidential elections are a perfect example of elite behavior maintaining party nonconsolidation, the 2002 parliamentary elections show how the same
actors used the same tactics to extend party fractionalization, once again intentionally and
rationally, in order to achieve their own ends.

THE

1998

AND

2002

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

Like the promotion of nonconsolidation, maneuvers to prolong party fractionalization,
although perfected in the 2002 elections, actually began earlier. Such tactics had first been
employed four years earlier in the 1998 parliamentary elections. In 1998, however, only
"clones" had been used ("clones," Wilson's term, were parties designed to steal votes that
would reduce opponents' shares of parliamentary seats; Wilson and Birch at that time
rderred to them as "spoiler" parties)-not "satellites" (parties designed to capture seats that
could then be added to the presidential coalition), and they had been employed only
against the left (see Table 5). The Agrarian Party was created to challenge the Village party
in rural areas; two different parties, one labor-based and one with a nostalgic appeal, were
set up to take on the Communist Party; and, a division was engineered in the Socialist Party
to create the Progressive Socialist Party, which was rumored to be receiving direct aid from
pro-presidential forces, in spite of the tact that its members continued caucllsing with
the left. Indeed, the success of the "spoilers" in 1998 may have been even greater than that
of the "clones" four years later (Wilson and Birch 1999, 1041, 104.1).
Table 5: 1998 Parliamentary Election Spoiler Parties
Spoiler Party

"Spoiling" from

% ofPR vote

Agrarian Parry

Village Parry

3.6R%

Working Ukraine

Communist Parry of Ukraine (trade unions)

3.06%

Parry of Defenders of the Fatherland

Communist Party of Ukraine (veterans)

O.Jl')'o

Progressive Socialist Parry

Socialist Party

4.05%

Source: Wilson, Andrew, and Sarah Birch. 1999. Voting stability, political gridlock:
Ukraine's 1998 parliamentary elections. Europe-Asia Studies 51 (September):
1039-68.
In 2002, while mainta1l1111g nonconsolidation was the presidential team's prderred
tactic for dealing with the left, engineering fractionalization was their modus operandi for
opponents on the right. Rukh (Ukrainian for "movement"), the main opposition group
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during the Soviet era, was subject to crippling disunity early on in the period of independence. At their third congress, the first after Ukrainian independence, the movement broke
into three factions and has remained more or less divided ever since. IH Additionally, a number
of ultra-nationalist (right-wing) parties sprang up in western Ukraine, further weakening
Rukh (Wilson 2002b, 178-79). Just as they had during the presidential election of 1994,
the right quickly sold their support to the incumbent based on his record of Ukrainian
state-building (their primary concern), but just to be safe Kuchmas reelection campaign
organized one more split of Rukll to ensure that the president would have no competition
on his right (200).
The party-splitting practiced in the 1999 presidential elections gave way to even more
advanced techniques of promoting party fractionalization in the 2002 parliamentary elections.
\V'ilson's analysis of the president's campaign ourlines a three-pronged plan to bolster
Kuchma's influence in parliament. The first part of the plan proposed creating a Ukrainian
version of the Russian Yedinsrvo Party that had enjoyed parliamentary success in the Russian
Duma elections earlier that year. The second parr of the plan, however, was the creation of
a number of "satellite" and "clone" parties. They were designed to mimic other parties and
steal votes from them; in the case of the "satellites," in order to capture seats that could
then be added to the presidential coalition modeled on Yedinstvo; in the case of "clones,"
votes that would reduce opponents' shares of parliamentary seats.
In the 2002 election "at least a dozen of the 33 parties and party blocs running in the
elections were artificial projects with opaque sponsorship and nefarious purposes .... All
such parties, however, were virtual in the sense of being nothing more than brands or fronts
and vehicles for [other] issues" (Wilson 2002a, 94). (See tables 6 and 7). By merely increasing the number of parties in the campaign artificially, the actions of the president's interests increased party fractionalization. Wilson gives two types of evidence of the "front"
nature of these parties. First, by analyzing the party lists, supporters of the president and
their business associates appear in parties incongruous to the individuals' identities-such
as men in the Women for the Future Party, the aged in the youth-oriented New Generation
Party, and executives from highly polluting industrial sectors in the Green Party. Second,
all the "satellite" parties spent vast amounts on television campaigns (some even more than
the president's own coalition and the chief opposition party, "Our Ukraine") that were
developed by expensive Russian public relations firms. These parties were also given
inordinate exposure in the state-controlled media and by television stations owned by
presidential supp~rters (94-95).
Table 6: 2002 Parliamentary Election Satellite Parties
Satellite Parties

% ofPR vote

\VOl11el1 for the Future

2.11%

\Vinter Crop

2.01%

Green Party

1..3%
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Table 7: 2002 Parliamentary Election Clone Parties
Clone Parties

"Cloned" from

% ofPR vote

Vitrenko Bloc

Ultra-left

.3.22%

Communist Party of\1(1orkers and Peasants

Communist Party of Ukraine (left tacrion)

0.41%

Communist Parry of Ukraine (renewed)

Communist Parry of Ukraine (right bcion)

1.4%

Bloc of the People's Movement of Ukraine

Our Ukraine

0.16%

Yabluko

Center/Ref(lrmists

1.15%

New Generation

Center/Reformists

0.77%

Source: Wilson. Andrew. 2002b. Ukraine's 2002 eleerions: i.e'S fraud, more virruality. Em Furopean
Cowtitutional Review II (summer): <)6.

In the end, however, only half of this part of the plan was successful. The "clone" parties
succeeded in drawing votes from Our Ukraine, the Socialists, the Communists, and others,
but the "satellites" failed simply because there were too many of them, and they crowded each
other out of the fteld. Unlike the Progressive Socialist Parry that met the threshold requirement in 1998, none of the "satellite" parties in 2002 broke the four-percent requirement
to win seats in the Verkhovna Rada.
Reviewing elite actions in these three elections demonstrates the great adverse impact
that Ukrainian elites have had on parry system development and parry consolidation. That
these actions were undertaken for personal political gain should be clear, and eliminate
questions about the rationality of elite actors. Considering the effect of these actors,
political scientists studying Ukraine or other post-socialist cases ought not to ignore
rational choice factors, particularly elite-motivator factors, any longer in analyses of parry
systems.
CONCLUSIONS

Ukraine, as one of the most important former Soviet republics, one of the most Westernoriented, and one of the most strategically important to the West, is an important beginning
point for studies of democratization in the post-socialist world. Parry consolidation, an
important factor in any course of democratic transition, is even more salient in former
Soviet states that lack a historical tradition of civil sociery. In these countries political parties
are practically the only method for mass expression of political preference. Developing a
theoretical understanding of how political parry systems consolidate, or fail to do so, is
clearly importam to understanding democratization in Eastern Europe.
This study has shown that Ukraine, like other post-socialist coumries of Eastern
Europe, fails to meet the expectations of an institutional approach to studies of parry systems.
Considering the importance of Ukraine as a post-socialist case, and the fact that previous
studies had failed to adequately consider Ukraine, this should be seen as a significant
finding. In the place of an institutional paradigm, evidence presented here has demonstrated
the salience of elite-motivator explanations for parry system development. Elite actors
intentional behave in such a way that prolongs party fractionalization and prevents
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parry consolidation. This is not symptomatic of a lack of rationality on the parr of political
actors, as has been suggested, but is done for political self-benefit and thus is likely to
continue so long as other factors allow it to. This ought to ptovide justifIcation for scholars
to give greater consideration to elite-motivator paradigms when attempting to identity
the causes of parry development in post-socialist countries. Furrher study of such cases is
necessary to determine with more precision the degree to which elite actors truly affect
party development, and also to determine to what extent this is or is not a function of culture.
This has significant implications for outlooks on the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Because of the historical lack of civil
society in former socialist states, a lack of party development should be considered an
important requirement for the continuation of this process. Institutional changes appear
unlikely to generate considerahle improvement in the current situation. This means that
until the circumstances that permit political elites to unduly influence party fractionalization are eliminated or at least curtailed, further democratic consolidation in Ukraine
appears tenuous at best.
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ENDNOTES

1. Russian-language news oudets ill Russia reacted with great surprise, almost outrage, to
such discussions.
2. Harasymiw noted in a study of party discipline that centrist deputies were even more
undisciplined (27.1) than the officially unafllliated (22.1), who, he notes, "had
absolutely no reason to show callCllS solidarity." Interestingly, three other factions were
also less disciplined than the unaffiliated (2002, 269, 271).
3. Officially, the president is not affiliated with any party, although United Ukraine is
explicitly a pro-presidential party.
4. Although the "Yulia 'l)'moshenko Bloc" received 7.3 percent of thd'R vote (equating
to 22 seats), it is unclear whether this group, more personality-based than most, ought
to be considered a "main" party.
5. "PR" refers the proportional-representation system introduced after legislative reform.
"SMD" refers to single-member district seats, of which the original parliament was fully
comprised and which was retained in part after the reforms; 85 seats in SMD's went to
independents, members of parties receiving less than 1 percent of the PR vote or that had
results that were disputed. An addition:U 11 seats were unaccounted for by the Central
Election Commission. Source: Ukrainian Central Election Comission. 2002 regular
election results. At <http://l95.230.157.53/pls/vd2002/webprocOv>. 10 Nov. 2003.
6. The parties of the right with enough support to win parliamentary seats all joined
centrist party blocs for the 2002 election.
7. Harasymiw makes the following observations: "Parliament even issued an appeal to the
Ukrainian people in October [1999], urging them not to vote during the presidential
election for the incumbent Leonid Kuchma in order to ensure democracy. The president,
for his part, was not above showing his disdain for Parliament by deciding, most importantly, to conduct his second inauguration on 30 November in a concert hall rather than
in the Parliament building. In protest, about 160 deputies-Communists and other leftists-refused to attend." After a short-lived pro-presidential majority, "several weeks of
turmoil followed. Both Deputy Speaker Martyniuk and Speaker Tkachenko were outsted, but Tkachenko refused to step down. The majority then adjourned to another place
and on 1 I;ebruary it elected Ivan Pliushch as speaker and Stepan Havrysh as deputy
speaker. For about a week the two groups held parallel sittings, with the leftist minority
physically occupying the parliamentary hall proper" (2002, 291, 294).
8. For example, some major parties do not compete in certain regions, particularly western
Ukraine, which is a stronghold of the right. This limits voter choice and creates implications for the rationality of voters.
9. Earlier, Giovanni Sartori, in Grofman and Lijphart's Hectoral Laws and Their Political
Consequences (1986), laid background for such doubt about the explanatory power of
insti tu tio lIal ism.
10. Although Wilson's article was written ten years ago, his description of the overall party
system is still accurate-it was provided earlier at the end of the section on the important role of parties in democratic consolidation.
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II. Wilson states, for example, that only Rukh movements had established offices in Kiev
and respectable publishing arms. The author, however, has visited the substantial Communist Parry headquarters in Kiev and is personally familiar with the many offerings
from their presses.
12. Moser states in a footnote (46) that data was not available from the 1998 election, the
second election case srudied in this research. Sufficient data to calculate all of Moser's
statistics, with the exception of effective number of candidates, is now available for
both the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary elections.
13. rollowing Moser's methodology: 'The effective number of parties index is calculated
by squaring the proportion of the vote or seat shares of each parry, adding these
together, then dividing I by this total: N [sub v]=I/I(v [sub 1]1) or N [sub v]=1/I(s
[sub i]?)" (Moser 1999, fn. 32).
14. Again, Moser's methodology: "The least-squared index of disproportionaliry is calculated by squaring the vote-seat share differences and adding them together; this total
is divided by 2; and then the square root of this value is taken: LSq= [SqRt of? I(v
[sub iJ ~s [sub i])?" (Moser 1999, fn. 33).
15. The requirement that a candidate receive an absolute majority in order to be elected
was exacerbated by the habit of some Ukrainians to vote against all candidates as a
protest. In a close race, even a few such voters could prevent either candidate from
receiving fifty percent of the vote (Birch 2000, 82~83).
16. An article in Foreign Policy in 1995 claimed that these problems were premeditated
actions by President Leonid Kravchuk against the development of political parries.
According to Anders Aslund, Kravchuk "tried to cancel the elections, and for a long
time it was unclear whether they would take place .... Finally, Kravchuk settled for a
very complicated electoral system with no role for political parties and low campaignspending ceilings .... His declared hope was that less than 50 percent of Ukrainian
voters would participate in the parliamentary elections, thus rendering them invalid
and leaving Ukraine with an elected president bur no parliament" (130). This provides
a precursor of the anti-parry actions of the elites that will be discussed.
17. One of the most destructive influences of the unreformed left has been opposition to
economic reforms, which others-·including the President-have used for their own
ends. By using the leftist vote, business interests aligned with the president were able
to hold up reforms in the Verkhovna Rada that were not beneficial to their own
interests. Kuchma's allies also relied upon Communist votes to remove Yushchenko in
a vote of no confidence in order to subdue a possible opponent of the president (Wilson 2002b, 329). D'Anieri, Kravchuk, and Kuzio wrote: "[The amorphous center] also
works to strengthen the executive at the Rada's expense, as the president can often tailor draft legislation presented to the Rada for approval in such a way as to win the support of the center (his natural supporters) in alliance usually with the right or,
occasionally, with the left" (1999,160).
18. In 200 I ~2002, former Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko's managed to unite at least
some of [he rival Rukh factions in his "Our Ukraine" bloc of parties.
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PruDE IN OUR PROGRESS:

An Examination of the John F. I(ennedy
Administration's Record Concerning
Civil Rights and Environmentalism
Benjan1in Mudrick
ABSTRACT

John F. Kennedy was presidrnt during a lime o/greal social change and upheaval. Social issues that
were once ignored ~v the/ederal gOl'ernment m01!Cd to theforefront of the presidential agenda. This
essay seeks to evaluate John F Kemtcd/r record on two important social issues-civil rights and the
environment. His successes anti/ailures are analyzed though the lens o/the presidential role theory
In the end, it is shown that Kennedy IIsed his roles in a nontraditional way and, in doing so,
achiel'ed mixed results.

n the wake of John F. Kennedy's assassination, President Lyndon B. Johnson pleaded
with Congress, "No memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President
Kennedy's memory than the earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he
fought so long" (1963). The civil rights legislation eventually passed in the form of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, but Kennedy's legacy with regards to civil rights and other social
issues has not been atforded such closure. While some consider Kennedy a champion of
civil rights and ot~er social concerns, others depict him as a cautious moderate who was
forced iIlto action by increasing public pressure. The truth, however, exists somewhere in
the middle. Kennedy found himself in the Oval Oftlce during a time when social issues
began to playa progressively more important role in the presidential agenda. In an attempt
to find balance between traditional presidential concerns and increasingly important social
issues, Kennedy moved in a measured and cautious manner. Though unsuccessful in bringing
about numerous concrete changes in the areas of civil rights and environmental protection,
Kennedy used a variety of presidential roles in nontraditional ways to promote racial
equaliry and environmentalism. Kennedy's successes, failures, and contributions to the
future progress of these social issues are made more evident by examining his actions in
the context of his different presidential roles.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Kennedy's stance on the issues of civil rights and the environment are most successfully
understood when examined through the lens of presidential role theory. Byron Daynes,
Raymond Tatalovich, and Dennis Soden define presidential roles as "the set of expectations
by political elites and citizenry that define the scope of presidential responsibilities in a
given policy area" (1998, 2). There are five major roles that are most often associated with
the modern presidency: commander in chief, chief diplomat, chief executive, legislative
leader, and opinion/party leader. According to Daynes, Tatalovich, and Soden, each role
traditionally affords a different amount of power of influence tor the president. For example,
the Constitution and historical precedence offer much more power to a president in the
role of commander in chief than in the role of legislative leader. This can be attributed to
the clear stating of the commander in chief role in the u.S. Constitution. The role of
legislative leader, however, has come into play only as an inferred power (and is in competition with Congress). Daynes, Tatalovich, and Soden use the following chart to rank the
presidential roles in terms of traditional power (6).

Less Powerful

r
Commander
in Chief

Chief
Diplomat

I
Chief
Executive

Legislative
Leader

I
Opinion/party
Leader

Throughout his administration, Kennedy attempted to use each role to further the
issues of civil rights and environmentalism. In some cases, Kennedy effectively used a certain role while at times other roles were ignored or ineffectual.

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

In their essay 'The Changing Agenda of the Environment and the Commander in Chief,'"
Ronald Ketter, Chris Bordick, and Michael Cabral explain, "Historically, the commander
in chief role is considered to be the most powedi.tI, meaning that presidents have more
authority and resources available in this role compared to others" (1999,228). This power
comes directly from the Constitution, which states, 'The President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, when called into actual service of the
United States" (art. 2, sec. 2). In short, the president has the final say in decisions directly
related to the military services of the United States. During Kennedy's administration,
President Kennedy lIsed the role of commander in chief sparingly but effectively. In the few
instances when he used this role, his actions spurred significant steps forward in the cause
of civil rights.
Although the U.S. military was oHicially desegregated during the Truman Administration, segregation still existed in the armed forces when Kennedy came into office in 1961.
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Most significantly, reserve units and the Coast Guard remained segregated. James C.
Harvey details Kennedy's efforts to further desegregation in the military.
An indication of the president's interest was manifested by his anger over the [tct that
in his inaugural parade no Negro coast guardsmen took part. Kennedy found that the
Coast Guard was virtually all white, and he immediately took steps to remedy that
situation after he was sworn in as president of the United States.
As of 1961 there were still six Negro reserve units in the Army. On April 3, 1962,

Roswell Gilpatrick, the deputy secretary of defense, ordered them integrated. In June
1963 the Pentagon announced that the integration of the services had been achieved.
(1971. 31)
Because the president has final say in matters involving the military, Kennedy's efforts to
desegregate the armed forces were effective. To ensure that the integration of the military
continued, Kennedy created the Committee on Equal Opportunity in the Armed Forces.
\X'hen the committee reported that discrimination was still present on military bases and
among the troops, Kennedy ordered Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to act on the
issue. In a letter to McNamara, Kennedy wrote:
The recommendations regarding both off·base and on-base conditions merit your
prompt attention and certainly are in the spirit that I believe should characterize our
approach to the matter [of integration]. I would hope your review and report on the
recommendations could be completed within 30 days. (l963d, 496)
The president's influence was immediately felt. Harvey explains,
On July 26, 1963, McNamara sent out a directive to all those under his department.
In the document the secretary noted that it was the responsibility of each military
commander to oppose discriminatory practices affecting his men and their dependents
in order to foster equal opportunity for them not only in areas under his immediate
command but also in nearby communities. (1971, 34)
Another directive followed, asking hase commanders to help families of soldiers in their
attempts to enter their children into formerly segregated schools; cancel contracts with segregationist morticians; and ban participation of base athletic teams or musical bands in any
off-hase events that would take place in front of a segregated audience (U.S. Department
of Defense 1963, 143';8-59).
From this exa~ple, Kennedy's commitment to desegregation and the power of the role
of commander in chief is clearly seen. Because of the role's inherent power, no other interest
group or institutional body could effectively oppose Kennedy's authority with regards to
the desegregation of the military. The changes, as evidenced in the Pentagon's quick reply,
took place according ro the commander in chief's directives with little debate or controversy.
A much more controversial issue in which Kennedy used the commander in chief role
ro further civil rights was the use of the military to desegregate schools in the South. In
1962-in direct conflict ro a federal court order-the University of Mississippi refused to
enroll James Meredith, an African-American. Governor Ross Barnett declared that no
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school in Mississippi would desegregate while he was governor and claimed that the federal government could not meddle in the internal affairs of Mississippi. Though reluctant
to do so, Kennedy sent 541 federal marshals to Oxford, Mississippi to escort Meredith,
force the school into cooperation, and maintain order in case of rioting. Kennedy federalized the Mississippi National Guard and alerted several thousand federal troops in case
more support was needed (Barrett 1965, 93-94, 221-22).
The next year a similar situation occurred in Alabama. Governor George Wallace
defied a court order to desegregate the University of Alabama. When Kennedy signed an
order federalizing the Alabama National Guard, however, Wallace quickly stepped aside
(Harvey 1971, 41). The threat of force was enough to change the governor's mind.
These examples show Kennedy's commitment to civil rights through school desegregation, as well as the effectiveness of the commander in chief role. While Congress can always
vote against a piece oflegislation or ignore a president's opinion, very few choose to ignore
or subvert the commander in chief Southern politicians fought strongly against almost
every attempt at desegregation. When the president lIsed the role of commander in chief,
however, things happened immediately. Clearly, the role of commander in chief is effective
and powerful. Although Kennedy did not use it often, it was always effective.
In the case of the environment, Kennedy also used the commander in chief role in one
instance. He saw the space program-usually considered a military or scientific programas an opportunity to bener understand the relationship between humankind and the
planer. In an address given the day before his death, Kennedy spoke about the space program and its importance to the environment:
Space research may open up new understanding of man's relation to his environment.
Examination of the astronauts' physical and mental and emotional reactions can teach
us more abollt the differences between normal and abnormal, about the causes and
effects of disorientation, in metabolism which could result in extending the life span.
When you study effects on ollr astronauts of exhaust gases which can contaminate
their environment, and seek ways to alter these gases so to reduce their toxicity, you
are working on problems similar to those we face in our great urban centers which
themselves are being corrupted by gases and which must be cleared. (1963a)
Kennedy clearly believed a major function of the space program was to better understand
and, conseqenrly, improve the environment.

CHIEF DIPLOMAT

Carolyn Long, Michael Cabral, and Brooks Vandivort explain the president's role as chief
diplomat; "The constitutional and legal authority empowering the president to act
as chief diplomat is significant, enabling the president, under most circumstances, to
carry out the role as the primary foreign policy representative of the United States, with
only limited intrusions by other branches of government" (1999, 189). In short, the
president has the ability to act as the chief foreign policy officer of the United States.
While in recent years presidents have used this role repeatedly to negotiate international
environmental agreements, Kennedy did so only on twO occasions.
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Civil rights was considered a domestic issue, so Kennedy did not use the role of chief
diplomat in his attempts to promote equality. He did, however, see possible foreign policy
implications stemming from the civil rights struggle. Russell Riley comments, "Kennedy
was concerned about racial struggles as a potential foreign policy problem, one which
could not be ignored at a time when possible hotspots such as Vietnam, Cuba, or Berlin
threatened to boil over, undermining the nation's security" (1999, 203).
As mentioned previously, the Kennedy Adminisrration negotiated two international
treaties that, in one way or another, concerned the environment. In 1963, President
Kennedy signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons 'Jests in the Atmosphere, also
known as the Atomic Test Ban Treaty. Long, Cabral, and Vandivort explain, "[The treaty]
represented a significant step toward limiting the environmental damage of nuclear
weapons testing, both in the atmosphere and underground" (1999, 203). In an address to
the nation, Kennedy explained that the Atomic Test Ban Treaty was environmentally significant because "over the years the number and the yield of weapons tested have rapidly
increased and so have the radioactive hazards from s\lch testing. Continued unrestricted
testing by the nuclear powers joined in time by other nations which may be less adept in
limiting pollution, will increasingly contaminate the air that all of us must breathe"
(1963e). In this case, Kennedy effectively used the role of chief diplomat to promote environmental concerns.
Kennedy also used the role of chief diplomat to negotiate the 1963 Protocol on North
Pacific Furs. Late in his administration, he sent a delegation to negotiate an international
protocol concerning north pacific fisheries. Kennedy explained, "It is obvious that unless
international conservation agreements are strictly enforced there is grave danger of permanent injury to our ocean resources" (1963j). Clearly, Kennedy saw the importance of international agreements concerning the environment, but, as evidenced, his initiation of such
agreements was limited.
Attempting to explain Kennedy's limited activism in regard to environmental diplomacy,
Long, Cabral, and Vandivort hypothesize, "Several factors contributed to JFK's limited
diplomatic activity; his focus on trade and the United States' growing role in Southeast
Asia, his lack of personal interest in environmental matters, and his limited time in office"
(1999, 189). It may also be noted that during the Kennedy Administration international
environmentalism was still not an important political-or even scientific-concern.
Although Kennedy did not use the role of environmental diplomat otten, he was effective
in the few issues in which he did involve himsel[ Most significantly, the Atomic Test Ban
'Ii-eary paved the way for future nuclear testing treaties and international environmental
agreements.
CHIEF ExECUTIVE

Daynes and Sussman define the role of chief executive as "involving a president's relationship with the bureaucracy, his administrative staff, and domestic policymaking" (2001, 6).
The extent to which Kennedy used this role to promote environmentalism and civil rights
can be seen in his executive branch appointments, court appointments, executive orders,
and creation of agencies and bureaus.
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Kennedy first used his executive appointing power to increase diversity in the executive
branch. He placed those who were sympathetic to the causes of civil rights and environmentalism in the administration. In regards to diversity, Kennedy appointed more AfricanAmericans to positions in the federal government than any president before him. Robert
C. Weaver was named to head the Housing and Home Finance Agency. George Weaver
was made assistant secretary of/abor. Carl T. Rowan was named assistant secretary of state
for public affairs. Andrew Hatcher was appointed associate press secretary. Lisle Carter was
named deputy assistant secretary in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Finally, Frank Reeves was named to the White House staff (Brauer 1977). Other important
appointments were also made to increase diversity in the executive branch. Spottswood
Robinson III was made a member of the Civil Rights Commission. John Duncan was
appointed as commissioner for the District of Columbia. The naming of A. Leon Higginbotham to the Federal Trade Commission is particularly noteworthy. He was the first
African-An1erican to serve on a federal regulatory agency (Harvey 1971,23).
Kennedy also appointed Mrican-Americans to European ambassadorships. James C.
Harvey writes, "For the first time blacks were named as ambassadors to European as well
as African countries. Clifton Wharton was appointed as ambassador to Norway, and he was
the first Negro to serve as ambassador to a predominantly white country and the first of
his race to rise through the career service to become an ambassador" (Harvey 1971, 24).
Kennedy also appointed many minorities as federal judges. The most important was
the appointment of Thurgood Marshall, one of the lawyers who argued Brown ll. Board of
Education, to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Kennedy also named the first female
minority federal judge. Marjorie Lawson was nominated as a federal judge in Washington,
D.C., and became the first African-American woman to be appointed to the federal bench
(Harvey 1971, 23).
With regards to his appointment of several African-Americans to executive and judicial
branches, the Southern Regional Council reported,
The Negro vote had been of great importance in the president's election. It was in harmony with American political tradition and practice that the role of the Negroes in
the election would have established the Negro's right to some of the spoils of victory.
Kennedy paid off his political debt, and in doing so he brought into office blacks of
recognized distinction and ability. (1962, 25)
While this view of the president's appointments makes them seem politically motivated, it
does highlight the extent to which he appointed minorities to federal positions and how
his actions were perceived by the nation.
Kennedy made two significant appointments on which he relied for most of his environmental decisions. Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel state, "It is noted that [Kennedy]
knew little about agriculture or natural resource issues, but relied on strong Secretaries,
Orville Freeman and Stewart Udall, respectively-at Agriculture and Interior, to direct policy
making in these areas" (1999, 228). Kennedy's commitment to the issue of conservationism
can be seen in the truSt he placed in his advisors.
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Kennedy also issued several Executive Orders concerning civil rights and environmental concerns. With regards to integrating federal housing, Kennedy issued an order enritled
Equal Opportunity in Housing. The order announced that discrimination and segregation
was to end in all federally owned or subsidized housing:
Whereas the executive branch of the Government, in faithfully executing the laws of
the United States which authorize federal financial assistance, directly or indirectly,
for the provision, rehabilitation, and operation of housing and related facilities, is
charged with an obligation and duty to assure that those laws are fairly administered
and that benefits there under are made available to all Americans without regard to
their race, color, creed, or national origin. (1962a)
To enforce this order, Kennedy created the President's Committee on Equal Opportunity
in Housing. He also attempted to end discrimination in the hiring practices of the federal
governmenr. On March 7, 1961, Kennedy announced,
I am today issuing an Executive Order combining the President's Committee on Government Contracts and the President's Committee on Government Employment Policy into a single President's COlllmittee on Equal Employment Opportunity. Through
this vastly strengthened machinery I intend to ensure that all Americans of all colors
and beliefs will have equal access to employment within the government, and those
who do business with the government. (1962c, 121)
Kennedy continued his assault of discrimination in the workplace with Executive Order
11114 on June 22, 1963. This order extended the authority of the Committee on Equal
Employment Practices to cover any federally assisted construction project, whether by
loan, grant contact, guaranty, or insurance. The committee was given the power to withhold funds from any project where discrimination was encountered (1963c). All in all, the
president issued five executive orders that dealt with race and equal opportunity. Kennedy
clearly saw the power of chief executive as a method to end discrimination and further the
civil rights agenda. During the first meeting of the Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity, Kennedy spoke of executive power and its role in promoting equality:
I am hopeful and confident that from this time forward the COlllmittee will exercise
the great powers given to it by executive order to permanently remove from Government employment and work performed for the Government every trace of discrimination because .of race, creed, color, or place of national origin. (1961 a)

to

Kennedy also used executive orders to promote his environmental agenda. According
"John F. Kennedy's Executive Orders 1961-1963," Kennedy issued nineteen executive

orders that had to do with environmental issues. These accounted for nine percent of all
of the executive orders that he issued; nine dealt with parks and forests, three with radioactivity, four with land use, and three with general environmental issues. ror example,
Executive Order 11072 states, "Whereas it would be in the public interest to extend the
exterior boundaries of the Superior National Forest in Minnesota and the Clark National
Forest in Missouri to include certain lands acquired or which may be hereafter acquired for
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national forest purposes; together with adjoining public lands" (1962b). Kennedy used this
and other execurive orders to extend national forests, protect parks and resources, and further
other environmental concerns.
From these examples, Kennedy's use of the chief executive role in the cases of civil
rights and environmental protection is better understood. Obviously, Kennedy used the
role of chief executive frequently; however, its effectiveness, at least in the case of civil
rights, is questionable. James Harvey explains why Kennedy's executive orders concerning
discrimination in the workplace were ineffective:
Harold Fleming in 1965 pointed out that the attempt to deal with discrimination in
jobs [with executive orders} had had little impact. He gave the followirig reasons: there
was little jurisdiction over labor unions; automation had caused a decline in less skilled
jobs, leaving Negroes at a disadvantage ... and enforcement provisions were practically never used. In fact. "the ultimate sanction"-contract termination-has never
been applied. no hearings have been held. and only a few companies have been pur on
the list of ineligibles for future contracts. (1971. 48)
Clearly, the implementation and enforcement of these executive orders proved difficult.
For this reason, though used more frequend y than other presidential roles. the role of chief
executive was still less effective than other presidential roles in bringing about consequential change in regards to civil rights and environmental protection.

LEGISlATIVE LEADER

lraditionally, the role of legislative leader has been considered less powerful than most
other presidential roles, because of the powerful position of Congress in creating legislation. Although the president may recommend legislation and use his influence to get
things passed, he cannot vote. And in the end, it is the vote that matters. This is not to say.
however, that the role cannot be important or used effectively. Daynes and Sussman
explain, "While [legislative leader] is one of the president's weaker roles. lacking in both
authority and resources, it is, nevertheless, a role of lasting consequence to most presidents-and a role that can build the social agenda." They continue, "The President may
veto important acts of Congress, refi.lse to appoint persons with legislative support to
administrative positions. or neglect to consult with representatives or senators on policy
issues" (2001,63).
Though Kennedy served in Congress for over a decade before his presidency. he rarely
used the role of legislative leader to further civil rights or the environment. in 1961.
Kennedy sent "A Special Message to the Congress on Natural Resources." This message
showed great foresight in stating that "problems of immediacy always have the advantage
of attracting notice-those that lie in the future fare poorly in the competition for attention and money.... We cannot, however. delude ourselves-we must understand our
resources problems, and we must face up to them now. The task is large but it will be done"
(1961 b). it called for legislative action regarding water resources, electric power, forests.
public lands, and ocean resources. The administration, however. did nothing following the
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release of this message to push for the legislation. Only one piece of significant environmental legislation was pas~ed during the Kennedy Administration. The Clean Air Act of
1963 set restriction on pollution and contamination. Kennedy supported the bill, but was
not an original proponent of it. Why Kennedy ignored the opportunity to use the role of
legislative leader to preserve the environment as he initially proposed is unknown, but his
failure is clear.
The reason for his legislative inaction on civil rights, on the other hand, is clearer. As a
Democratic president, Kennedy found himself in a precarious position with Congress.
While a majority of his party supported progressive civil rights legislation, a good portion
of the party belonged to the southern "Dixiecrat" coalition. The Dixiecrats were southern
segregationists who distrusted the federal government and vehemently opposed any civil
rights legislation. The Dixiecrats held several important committee chairmanships in both
the House and Senate and vowed to stop any civil rights legislation from getting to the
floor. Alexander Bickel explains:
A first and obvious generalization is that the [civil rights] performance through 1962
was almost wholly executive. The administration broke no lances with Congress. As to
this, one need perhaps say no more than President Kennedy was a realist, and he had
troubles enough in what was in all intents and purposes a three-party legislature, with
a species of [southern] Democrats holding the balance of power. (1962, 1877)

By 1963, however, Kennedy decided to push for a strong piece of civil rights legislation in
the Congress. On Fehruary 28, 1963, Kennedy sem a special message to Congress concerning civil rights. It stated:
In the last two years, more progress has been made in securing the civil rights of all
Americans than in any comparable period in our history. Progress has been madethrough executive action, litigation, persuasion and private initiative-in achieving
and protecting equality of opportunity in education, voting, transportation, employment, housing, government, and the enjoyment of public accommodations.
But pride in our progress must not give way to relaxation of our effort. Nor does
progress in the Executive Branch enable the Legislative Branch to escape its own obligations. On the contrary, it is in the light of this nationwide progress, and in the belief
that Congress will wish once again to meet its responsibilities in this matter, that I
stress in the following agenda of existing and prospective action important legislative
as well as administrative measures. (1963h)
Kennedy sent a clear message to Congress that the time for meaningful civil rights legislation had arrived. Unlike his message on natural resources, however, Kennedy followed up
on this message and devoted great time and energy to the success of civil rights legislation.
When Congress did not propose any meaningful legislation after the delivery of his
special message, the Kenlledy Administratioll decided to take matters into its own hands.
Harvey writes, "The president decided to go ahead with a sweeping new bill on May 31,
over the objection of some of his political advisors who foresaw both congressional and
electoral defeat" (1971, 56). On June 19, 1963, Kennedy sent another special message to
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Congress entitled "Civil Rights and Job Opportunities." In the message, Kennedy proposed that Congress stay in session until meaningful legislation was passed. He also asked
for the following provisions: an extension of the Civil Rights Commission, an increase in
voting rights, equal accommodations in public facilities, equal opportunity in employment, more federally assisted programs for minorities, and broader efforts in the desegregation of schools (196~i).
Kennedy also attempted to get civil rights legislation through Congress. He actively
lobbied congressional leaders from both the Republican and Democratic parties and held
daily meetings in regards to the legislation's progress. Unfortunately, Kennedy was assassinated before the legislation was enacted. However, as President Johnson later stated, the
eventual passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can partially be attributed to "President
Kennedy's memory" (1963).
As evidenced in this section, Kennedy did not use his role as legislative leader as
frequently as other roles, but in the one case in which he did, he eventually found great
success-though posthumously-despite strong opposition from Congress. This
demonstrates that the role of legislative leader is not necessarily as powerful or influential as other presidential roles in bringing about social change, but can be significantly
effective when it is used properly. For example, the Civil Rights Act, though slow in its
incubation, was significantly more influential than any of Kennedy's other executive
orders on civil rights.

OPINION/PARTY lEADER

Opinion/party leader is generally considered the weakest of the presidential roles. Daynes
and Sussman define the role: 'The opinion/party leader arrempts to mobilize public support
for the policies and programs of the administration and party on one hand and respond to
constituent interests on the other." They continue, "At the same time, the president must
decide which issues to address and then present a case for them to the public" (2001, 32).
In the case of both the environment and civil rights, Kennedy progressively dedicated more
time to each issue in his role as an opinion leader.
The Democratic Party Platform of 1960 contained small sections on both the environment and civil rights. An entire section on natural resources stated, "Sound public policy
must assure that these essential resources will be available to provide the good life for our
children and future generations" (Democratic National Commirree, 45). The same platform contained two sections on civil rights issues. One is entitled "Discrimination in
Employment" and the other "Civil Rights." This section came to be known as the "Rights
of Man" document. It states, "We shall also seek to create an affirmative new atmosphere
in which to deal with racial divisions and inequalities which threaten both the integrity of
our democratic faith and the proposition on which our nation was founded-that all men
are created equal" (Democratic National Commirree, 47). In his acceptance speech, at the
Democratic Convention, Kennedy accepted the party platform and dedicated himself to
fi.tlfilling the "Rights of Man."
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During the early years of his administration, however, Kennedy did not use his role as
opinion leader frequently in the cases of civil rights and environmentalism. He mentioned
both briefly in his first State of the Union Address but provided no specifics on how he
planned to deal with the issues. Concerning Kennedy's early rhetoric on civil rights, Carl
Brauer writes, "Evidently fearing an adverse reaction from Southern Democrats, Kennedy
avoided the 'bully pulpit.' He did not devote a major address to the issue" (1977,74).
This trend continued until Kennedy decided to fully push the civil rights legislation
mentioned earlier. The day following his standoff with George Wallace over the admission
of African-Americans into the University of Alabama, Kennedy delivered a nationally
broadcast speech concerning the topic of civil rights. Kennedy not only explained his reasoning for federalizing the Alabama National Guard, he redefined the entire civil rights
struggle as a moral issue f:lcing the country. Kennedy stated, "We are confronted primarily
with a moral issue. It is as old as the scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution. The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and
equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be
treated" (1963f). For the first time, an American president spoke to the entire nation about
civil rights and the nation's moral obligation to make necessary changes. From the time of
this speech, Kennedy spoke frequently and passionately about the issue of civil rights.
As with civil rights, Kennedy did not use the "bully pulpit" to discuss envitonmental
issues early on in his administration. A few months before his death, however, he embarked
on a "Conservation Tour of America" during which he spoke about conservation and natural resources all over the country. At the first stop on the tour, Grey Towers, Kennedy
expressed his views on conservation ism, "The riches of this continent should be used for
all the people to provide a more abundant life, and ... that the waste of these resources,
or the exploitation by a few, [is] a threat to our national democratic way of life" (I 963b).
Kennedy continued his tour throughout the United States over the next week and, in his
final stop in Las Vegas, expressed his ultimate goal concerning environmental protection:
Our task, the task of propelling a third wave of conservation in the United States, following that of Theodore Roosevelt and of Franklin Roosevelt, is to make science the
servant of conservation, and to devise new programs of land stewardship that will
enable lIS to preserve this green environment, which means so much to all of us ....
We must mount a new campaign to preserve our natural environment in order that
those who come after us will find a green and rich country. (l963g)
As with civil rights, Kennedy made a more concerted effort to affect public opinion concerning the issue of the environment as his presidency drew to a close. Had Kennedy not
been assassinated, it is possible that he would have used the role of opinion/party leader to
a much greater extent.
While opinion/party leader is not considered a powerful role, Kennedy used it increasingly more often and more effectively as his administration progressed. Because of the
strong opposition he faced in Congress, Kennedy found it necessaty to appeal to the public, especially in the case of civil rights. By appealing

to

the moral conscience of America,

Kennedy increased the chances for his legislative and executive policies to succeed.
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CONCLUSION

In his attempt to promote civil rights and conservationism, John F. Kennedy used with
varying levels of success all of the different roles available to him. As commander in chief,
Kennedy successfully continued the integration of the military that began during the Truman Administration and successfully desegregated universities in the South. He also used
this role to promote the continuance of the space program to research the environment and
its relation to man. Whenever Kennedy used this role to address these issues, the results
were positive. Because conservationism and civil rights were considered domestic political
issues, however, Kennedy used the role of commander in chief infi·equenrly. Kennedy's use
of the chief diplomat role mirrored his role as commander in chief. i'he times he used
diplomacy for environmental issues, though infrequent, were successful.
Kennedy used the chief executive role more frequen r1y than any other role. Kennedy
appointed more African-Americans to positions in the federal government than any president before him. He appointed the first minority ambassador to a European nation and
appointed many minorities as federal judges-including Marjorie Lawson, the fIrst female
minority federal judge, and Thurgood Marshall, an eventual Supreme Court Justice.
Kennedy also appointed strong environmentalists to positions and relied on their judgment
when faced with related issues.
Through the use of executive power, Kennedy created the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission and bolstered the power of the Civil Rights Commission. Kennedy also
used this role to further integrate schools and the military. Kennedy also issued several
executive orders concerning national parks and forests. Clearly, the role of chief executive
was Kennedy's most frequently used role and, in most cases, was quite effective.
The role of legislative leader was not used often by Kennedy. In the one case that he
pushed Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act, however, the legislation eventually passed
(though after his assassination). Clearly, the role of legislative leader can be used to promote the social agenda, but it faces strong opposition and requires a great deal of effort. In
many cases, however, its effects can carry greater inHuence nationwide than military actions
and executive orders.
The role of opinion/party leader is the least effective of all of the presidential roles, but
by the end of his administration Kennedy found it important to discuss the social issues
with the public. He gave more and more speeches on the issues of civil rights and conservation as his presidency progressed. While it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of his
effort, the frequency with which he used speeches to influence social policy reflects the
role's importance
This diagram was presented earlier to show the relative power of presidential roles.
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As evidenced, the relative power of each role was consistent during the Kennedy
Administration. For example, his infrequent uses of commander in chief and chief diplomat were always sllccessful. His frequent use of chief executive, however, produced mixed
results. It is interesting that John F. Kennedy, though probably cognizant of the differing
powers of each role, used less powerful roles more frequently than more powerful roles. The
following diagram shows the frequency with which Kennedy used diHerent roles to promote
his civil rights and environmental agenda.
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In terms of the social agenda, Kennedy found the roles of chief executive and
opinion/party leader to be most suited to his policy concerns. While these roles are not
always the most effective or powerful, they fit with the attributes of social issues during the
Kennedy Administration.
Although Kennedy was not entirely successful in bringing about monumental changes
in civil rights and environmental issues, he did use almost every role at his disposal in
attempts to further both issues. Following his assassination, a great deal of progress was
made in relation to both issues. Clearly, he planted the seeds for future change.
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A LAND WHEREIN THOU ART A STRANGER:
Notes on Ukrainian National Identity
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Honors thesis in partial fitlfillment of Unil'ersity Honors. Ben Peters examines

Ukrainian national identity as a contemporary phenomenon fraught with tensions and paradoxes.
Here in the intro{iuctioll and final chapter of his undergraduate thesis, Peters briefly presents, first,
Ukrainian national identity in light ofa number of th£'Oretical approaches (e.g.. Herder, Renan,
Honig, BOljamin, Smith, and Anderson) and then turns his attention toward synthesizing obserl'ations
about Ukrainian architecture of public space (e.g.. monuments. institutions. ~ymboL,) into two gOleral
themes

of Ukrainian

mltional idOltity: national otherness and resurrection. When seen

tlJ

the

Hegelian "other," Ukrainian histOl:y leads toward an internal intolerance of identity. Instead, Peters
suggests that dismissing the label "other" and not those labeled "others" in historical and present
situations prol'ides a Jf.rtill' soi! in which a Ukrainian national identi~y capable
demands

ofdemocracy

0/ mlwing the

may dewlop.

INTRODUCTORY NOTES ON UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

f nations are actors on the stage of their state, then independent Ukraine since 1991 has
the script and cast for a world-class soap opera. Members of the Ukrainian collective
squabble over cultural inheritance. the closest of ethnicities clash. and religious zealots boil
over inheritance claims. Ukraine today struggles to stabilize its many conflicting charactersjealousy, heated spats. and grudges are not uncommon spices in brewing the modern
Ukrainian nation. Altogether, Ukraine makes for a fantastic drama.
Ukraine also makes a sterling subject to study Eastern European national neighborhoods.
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Jimmy Carter's former National Security Adviser, called Ukrainian
independence "one of the three major geopolitical events of the twentieth century" because
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Russia, that great historical empire, would not rise again to superpower status as long as
Ukraine remains independent (Zbigniew 1996, 3-8; Wilson 2002, 368). The Ukrainian
nation then is a modern milestone of Russia's post-imperial legacy-its independence
indirectly means that a superpower is no more. In the words of Benedict Anderson, a
nation, as all other imagined communities, is sovereign but limited. Ukraine is becoming
a nation in these terms but is neither completely sovereign nor aware of its limitations.
Neither Ukrainian confines nor power are fully formed: Ukraine is not yet entirely sovereign
nor is it perhaps even adequately aware of its limitations because Ukrainians on the whole
do not yet have a common understanding of what it means to be Ukrainian. As Anatolii
Pohribnyi, former Minister of Education, forewarns, "[Ukraine] cannot ... pull [itself]
out of economic crisis without uniting the clear majority of the population around
the national idea" (Wilson 2002, 235). This work attempts to help address the creation
of that Ukrainian national idea.
To scudy independent Ukraine is to watch an important balancing of future and past:
as Ukraine tries to unite behind its new role as Eastern Europe's post-Soviet flagship of
independence, it also ought to account for the historic pluralism that tends to divide its
population. Left to watch anyone episode of Ukraine's recent, knotty history, most
outside observers would be left dumbfounded by the diversity and disunion found within
its boundaries. Yet despite recent national independence placing Ukraine delicately upon
an edge between Europe and Russia, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, West and East, Ukrainian's
pluralism also carries a productive potential in terms of developing a consensual national
identity. And what Tocqueville said, "Democratic ages arc times of experiment, innovation,
and adventure" holds true for contemporary Ukrainian nation-building. All democracies,
but especially new ones, are constantly in a state of flux and fluidity-concrete national
identity is impossible in democratic societies without a built-in societal consensus toward
tolerating foreignness among its natives.
What is a nation? I will try to follow Anderson's superb prescription that a nation is an
"imagined [not imaginary] community ... limited and sovereign" (1996, 7). Ukraine as a
nation with borders functions as an evolving organism formed by two interacting,
interwoven substances-or as Ernest Barker, distinguished British political theorist,
describes "a nation [as something that] is simultaneously, and coextensively, two things in
one. It is a social substance, or Society ... [andl a legal substance; a single compulsory
association . . . to make and enforce rules for all" (Barker 1956, 4). Conflict between
differing social groups in Ukraine is largely kept in check by legal oversight; yet justification for disobedience to the state among these groups draws heavily upon centuries of
predemocratic social-state relations, while state oversight falters out of inexperience. Some
historical elements of the Ukrainian nation are centuries old, but Ukraine as a nation-state
has only existed since the early 1990s. In brief, while only one section of this essay is dedicated to the legal situation in Ukraine per se, compulsory policies and politics between
the state and society pervade discussion throughout. As illustrated in Ukraine's case, a
nation is a sovereign community limited by its relative composition of and compromise
between social and compulsory components.
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To understand the origins of nation, one must consider two leading concepts that have
shaped debate over the past two centuries. One is Renan's endorsement of forgetting the
past to develop national solidarity, and the other is Herder's claim that a nation is
organically rooted in a historical folk or people. The first is a synchronic argument,
the second diachronic. Either a nation is born of imagined memory or out of the very dirt
of organic fact. This dialectic between inventive remembering and forgetting remains key
to the following discussion of Ukraine. In brief, the batrle betvveen mind and blood, politics
and history, collective memory and its misplacement will ultimately define independent
Ukraine as a nation. For democracy to succeed, a nation must be amenable to a new set of
national memories that can allow its present people to accept diversity and difference
of organic characteristics (e.g., language, ethnicity, religion).
Some see history as nothing but the web of stories about the past: others see it as a
professional academic field of inquiry; and yet others see history as the factual content of
past time, things as they "really" happened. Here history will refer to that mutable record
of roots that resurrects the past into the present and defines the collective potential,
memory, and consciousness of a people. As Walter Benjamin (1968) argues, history
enlivens the past only by being a version of the present. Especially because Ukraine's
history is a composite of foreign nations and alien entities, Ukrainians need to unravel their
patchwork of painful history and abstract their own modern national identity to embrace
its many contributors. The questions between "us" and "other" will be answered by
the modern rendering of Ukrainian history. We need to, as Bonnie Honig argues, switch the
question from "how should we solve the problem of foreignness" to the question "what
problems does foreignness solve for us" (200 I)-in other words, only that which is the
"other" in Ukraine can liberate Ukrainian identity from the bonds of historical resentment
into present equivalence for all its people. The "other" in Ukraine is not the problem-it
is the solution.
What is national identity? Anthony D. Smith's five fundamental features of national
identity provide a platform for investigating the embryonic formation of claimed ancient
Ukrainian identity. According to this formula, a successful Ukrainian national identity
would require
1. A historic territory, or homeland,

2.
3.
4.
5.

Common myths and historical memories,
A common, mass public culture,
Common legal rights and duties for all members, and
A common economy with territorial mobility for members. (1991, 14)

Commonality is perhaps the stickiest subject for Ukraine: are memories, myths, and
culture truly common or do they remain only because of collectively imposed Soviet
nation-building policies? Probably the latter, but it remains a question. I will argue that in
some sense foreigners have done more-by fanning Ukrainian nationalism in the Canadian Diaspora or by simply occupying the area-to create Ukraine today than Ukrainian
polity or policy have had time to do themselves. The race to make Ukraine is run today by
natives trying to catch up with what foreigners have done or are doing.
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Who, then, is a Ukrainian today? A brief demographic sketch of Ukraine reveals about
49 million inhabitants in a little over 600,000 square kilometers (an area slightly smaller
than Texas). Ukraine is thus the largest country in European Eurasia besides Russia (U.S.
State Department 2002). Ukrainian history houses the mixed political legacies of the
Soviet Union, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, the Cossacks, the Hapsburg empire, and Kyiv
Rus as well as the religions of Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, and
Paganism. Ethnic groups include, in descending order, Ukrainians (73%), Russians (22%),
Jews, Belarusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, Crimean
Tatars, and others. The rubrics of Ukrainian and Russian ethnicity often are politicized and
misleading. Many citizens of Russian ancestry claim Ukrainian ethnicity our of allegiance
to territory rather than actual genealogy, skewing true ethnic distinctions. Traditional religious movements include Ukrainian Orthodoxies (of Moscow and Kyiv Patriarchates
and other less prominent variants), Greek Catholicism, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and
Islam.' Ukraine has no simple majority along religious, political, ethnic, linguistic, or even
economic lines. Economically, the nation's predicted 2002 GOP was near 40 billion USD
(a 4.1 % increase since 2001). This remains surprisingly small compared to its European neighbors to the west.
Ukrainian internal divisions are largely due to its history with neighboring nations.
Perhaps the political question for Ukraine in the twenty-first century follows: with which
neighbors will it choose to seek the most affiliation and communication? East or West?
Before the fall of Communism, John A. Armstrong treated the Soviet Republic of Ukraine
as a "younger brother" of Russia (together with Belarus) in understanding post-Communist
Ukraine. Now, however, we must also investigate independent Ukraine's split relationships
with its neighboring nations. The European Union is looking more and more attractive
to western Ukraine, while economic alliance with Russia remains the primary interest of
eastern Ukraine. The elusive answer to the question "what Ukrainians consider to be
Ukrainian" lies in how those within Ukraine's borders will treat those beyond its borders.
IDENTITY IN OTHERNESS AND HISTORY, DEATH AND RESURRECTION

"And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger
... for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God" (Genesis 17:8).
The Judeo-Christian tradition of inheritance (seed), possession (territory), and exile
(stranger) are central to Ukrainian national identity. Much like when Abram (later known
as Abraham) received the land of Canaan as his divinely appointed inheritance, the newly
formed Ukrainian state in 1991 received its land as a stranger. In a strong sense, Ukraine
is a stranger in its own land. This will be better demonstrated as I trace two themes in
Ukrainian national identity: the presence of otherness and the prevalence of death and
resurrection.
OTHERNESS IN NATIONALITY

As the historian Lord Acton once said, "Exile is the mother of nationalism." Ukraine has
been an exile cast upon itself. The idea of alienness is closely associated with the idea of
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land: typically those who possess the land are entitled to make the distinction between the
near-cognates extraterrestrial (i.e., alien) and extra-territorial (i.e., foreigner)-however,
in Ukraine the distinction between alien and foreigner is obscured as is the land's possessor. '
Ukraine has historically been its own alien: Constantinople, Poland-Lithuania, Russian
Muscovy, Nazi Germany, and Soviet Moscow have all contributed to a contemporary
Ukrainian national identity-they, Ukraine's historical possessors, were not what Ukraine is.
Whom we recognize as "other" is perhaps the ultimate political question; it is not about
how, but with whom we interact that forms the whole human order. For instance, academics in the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada have ostensibly kept alive Ukrainian nationalism
and, with it, a version of Ukrainian identity characterized by the anti-Russian Orthodox
sentiment prevalent during the Soviet era. Much like their original national prophet Taras
Shevchenko, who was stranded in alien Russia, expatriate Ukrainian nationalists fought
most vigorously for a distant homeland. Because he is the quintessential epitome of exile,
Shevchenko also makes for a resilient source of collective identity. He wrote the bulk of his
nationalistic poetry from the then remote capital of St..' Petersburg. Such a textual Diaspora
breeds life. In fact the word Diaspora, related to our spore, comes from Greek for dispersion, dissemination, or sowing about of seeds-in other words, foreign soil brings new life
to seeds of distant nations. The Diaspora defines the fIeld of the very thing it is not, a
national homeland.
Borders magnifY national distinctions. Between Ukrainian borders, the words of foreigners-be they imperialist and ecclesiastical rulers or displaced and disaffected nationalists-have been history's law. Now, Ukrainians would do well to recognize the historical
and contemporary presence of otherness found in the territory between their borders. In
short, the outsider has largely defined Ukrainian national identity to date.' If consciousness, as Hegel's parable puts it, is "itself the gazing of one self-consciousness into another,
and itself is both, and the unity of both is also its own essence," then Ukraine is awakening
to its true essence, the presence of the other within itself (1807, 251). Ukraine has long
viewed itself, its history, and its future through the eyes of others-now, looking deep into
the reflective pool of Ukrainian social territory and texts, it finds the eyes of another staring
intently back.
DEATH AND RESURRECTION

In an interview with the Russian national newspaper lzvestia on 11 September 2003,
Ukrainian President Kuchma said, "What is the main holiday for Catholics, and what is
the main one for us? They have Christmas-Christ was born; we have Easter-Christ rose
from the dead. In Ukraine, in order to be understood, you have to die first" (Radio Free
Europe 2003). The prevalence of evidence on national death and resurrection in public
space exposes the life force behind many conflicting national memories during millennia
of national otherness. Death, after all, signifies life past-that which is dead once lived.
Ukraine is a historical graveyard, and a contemporary garden, identities.
Modern Ukrainian national identity is steeped in past death; nearly all claims made for
national identification are paralleled by both termination anmesd rejuvenation of life. The
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University of Petro Mohyla Academy was resrored in 1991 as the largest, most prestigious
private university in Kyiv-characterized by strong nationalist publications meant ro
create a Ukrainian intellectual spirit through a sort of "nonprofir entrepreneurship" that
energetically drives the faculty at Mohyla Academy ro resrore lost national virtues and
cachet among educated readers."
Yet death has spread at least two shadows over their work toward national revitalization. The first, in responding ro the "denationalization" of Ukraine during the Russian and
Soviet rule, Mohyla Academy recognizes the enervating loss of national spirit. After all, historical defeat-the death and dependency of the Ukrainian nation to outside empirescould only be fought so vigorously by Ukrainian scholars given an almost universal
interpretation of national defeat from foreign scholars.
The second and more interestingly explicit recognition of death is in the Academy's
own name and placement: "Mohyla" (Mol'I\.l1a in both Russian and Ukrainian) means
grave, an odd yet more appropriate name than most because Mohyla Academy's campus is
built upon the vestiges of 1615 Petro Mohyla's (an early Ukrainian Orthodox metropolitan, educator, and Cossack leader) original academy of higher education that was dismantled and transported to St Petersburg 'in 1815.' On the nominal and literal grave of
higher education arises, like the phoenix from irs ashes, modern Ukrainian national education. Accepting and then turning to fight death has become a modern way of life for
many educated Ukrainians.
Religious undertones and overtones unite public death and life in Ukraine. Soviet and
modern public monuments unanimously celebrate national conception and even more
visibly (though not intentionally) national death. The 1980 Brezhnev-built leviathan of
Soviet statues in Kyiv, the Morher of the Motherland (p()~lIl11a~laT"), rowers over the
Dnieper River with sword stretched in stalwarr pose, reminding Kyiv of its double role as
protecror in war and life-source of Slavic hisrory. The statue stands in the center of the city's
vast World War II memorial complex and right above the Park of Eternal Glory dedicated
to commemorating past death inflicted at the hands of history and glori/}'ing, Soviet-style,
the longevity of the Ukrainian nation. Although many consider the leviathan statue a
Soviet scar, no action is being taken to remove it. Only the nearby steeple of the Pechersk
Complex of the Moscow Orthodox Patriarchate stands higher than the sword of the
Mother of the Motherland statue. The sword was supposedly shortened immediately after
it was built because the Russian Orthodox Church pressured Brezhnev ro avoid blaspheming God by placing the state higher than the church. The parallel is unnerving; wartime
monuments are built in honor of personal sacrifice (i.e., the loss of life) for national
longevity while monuments in honor of Orthodox religion are founded 011 the idea of life
after death (i.e., resurrection).
Other public monuments include the marbled grave of Kyiv Orthodox Patriarch
Volodymyr, which lies near a bus srop on a central public square a ftw meters outside the
entrance to the resplendent Divine Wisdom Cathedral, an awkward result of a religious
squabble in 1995 over the placement of religious graves on public grounds.' It is not surprising that Shevchenko fdls his paintings with crosses and graves that draw the center of

Peters

53

attention. As another example of life and death in one institution, the Nikolaevskyi Roman
Catholic cathedtal in downtown Kyiv was built just before it was taken over by the Soviets
and converted into a "Silencer""-a storage silo tor equipment to silence international radio
broadcasts. Now, restored to its original function, the cathedral hosts international choirs
and organ recitals. Once a disruptor of radio waves, the cathedral now transmits its own
melody for all to hear. It. like much in Ukraine. has undergone a turnabout of signalsfrom static to sound. from death to life. As in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, as in Ukrainian
culture, death is as active as life.
But perhaps the most symbolic union of death. rebirth. and modern Ukrainian identity is the Christian cross. The Christian cross has become such a common occurrence since
independence that its significance almost disappears in Ukrainian culture like leaves do on
a tree. For instance. although a Soviet military cemetery in downtown Kyiv was bereft of
crosses until 1991. practically every additional gravestone placed since bears a cross. Socialist Party leader Olcksandr Moroz said profoundly of a cross erected at the site where the
body ofa slain reporter-Heorhiy Gongadze-was found, "This is not just a symbol of the
death of a man, this is a symbol of truth. of the fight for ttuth." Thus topping Mafioso
jewelry, political rhetoric, and rural hilltops alike, the cross crowns many acrors and institutes of modern Ukrainian culture, symbolizing the religious zenith of popular identity
and evidencing the strong prevalence of death and resurrection as key ideological ornaments with which Ukrainians decorate their public spaces, services, and lives. Although the
crosses come in Illany varieties (e.g., if a figure of Christ's body is attached to a cross, a
Greek Catholic crucifix has one nail through both feet, while an Orthodox crucifix has
a nail through each foot), the social connotation is the same: Ukraine remembers death and
resurrection as part of its collective conscience.
A Jewish memorial at Babi Yar (where the Nazis exterminated over 100,000 Jews in
Kyiv) evokes renewed life from death in three languages (Ukrainian. English. and Yiddish)
with an inscribed winged angel carrying a crossed shield and a sword (not too unlike the
Mother of the Motherland statue in its minute features) and a quotation of Ezekiel 34: 14:
"I will put my breath into you and you will live again." Another public monument on
Kyiv's central street-Khreshatik (\pClllann.:)-marks the place of, and in names identifies, the baptism of Kyiv Rus in the Dnieper River. marking the state-sponsored birth of
Christianity and the official grave of paganism. Ukrainian baptism by immersion refers
once again to the death and rebirth of a nation.
Perhaps the most colorful national symbol is the Ukrainian nationalist emblem: an
inverted triangle with black and red vertical halves, a white cross, and a green trident symbol
encircled by black. The color black stands for Ukrainian soil (territory), the red symbolizes
spilt Ukrainian blood, the white cross invokes Christian purity, and the green trident refers
ro Ukrainian mythology. In all, this symbol subtly portrays Ukrainian nationalistic identity:
religion and farmland that have survived a bloody and noble history. While this formula
of nationalism is largely contrived. it draws well frolll century-old national colors, red for
life and black for death that is ubiquirous in Ukrainian folk art, fabric, and design.
The death and rebirth of Ukrainian national heroes contrasts distinctly with America's
national heroes. Shevchenko has achieved much more since death than in life. George
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Washington, in contrast, remembered for living to make America free from Britain and for
his role in participating in the birth of America, has earned the rightful title of forefather
to his nation." In contrast, Ukraine has its Shevchenko, who glorif-Ies the f-emale whose
bearing of life has often brought death. Instead of forefather, Shevchenko is the foreteller
of his nation, silenced in life in all but script; doomed to be unable to bring about national
independence, he imagined a Cossack historical heritage that would help Ukraine free itself
from others and possess the whole of its bright future. While George Washington lived to
free America, Shevchenko died foretelling Ukrainian rebirth.
Another social text, the national anthem, spells an interesting contrast: while the American
national anthem emphasizes ever waving banners, freedom, and fighting, the Ukrainian
national anthem "Ille lie mlepJIa h.:pa ji1111" translates "Ukraine has not yct died," morbidly hinting that death has long been a serious concern and has yet to leave the nation's
foreseeable horizon. The Polish national anthem similarly reads, "My zyjemy, my zyjemy,
Polska nie zginda" or "we live, we live, Poland has not perished!" As othcr testaments to
how exile and foreign nationalities in tandem give birth to new nations, the Polish historical national anthem begins "oh, Lithuania," the Dutch national anthem begins with "all
those of German blood," France's name comes from the Germanic tribc, the Franks, and
lastly, the Ukrainian national anthem testifIes to how all Ukrainian brothers are "of
Cossack kin." Ukraine-like Europe-shares ancestors of foreign blood. Extending from
Rcmi Brague's (2002) argumcnts on Europe, Ukrainc could also benefit from a national
identity willingly built on original sources outside of its current self" Ukrainian identity is
found in its search-an unsettled national identity ensures that cultural stagnation and
self-absorption will be washed away in a strcam of change.

ON THE THEORY OF THE DEATH OF THE OTHER
Echoing its second theme, modern Ukrainian identity is currently transitioning from death
in its past to its resurrected present. Given the prevalence of plural otherness as a defining
factor in Ukrainian history and the continual reoccurrence of death and rebirth in modcrn
Ukrainian culture, the Ukrainian nation will be able to overcome its identity crisis through
a careful balance between national selfhood and otherness. G .W. F. Hegel offers a compelling account of the achievement of full personhood (which can be extended to include
full nationhood) over the "other" through trial by death:
The individual [nation] who has not staked his lite, may, no doubt, be recognized as
a Person [Nation]; but he has not attained the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. In the same way each must aim at thc death of thc other,
as it risks its own life thereby; for that other is to it of no more worth than itself; the
other's reality is presented to the former as an external other, as outside itself; it must
view its otherness as pure existence for itself or as absolute negation. (1807, 233)
The key to this trial by death is consensus on what "self" means. Without consensus,
the most likely and most dangerous misinterpretation of Hegel's "the death of the other"
leads us to internecine aggression against other nations, which unfortunately characterizes
much of European history since Hegel. The secret to making this Hegelian formula
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friendly is rejecting the label of "other" and not those labeled "other." By defining collectives not in terms of what is "other" but by dismissing altogether the term "other," a nation
is congealed and created. Otherness must be embraced (or at least ignored) in policy and
by polity if nontraditional persuasions are to survive on the national level.
World history would suggest that collectives tend to chafe at the suggestion of accepting
nontraditional groups as one's own, hut as the poet Friedrich Holderlin said, "Wo die
Gefahr ist, wachst das Rettende auch"-where danger is, there lies salvation. Undeniably,
the question of what is Ukrainian will go unanswered until the question of "other" is
resolved, or dismissed altogether.
What then is "other"? For any European collective identity, the "other" is its "outside
self" and not "outside itself" For Ukraine, the other cannot arguably be considered any
one minority because it would be foolish not to recognize its own centuries of abuse that
Ukrainians endured as minorities under other foreign rulers. In a strong sense, Ukraine is
its other.

IMPI.ICATIONS OF A MODERN UKRAINIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

Independent Ukraine has made a fresh start from its history of abuse and suppression. For
example, most people within its borders welcome distancing Ukraine's image from Soviet
history. This may allow for a clean break from sticky national history, facilitating a more
potent national reconstruction, a literal re-member-ing of Ukrainian memory.
On the whole, deliberately (re)envisioning national history in attempt to form a
Ukrainian identity is not unique, nor is it necessarily wrong. In 1882 Ernest Renan stated:
"Getting history wrong is part of being a nation" (1996, 52-54). The word "nation" itself
derives from the Latin past participle of nasci, to be born. Thus quite literally, in reinventing history, every new nation is reborn as an imagined nation. lo
For Ukraine, to remember is to actualize the past in the present. Walter Benjamin helps
explain how political stability and national memory-an invariably misinterpreted institutionalization of memories both kept and forgotten-are related and therefore necessary for
establishing national movements. With the onset of World War II not long past, Benjamin
(1968) pictured the present as a critical meeting of history where the future would fail if a
missing history was not resurrected. Similarly, Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak argues
that in fact Ukrainian history is as "normal" as any other national history (1996, 3).
Because Ukraine is not unique in its history, it needs to treat carefully its divisive history.
The value of history is an ongoing moral, even almost religious, task for the Ukrainian
people-it should be kept out of reach of legislation, state-sponsorship, and arenas of factious
national questions but well within reach of a public devoted to tolerating one another.
Ukrainian identity has not yet been unmade. In other words, Ukraine is still entangled
in the political and religious histories with which it has been involved over the past centuries. Abstracting, instead of constructing, a national identity better describes the intellectual activity at hand because it needs to find itself among consensual principles and not
among the divisive details and distinctions of its past. Consensus is the key to democracy,
another ambition on the national agenda.
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A few areas in the country seem to display such tolerance, giving hope to the whole.
Odes a, the southern city with a cosmopolitan port and population ostensibly illustrates
legislative tolerance toward its many minorities and forms an excellent example for the
larger Ukrainian state. Public declarations are consistently bilingual and restrictions placed
upon religious and ethnic groups are only on the basis of legal infraction and not on the
bias of exclusive treatment. Odesa seems to embrace otherness, which is key to the success
of Ukrainian state and nation. While groups united by similar characteristics (race, religion, and language, to name a few) retain power on the state level, the state itself should
seriously consider going beyond blindness toward difference to the degree of seeking out
and seizing opportunities to tolerate disparate groups within the nation.
Jewish and Gypsy minorities in Odesa are also excellent micro-examples of the sort of
variegated, tolerant pluralism needed in Ukraine: Jews and Gypsies are Europe's two inrernational minorities. Before 1948, neither had a homeland or a set 'nation' of its own; in
addition, the two groups are historically antipodal to one another: while Jews have long
integrated and dominated social capital across Ukraine (and all of the Western world),
Gypsies generally have preferred close-knit communities separated from their host nations.
Thus socially perpendicular, Jews and Gypsies have found at least one tolerant point
of intersection in Odesa, which city houses its own Jew-Gypsy cemetery, another instance of
a place of death as the Ukrainian medium for finding new hope for the future.
Differences, however, are not absolute or irreducible-they are occasions for understanding, not separation. The key to integration of a larger national identity into a state
with many minorities is for no element of the nation to consider itself superior to others.
Instead, as Professor Roman Szporluk writes that any dominant majority should "dissolve
itself within or identifY itself with a broader territorial, political, and or ideological concept
as well. And so we have Americans, not 'WASPS'; Ottomans, not Turks; British, not English; Spaniards, not Castilians" (2001, 249). Thus we can have all Ukrainians, not merely
Poles, Russians, Catholics, Orthodox, etc.
CONCLUSION ON THE CHERNOZEM (BlACK EARTH) OF HISTORY

A nation's history is a composition greater than the sum of its components, which can
transform a nation from a historical graveyard into a garden of identities. Ukrainian
history is in fact Ukrainian national identity's surest friend. Now, to succeed in its openly
pro-European Union foreign policy, the Ukrainian state can foster a society whose ideals
are based on tolerance of internal otherness, or a national identity in differences. In particular, Ukraine would do well to adopt a capability of Europeans, to accept one's preferred
identity as secondary to a larger identity. As Remi Brague argues, this idea of voluntary
secondarity to a greater source is originally Roman. In other words, the ability that Europeans have to think that they are Greek is actually Roman. The Romanity of Europe allows
Europe to accept itself on the whole as secondary to its Greek origins. In the same light,
Ukrainians can be European if they will accept their local identity as secondary to that of
an all-embracing Ukrainian identity. Thus the success of democratization and nation-
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building-Ukraine's two greatest political experiments-hinges on humility, or the recognition of self as secondary to a greater good.
Ukraine needs its pluralistic history and heritage to show that it was not always what
it thinks it was; such an understanding will help it become more than what previous visions
of its origins would allow. Ironically, without its traumatic history with its neighbors,
Ukraine could never have become what it is today, heterogeneous and diverse. The ultimate
reversal of Shevchenko's rue and rath against Muscovy and Poland, Ukraine's past plight
under foreign rulers has lead Ukraine to this point where, given its embryonic statehood
and inveterate historical pluralism, it must become one of the most progressive, tolerant
nations in all of Eastern Europe to survive independently.
The coals of Ukrainian national history glow red under the ashes of time. As
Emmanuel Levinas said, history is "truth [thar] illuminates whoever breathes on its flame
and coaxes it back to life. More or less. It's a question of breath. To admit the effect that
literature [and all other national texts] has on men is perhaps the ultimate wisdom of the
West in which the people ... may recognize themselv~s" (1989, 266).]] Will history's heat
and flame be used to burn the intruder's hand, or will the flame harmlessly traverse a
nation, thawing the bitterness of a painful past? History is a question of breath. A controlled diaphragm can build a bonttre, while a careless breeze (;111 set the whole territory
ablaze. Only by ttnding their national image refracted and imperfect in the dissonance of
their many historical texts, will Ukraine be reborn strong and supple. Ukraine lies in the
world's richest soil, chemozem, or literally black earth, which history has made again to
cultivate its perennial crop, Ukrainian national identity.
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ENDNOTES
I. A patriarchate is the geographic and spiritual center of an Orthodoxy church that houses
a patriarch who rules over all other bishops. Since authority of church doctrine and
political clout remain intertwined today, this concept of patriarchate will be useful for
later discussion of conflicting national churches.
2. A similar word play, the Russian word for "country," invokes its sister word tor "strange."
3. For another attempt of an outsider who tries to define Ukraine as a nation, see this essay.
For an excellent and accessible treatment of the process of identity and otherness, see
Honig 2001.
4. This term is borrowed from the author's father, John Peters, who made the observation
while visiting Mohyla Academy in summer 2003.
5. Incidentally, molryla, or grave, is another of Shevchenko's favorite words, appearing
almost as often as its conceptual partner, chuzhii, or foreign. Also, Petro Mohyla's
innovative brand of Orthodoxy combined with the fighting Cossack counterculture to
create in 1648, perhaps for the first time, a distinctly Ukrainian (non-Rus, nonRuthenian) society.
6. The Divine Wisdom Cathedral is most ~ommonly known in English as the mistranslation "Saint Sophia's Cathedral." However, the translation "divine wisdom" adheres
more closely to the original meaning of the name of the building after which the
Divine Wisdom Cathedral was patterned-the Hagia Sophia in Instanbul, Turkey. In
fact Hagia Sophia is originally an Eastern Orthodox title tor Jesus.
7. Literally a "Silencer" in Russian, which could also be rendered "jamming station" in
English.
8. Considering Washington as America's forefather, it is interesting to note that some interpret the Washington monument as a phallic symbol.
9. See Brague 2002 for more on the treatment of European identity and otherness.
10. As a young boy, the author created the word "remcmbertend," a portmanteau of
"remember" and "pretend," that might work well for Ukraine in imagining anew a
collective, consensual national identity.
II. Brackets added.
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THEORIES OF MONEY IN POLITICS:

The 2002 Missouri Senate Race

John J. Nielsen
ABSTRACT

The 2002 Missouri Senate race, ill which challmgerJames 71tlent (R) defeated incumbent Jean Carnahan (D). is used as a case study to determine the strength ofuarious theories relating to money in
politics, /1 bricfhistory is o/Jercd 011 the race itself as well as the 2000 election that necessitated it,
In examining the theoretiCtlI and actual roles of war chests and candidates, parties, and interestgroup spending. it seems that money was not the deciding/actor in this race, No one bought the election beeause it could not be bought. although presidential popularity possib{y gave the marginal edge
to 71zlent, This study concludes with countel/actuals to test the effict of three di./firmt campaign
finance regimes-publicfinancing, an open ~ystem, and BeRA (2002)-andfinds that the election
would not have turned out di./firentry under any ofthem, Therefore, campaign finance reform in this
case would constitute unnece,Ha~y and uncollJtitutional restrictions on speech without providing the
desired benefits ofgreater competitiveness and democratic responsiveness,

T

o say that money is the lifeblood of politics is not to say that money overrides all other
considerations at all times and under all circumstances, but rather to make the point
that politics as we'know it would be impossible without it-lots of it, The role of money
in politics in general is as controversial as it is vital, and elections, as no other aspect of the
political process, make this abundantly clear, Money in elections is controversial because if
the candidate who has the most money wins at the polls-and he or she usually doesthen the very essence of democracy seems to be threatened, However, money in elections
is vital because, in addition to organization of every other imaginable logistical category
involved in running a campaign that has any chance of winning, staffs must be hired, fundraisers organized, Hiers and mailers printed and sent out, television ads produced and time
purchased, personal appearances organized, and travel coordinated. The concern over
campaign finance has developed into an intense political and scholarly debate that is not
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likely to be resolved any time soon; however, even though there may be a certain amount
of aporia involved, it is nonetheless crucial to examine the evidence, theories, and practical
application of the campaign finance reform debate in ordt:r to craft an elt:ctoral system that
will provide the broadest freedom of participation possible, while making sure that there is
a level playing fIeld.
In this essay, I will test competing theories from campaign finance literature using the
2002 Missouri Senate race as a case study. The literature heavily emphasizes competitive
races because they attract the most money (Mann and Corrado 2002; GoodliHe and
Magleby 2001). This race was extremely competitive throughout, providing an excellent
cast: study for theory tt:sting. Focusing on one ract: is advantagt:Ous bt:caust: it can provide a
deep understanding of the forces at work in a single case, but it is also problematic because
particular circumstances reduce the likelihood that the results can be extrapolated to other
races. Senate races in general differ from House races in that they are broader in scopt:, they
are much more competitive, and the candidates are better known and better funded. This
particular senate race differs from most others in that the incumbent was appointed rather
than dt:cted. Nevertheless, a study of this sort can provide interesting insights into tht: workings of a state's politics and the possible eHects of further campaign fInance reform.
I will begin with a brief description of the 2000 Missouri Sen are race, whose special
circumstances made the 2002 race nect:ssary, and briefly trace the candidates' political
background and experience. Then, ill examining the race itself; I will follow the campaigns
of incumbent Jean Carnahan (0) and challenger James Talent (R) from before the primaries
up through Talent's narrow victory on election night, examining the effect of money at
each stage of the process. My findings indicate that money was not the determining factor
in the 2002 Missouri Senate race. Spending on each side essentially cancelled out spending
on the other side and did not signifIcantly affect candidate entry, expected vore share, or
actual votes. Thus, to the extent that other Senate races are similar to the 2002 Missouri
race, campaign finance reform would unnecessarily hinder political speech without significantly affecting the outcome. For those who would doubt the general applicability of these
findings, this essay provides clear evidence that campaign finance reform can have detrimental, though unintended, effects on polirical speech wirhout accomplishing rhe
intended goals of increased comperition and accountability.
THE 2000 ELECTION

The 2000 Missouri Senate race promised to be one of the most hotly contesred races in
the nation. Governor Mel Carnahan (0) was finishing his second term as governor and
challenging former governor and then-freshman Senator John Ashcroft: (R). Jusr three
weeks before Election Day, Governor Mel Carnahan, his son Randy, and an aide were
killed in a plane crash. Politics and campaigning stopped for a couple of days as the acting
governor, Roger Wilson, decided what to do. Because Missouri law did not allow Cafllahan's name to be removed from the ballor, Wilson announced thar he would appoint rhe
governor's wife, Jean Carnahan, to fill the seat for two years if the late governor won
(appointing the spouse of a deceased senator is COllllllon practice alllong governors). The
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Republicans were furious, but Senator Ashcroft assented, Mrs. Carnahan agreed, and the
campaign went forward. The race remained close to the end-a fumsas City Star poll commissioned two weeks before the election had the candidates deadlocked at 46 percent
apiece (CBS News 2002)-bllt the late governor Carnahan won with 50 percent of the
vote to Ashcroft's 48 percent. Ashcroft refused to contest the results despite significant
pressure ~I'om the Republican Party on the grounds that late poll numbers from St. Louis
should have been excluded from the count and that Jean Carnahan should have been a
write-in candidate instead of an appointee (Bellamy 2002). Insisting that the people had
spoken, Ashcroft conceded to the results of the election on November 8 and Jean Carnahan was
appointed by Acting-Governor Wilson to fill the Senate seat for two years (jefferson City News

Tribune 2002).
CARNAHAN AND TALENr-BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

Mel Carnahan had been a fixture in Missouri politics, for a long time, a well-known and
respected Democrat who, in addition to being the forn~er lielltenant governor and governor,
had served as state treasurer, a member of the state House of Representatives, and a municipal judge after practicing law for a few years. Jean Carnahan, however, was an inexperienced appointed state senator, and appointed senators do not fare very well in reelection
bids-according to James King (1999), their success rate is a mere 38.3 percent (434).
The fact that Jean Carnahan would be facing a high-quality Republican would not help
her cause either. Her opponent, Jim Talent, had an extensive background in the law,
campaigns, and elected office. He had served as minority leader in the state House of
Representatives, had been a member and assistant majority leader of Congress for eight
years (1992-2000), and had narrowly lost (by 22,000 votes) a bid for the governorship to
Bob Holden in 2000. He had been the candidate of choice for Republicans after John
Ashcroft had been appointed and confirmed U.S. attorney general in January 2001 and
had formally declared his intention to run in October of that year.
With this basic understanding of the race and the candidates involved, we can now
enter into a discussion of the role of money during the campaign, examining whether
money was able to keep challengers from entering the race by looking at the money
primary, the party primaries, the role of the political parties, and the effects of war chests.

DID

MONEY

KEEP

OUT CHALLENGERS?

The Money Primary

Theory. Winning the money primary, the race for dollars in the months leading up to the
party primaries, is often crucial to winning elections. According to a study of presidential
elections conducted by Adkins and Dowdle (2002), the winner of the money primary
tends to win the party primary overwhelmingly, and because the primary season is "frontloaded," or weighted towards the first quarter of the year, this early money becomes even
more important. Adkins and Dowdle cite four important advantages of early money: it
allows candidates to more easily hire skilled personnel and set up campaign organizations;
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it affects media coverage, as news outlets often determine the level of coverage given to a
candidate by how much money that candidate has; it is an early sign of support, which
helps with futute fund-raising; and it allows the candidates to deal with unexpected setbacks (258). Therefore, the more early money a candidate raises, the greater his or her
chances of success become. The most signitlcant factors determining who gets this early
money are strong poll performance and a large commitment of monies to fund-raising
(273). Even though this particular srudy dealt with presidential primary races, it might
prove useful in understanding the 2002 Missouri Senate race; if Adkins and Dowdle are
right, then Carnahan and Talent won the money primary and probably had strong poll
numbers and a signitlcant amount of money committed to fiJlld-raising.
Evidence. Both candidates won the money primary and had strong support in public
polls, though it is unclear just how much they committed to fund-raising. In the months
leading up to the party primaries, Carnahan and Talent raised a great deal of money. As of
December 31, 2001, Carnahan had already raised $2.2 million and had reached $3.47
million by primary season, the summer of 2002 (Quaid 2002b). Talent had raised
$2.12 million by the same time (Quaid 2002b). In accordance with Adkins and Dowdle's
results, both candidates had excellent performance in statewide polls, and Carnahan's
greater success at this stage could be attributable to a greater organizational investment in
fund-raising. Because it was clear early on to both voters and political parties in Missouri
that Carnahan and Talent would be their respective party's candidate, they attracted almost
all the money and were both incredibly successful not only compared to their in-parry
opponents (whose combined fund-raising totaled $29,198) hut also to senate candidates
across the nation (politicalmoneyline.com 2002). This confIrms the assertion that those
who win the money primary tend to win the nomination of their party. But, was it
the money per se that scared off the competition? The answer requires an investigation of the
primary itself and those who planned to run.

The Party Primaries
Though there were a numher of quality Democratic candidates who could have entered the
Missouri Senate race in 2002, none showed any interest, at least publicly, in running. This
is to be expected, given that incumbents rarely face opposition for reelection from within
their own parry. Aside from the incumbent Carnahan, possible contenders included
Governor Bob Holden; Lieutenant Governor Joe Maxwell; state Attorney General (and
former senate challenger) Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon; state senate minority leader Ken Jacob;
and state house minority leader Mark Abel. Governor Holden, as previously discussed, had
been in office only since 2000 and did not show any interest in running, especially against
Talent, whom he had so narrowly defeated. The lieutenant governor never expressed
interest, at least nor publicly, and probably would nor want to leave office after only two
years to challenge an incumbent senator. Jacob and Abel never showed interest. Only Jay
Nixon decided to enter rhe primary, but did not raise any money, showing that he was nor
serious about winning. Other candidates included Darrell Day, a man with no electoral
experience who was in jail for violation of probation at the time of the vote, and Alan
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Wheat, another man with no experience in politics who raised no money during the entire
election cycle. Carnahan won the Democratic primary handily against such token
opposition with 81 percent of the vote.
In the Republican primary, Talent's opposition was as weak as Carnahan's. On the
Republican side, besides Jim '/alent, quality potential candidates included other U.S.
representatives from Missouri; 1996 gubernatorial candidate State Auditor Margaret Kelly;
state senate majority leader Michael Gibbons; and state house speaker Catherine Hanaway.
Aside from Talent, two other U.S. representatives, .fo Ann Emerson and Kenny Hulshof,
showed interest early, but they quickly dropped off the radar because of a lack of support.
Republican party members, leaders, and contributors began to solidly back Talent by
mid-200 1, shortly before he announced his candidacy (Quaid 2001). Actual primary
candidates included Joseph May, former president of a local dental association; Martin
"Mad Dog" Lindstedt, a former libertarian and militiaman whose only campaign experience
was a losing bid for Newton County sheriff in 1996; and Scott Craig Babbit, a write-in
candidate who took time ofT from running a website dedicated to conspiracy theories
(www.thefinaldays.com) to try for the Republican nomination. Talent swept the field with
91 percent of the primary vote.
It is not intuitive to imagine anyone wanting to go up against candidates with as much
financial backing as Carnahan and Talent had; however, the reasons for the lack of quality
challengers go beyond money. Recent Missouri Senate races had a legacy oflackluster candidates. Going back to 1992, unsuccessful challengers from both parties in the primaries
included Marc Perket (R)' who bragged that if he lost the primary, "I have gotten my 200
bucks worth of entertainment out of it" (Quaid 2000); James Askew (D), a truck driver
who seemed to enjoy just declaring candidacy in the primaries; Ronald Wagganer (D), a
teamster with no party backing; and Doris Bass Landfather (R), a self-proclaimed student
of national politics with no political experience of her own. These challengers were not just
a few nuisance candidates-they were the only candidates from the major parties that ran
and did not go on ro win the nomination. In this case, Carnahan's and Talent's monies that
accumulated up to the party primaries were not even sufficient to deter nuisance challengers (Goodliffe 2002, 12), let alone quality challengers.

Party Strength, Not Money, Was Responsible for the Lack of Quality Challengers
Given the candidates in Missouri Senate races in the last decade, it appears that party politics in Missouri is very strong and is responsible for the lack of quality opposition in
primary races. It seems that it is not the money that deters challengers, but it is the party
that both keeps challengers away and brings in the money for its chosen candidate. This
assumption would confirm the suspicion of Jo Mannies, political correspondent with the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, that both parties were solidly behind their chosen candidate, which
support had a deterrent effect (2003). It is possible that decisions were made even before
Carnahan and Talent formally announced their candidacies, perhaps in order to prevent
infighting and to concentrate scarce resources for what all predicted would be a very close,
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hard-fought race. It could also be the case that Carnahan and Talent were such highquality candidates that quality challengers refused to run against them. In any case, it does
not seem to have been money that determined the candidates.
War Chests in the General Election

Theory. Though both Talent and Carnahan had large amounts of money going into the
general election-they had accumulated large "war chests"-in the general election,
Carnahan's war chest would play the most important role; as the incumbent, she would
have the greatest chance of any Democrat of getting enough money t9 deter quality challengers from the Republican Party. Some scholars would confirm that incumbent war
chests are indeed important signaling devices that deter challengers and stifle competition,
but others see war chests merely as leftover funds from a previous campaign. Hersch and
McDougall (1994) are of the former persuasion, holding that large war chests are sufficient
to deter quality challengers from entering races. These "unencumbered funds" deter by
serving as a sign to potential challengers that the incumbent is willing and able to engage
in a "formidable campaign" (630). The authors propose three mechanisms for this effect:
the money itself, the money as a signal of tllture fund-raising power, and the money as a
signal of nonobservable attributes of the incumbent (i.e., tenacity, charisma) (633).
According to this theory, given the advantages of incumbency (franking privilege, greater
fund-raising capability, greater visibility, and so on), quality challengers are unlikely to
enter unless they believe that they have a good chance of winning because they do not .want
to squander their hard-earned political capital. The data of Hersch and McDougall
suggests that variables such as party strength, lagged (previous election) vote, and tenure all
surpass war chests in substantive significance, but leave room for the assertion that experienced challengers are deterred by war chests and the signals they send (640).
Goodliffe (2001) takes a very different view. (Sec also Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000a.)
Rather than endowing war chests with great symbolic importance and understanding them
as strategic funds accumulated in anticipation (or prevention) of a tough campaign, he
asserts that they are simply the funds left over after an election (200 I, 833; 2002, 1). The
effect of war chests disappears when previous (or lagged) vote share is taken into account
along with the quality of the previous challenger (measured in terms of political experience
in elective office). In other words, just as we would expect, politicians defeating a weak
challenger by a large vote margin have a lot of money left at the end of a campaign simply
because they did not have to spend it to win.
Evidence. Carnahan's incredible fund-raising success is documented above, bur in order
to examine the possible deterrent ettect of war chests on Republican challengers, it is necessary to go further back to the beginning of her term in 2000, when Republicans began
making their decisions on running against her in 2002. In her first six months in office,
she raised $1.7 million (Quaid 2002a); even this unusually large amount was not enough
to dissuade Jim Talent, a high-quality challenger, from entering and eventually winning
the race. Indeed, Carnahan might have engaged in so serious fund-raising in an attempt to
scare off the competition, but it did not work.
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This conclusion is difficult to accept because it both seems counterintuitive and goes
against anecdotal evidence. First, Jonathan Salant (J 996) offers a number of examples of
candidates who explicitly state that they did not enter a race because of the incumbent's
war chest. Also, Milyo and Groseclose (1999) quote Mitt Romney, a multimillionaire, as
saying that he did not want to go up against the kind of money his opponent had saved
up. It seems that war chests are not so much a deterrent as a convenient excuse-why
would an experienced politician or a multimillionaire be frightened off by some money
their opponents h~d saved up? Despite this anecdotal evidence to the contrary, war chests
do not exert a systematic deterrent effect on entry of either high-quality or low-quality
challengers (Goodliffe 2001, 838). However, the fact that money did not keep anyone out
of the race does not preclude the possibility that Talent bought his victory. In order to
determine what effect Talent's spending had in the general election, it is necessary
to examine his campaign.

Did Talent Buy the Election?

Theory. The suspicion that Talent won the Missouri Senate election because of h is money
reflects one of reformers' greatest concerns, that candidates can "buy" a campaign. As
evidence that campaigns are for sale to the highest bidder, reformers cite the 2000 New
Jersey Senate race, in which Democrat John Corzine spent over $60 million of his own
money on the way to victory. Assuming that Corzine did not win because of political skill
or other personal characteristics, reformers see the troubling prospect that elective office,
at least in some cases, may go not to the most qualified candidate, but to the candidate
with the most money (Jacobson 1990; Gerber 1998; Damore 1997). This theory becomes
more complicated when spending eHects are taken into account. In the case of John
Corzine, the election might not necessarily have gone to the highest bidder, but it went to
the most effective spender. Spending in and of itself may be insufficient as a means of gaining
victory because the returns on that spending in terms of votes might be different for
incumbents and challengers.
In studying house elections, Jacobson (1990) finds that spending effects are indeed
different for incumbents and challengers. Does this apply to the Senate? Although there are
some fundamental diHerences between house and senate races (such as that in senate races
the challengers are more well known and the races are generally more competitive),
Jacobson's findings might well apply to Carnahan and Talent.
Jacobson uses 1986 ABC News polling data to track the expected vote and detect
change during two distinct "waves" of political advertising. Keeping partisanship, support
for then-President Reagan, and economic expectations constant, he finds that there is
statistical evidence for the claim that incumbent spending does not go as far, dollar for
dollar, as challenger spending (345). Because challengers are not as well known, they get
more for the marginal dollar (355); therefore, spending limits would harm competition in
congressional races.
'l\vo different studies criticize Jacobson's research and make the case for spending limits.
First, Erikson and Palfrey (2000) hold that spending effects, especially in close elections, are
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equal for incumbents and challengers. They fault Jacobson for not correcting for endogeneity
(simulraneity bias) in running Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions that compare the
spending effectiveness of incumbents and challengers and they propose to correct for it
themselves by focusing solely on close elections. '10 do so in their study, they use game
theory, which says that our choices and the choices of others have an effect on each other.
Using game theory, they examine the variahles endogenous to (accounted for in) Jacobsen's
study~district characteristics, short-term forces, candidate characteristics, campaign
spending, and chance-and the exogenous (unaccounted fur) variables of lagged incumbent vote, district vote for incumbent party, year, and southern states. Looking at these
endogenous and exogenous variables, Erikson and Palfrey determine that safe seats cost
the least and that total spending is "continuously increasing in the expected closeness
of the race" (605). In close races, the marginal value of money is basically equal, and
because incumbents have more money to spend, they have an unfair advantage in the races
that are most important. Because Jacobson included all races, the high number of safe seats
skewed the results and did not reflect this unfair advantage. Spending limits, therefore,
would favor challengers by giving them a greater chance of winning and would also
increase electoral competition, which would improve the quality of elected officials.
Second, Gerber (1998) puts forth the same critique of Jacobsen, but proposes a
different solution to arrive at the same conclusion as Erikson and Palfrey. He presents his
work as a departure from previous studies on the effect of spending by incumbents and
challengers. The conventional view, supported by OLS regressions, is that challenger
spending is much more effective than incumbent spending. Gerber corrects for endogeneity
bias of candidate spending inherent in OLS regressions by running a Two Stage Least
Squares (TSLS) regression. The dependent variables are challenger spending and
incumbent spending. Independent variables include measures of challenger quality
(previous dective office); dummy variables to control for scandal, healrh, and so forth;
a number related to party; and three additional original variables (1998, 401). Gerber's
biggest contribution is the inclusion of three instrumental variables: challenger wealrh,
state population, and lagged (previous election) spending. When all are included in a TSLS
analysis, the gap between spending effectiveness of incumbent and challenger disappears.
In a study unconnected with the three just discussed, Leavitt (1994) offers an entirely
different explanation: spending effects are equal for challengers and incumbents because
spending does not make any difference at all. According to his study, previous studies had
not adequately controlled for candidate quality. This oversight introduces a bias into
spending analyses: having certain personal characteristics and spending a lot of money won
high-quality challengers a large share of the vote. To control for candidate quality, Leavitt
examines rematch races in the House, which would make them more similar to Senate
races by involving well-known candidates that presumably would not have as much to gain
from increased spending as obscure candidates would. He finds that spending has "an
extremely small impact, regardless of who does [it]" (777). If spending does nO[ increase
candidates' chances of winning, why then do politicians spend so much money on campaigns? Leavitt believes that either the politicians are acting on faulty assumptions or the
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marginal cost of fund-raising is low (796). In essence, the candidates are either bidding on
the electoral equivalent of oceanfront property in New Mexico or spending money because
it comes, and goes, relatively easily.
Evidence. The data from Carnahan's and Talent's campaigns supports the assertion that
money had no effect on the outcome of the election. Figures 1 and 2 track polling results (or
expected vote) and candidate spending and compare the effect of spending on the results.
Figure 1 comes directly from Kropf et al. (2003, 11) and Figure 2 is made from
FEC numbers.
As Figure 1 shows, the race was too close to call, even from the earliest stages of
the campaign. Neither Carnahan nor Talent had a lead outside the margin of error in the
available polls. It seems that voters had made up their minds early on in the race.
Figure 1 Missouri Polls Taken during 2003
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This graph represents an author compilation of the different polls taken during the course
of the campaign including those by American Viewpoint, Garin-Hart-Yang, Research 2000 and
the Kansas City Star.

Figure 2 Candidate Spending in the 2002 Missouri Senate Race
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Figure 2 shows that candidate spending (tracked from April to November) through
July was basically equal and had no effect on poll standing in Figure 1. Although spending
changed drastically during the October quarter when Carnahan more than doubled
Talent's spending, and equalized again in the weeks leading up to the general election, the
candidates' standings did not experience a proportional change. Even though huge amounts
were spent on both sides, and relatively more by the incumbent, candidate spending did
not significantly affect expected or actual vote. Because Talent won even while spending
significantly less money, it appears that Jacobsen's theory is confirmed: challenger
spending is more effective than incumbent spending.
In this 2002 election, the recent past could account for the futility of Carnahan's
spending; Jim Talent was not a typical challenger. In 2000, Jim Talent lost the Missouri
governorship to Bob Holden by only 22,000 votes; he had run and barely lost a statewide
campaign only a couple of years before. Voters were already familiar with his policy views,
his face, image, and so forth, perhaps even as much as they were with Jean Carnahan's. The
gubernatorial race brought Talent to the attention of the entire state (not just his congressional district) in such a way as to eliminate the already-mitigated obscurity of a challenger
in a senate race. Perhaps spending canceled out or reached a saturation point at which
neither candidate could get more votes with their marginal dollar; indeed, according to
Political Money Line, Carnahan actually out-raised (she raised $12,316,325 to Talent's
$9,431,603) and out-spent ($12,293,579 to $8,777,033) Talent by millions of dollars.
This could be in line with Leavitt's assertion that spending has no effect on electoral outcomes; in fact, the 2002 Missouri Senate race was very similar to the rematches Leavitt
examines because both candidates were very well known and neither candidate's spending
seemed to have any eHeer. Therefore, Talent did not buy the election because it could not
be bought by a candidate. It is also plausible that spending by both candidates simply
suffered from diminishing marginal returns, which Jacobson suggests is nor rhe case wirh
lesser-known candidates (1990, 355).
But what if the bidders in rhe electoral auction are not just the candidates? What if
their political parties are bidders as well? Some reformers believe that it is possible for
polirical party spending, the subject of our next inquiry, to make the crucial difference.

Did the Republican Party Buy the Election?

Background. Another of campaign finance reformers' largest concerns centers around what
is commonly called "soft money," or money that is not subject to contribution limits
because it is donated to the party as a whole rather than to individual candidates. For
reformers, soft money represents an illegal and corrupting influence on the campaign
process; for others, it represents greater participation in the political process and the
strengthening of both political parties and federalism, which encourages responsive government. Following an FEC decision in 1978 relating to Republican Party expenditures in
Kansas, soft money has grown both in the amount spent and areas of expenditure, with
parties using millions each election cycle for everything from "building funds" to "coordiluted expenditures," always in the name of party building (Corrado 1997, 168). Soft
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money expenditures also free up hard money funds, making them available for express
advocacy and close races. For example, a party can spend soft money on building fees and
other overhead expenses, allowing them to spend more hard money on the campaigns
themselves.
La Raja (200 1) seeks to discredit the idea that soft money is by nature a corrupting
influence. Though he concedes that parties violate the spirit, and possibly the letter, of the
law in their soft money raising and spending, he asserts that parties are stronger as a result,
which strength seems to be a good thing. Using FEC numbers (1992-1998) and comparing
the major parties, he explores the sources and uses of soft money over time and finds
that the amount of soft money in campaigns has risen dramatically in the 1990s, with individuals contributing the most (for both parties), followed by business (with a ,light edge
to Republicans). Labor unions give Democrats nontinancial benefits, which aid in mobilization efforts. Both parties are about equal in terms of soft money, so neither really wants
to reform the system. Though reformers dislike the ways national and state parties have
worked the system to their advantage in order to have unlimited fund-raising and expenditures, they also recognize that soft money has strengthened political parties in positive
ways. La Raja concludes with a recommendation that soft money be limited, but that
parties have some access to other funds for party building and citizen participation (200 I,
106). The normative aspects of soft money will be addressed later in this essay. At this
point. I will examine two differing views on soft money influence and see how they apply
in the Missouri race.
Theory. Magleby and Smith (2002) focus on the 2000 elections to understand the role
of soft money in today's campaigns. Using FEC numbers and some estimates from scholarly
journals, they prove that soft money can strengthen political parties to a small degree; this
strengthening is a good thing to the extent that the money is spent on party-building
activities (registration, Get Out the Vote (GOTV) drives. communication. and so forth)
as opposed to mere tederal campaigns. They point out three advantages that soft money
has over hard money: it can he more easily raised and in unlimited amounts. it is easily
transferable, and it frees up hard money for more direct campaigning (34-36). From their
examination of soft money use. they conclude that soft money is primarily spent on a combination of "air war" (television and radio) and "ground war" (mailing, telephone call)
efforts rather than party building. Because such "electioneering" efforts (campaigning that
is ostensibly issue-oriented but actually directed for or against a candidate) do not signifIcantly strengthen parties, soft money should be regulated (45-46).
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000b) focus on the consequences of banning soft money.
They also extol the virtues of strong political parties but conclude that money is a major
factor contributing to their strength. Both articles point out that soft money makes up
only 12 percent of total campaign financing; therefore. banning it would not have a
devastating effect on national party politics. Neither would banning soft money drastically
affect party discipline (which runs somewhat counter to the proposition that stronger
parties contribute to greater responsiveness in government). State parties would sustain
the most damage from the effects of a soft-money ban. Here they dispute Magleby and
Smith's claim that nonfederal (state) money is almost exclusively used for media blitzes.
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Money given to state and local parties, they claim, is under the state, not national, party's
discretion and is used largely for party-building purposes; as such, cutting it would
significantly lower voter turnout.
Evidence. The national parties put substantial amounts of money into the Missouri
2002 Senate race, though not in equal amounts. According to Political Money Line, the
Republican National Party spent $171,850 and the Democratic National Party $16,500 in
"nonfederal" funds. This favors Talent, of course, but apparently the DNC understood that
Carnahan's campaign had plenty of funds. According to the FEC, Carnahan transferred
$782,000 back to the national party in soft money.
Soft money and other party resources can be spent on radio orTY issue advocacy (the
"air war"), which attacks or defends a candidate for federal office without expressly
advocating the election or defeat of that candidate. Issue advocacy is distinguished
from what is called express advocacy by the Buckley test. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976)' the
Supreme Court determined that Congress could limit expenditures on advertisements that
expressly advocated the election or deleat of a candidate for federal oHice. The so-called
"magic words" test ftom this case opinion defines an advertisement as express if it contains
words such as "vote for or against," "elect," or "defeat." If it does not contain such terms,
an advertisement is defined as issue advocacy. These advertisements are not qualitatively
different than express advertisements (Baker and Magleby 2002, 54) but avoid regulation
by using phrases like "call candidate x and tell him or her what a great or lousy job he or
she is doing" or "let candidate x know how much you care about issue y." These types are
sometimes referred to as "sham" or "electioneering" advertisements. Soft money can also be
put into party building, GOTV drives, and direct mailings (the "ground war"). According
to Kropf et al. (2003), the air war was basically a wash: the Democrats spent
$2,718,344 on television and $217,757 on radio; the Republicans spent $2,561,385 and
$146,950, respectively (2).
The ground war involved, according to Kropf et aI., "unprecedented direct mail
programs" totaling nine million pieces and costing $4 million (4). This portion of the
ground war for 'lalent targeted women. To narrow the gender gap, most mailers addressed
women's concerns on various issues from health care to education. There were also a
number of visits by nationally prominent Republican women such as Laura Bush and Janet
Ashcroft (3). Mailers were also sent defending Talent's issue stances from Democratic
attacks (4). The ground war for Carnahan focused on her voting record and her stance on
issues such as defense and the economy and targeted traditional Democratic supporters
such as labor unions and blacks (3, 4).
Both parties also invested heavily in getting citizens out to vote. Using past voting
records, volunteer public gatherings, phone calls, and door-to-door visits, the Democrats
targeted those of their party most likely to vote. The day of the election, volunteers staked
out the polls and drove about in volunteered cabs, reminding the party faithful to get to
the ballot box (4-5). The Republicans are not historically successful at getting out the vote,
especially since they do not traditionally have much support in large cities. Because they
did not have enough volunteers, the Republicans ended up hiring staff to work
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contacting loyal parry members by any means possible (5). A couple of visits in late October
and early November by President Bush probably helped out as well (5).
According to recent estimates, the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
(OSCC) transferred about $2.9 million in hard money and $5.8 million in soft money for
a total of $8.6 million to the Missouri state Democratic Party for use in the campaign; the
National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) transferred $2.2 million in hard and
$5.6 million in soft money to their state party for a total of $7.7 million (though reports
indicate it was closer to $8.1 million; Magleby and Monson 2004, 47). It seems that each
parry either canceled out the other's spending in both soft and hard money or just matched
the other's spending for the sake of not falling behind. Andy Grossman of the DSCC
recently commented at the National Press Club that a lot of his party's spending in Missouri was "absurd .... It was a waste of money. We did it because [the Republicans] did it.
We had to respond" (Magleby and Monson 2003, 28). The Republican Party did not
"buy" the election. Could special interest groups have made the difference?
Did Special Interests Buy the Electionr

Theory. Many reformers target special interest groups in addition to candidates and.
parries, believing that interest-group money reflects the narrow preferences of an elite
few. Baker and Magleby (2002) study the impact of interest group activity on the 2000
elections, guiding their work with Madison's analysis of factions in Federalist No.1 O. Is
the large republic theory of pluralist competition enough to control modern factions?
Interest groups work mostly through soft money contributions and issue advocacy. A
concern for candidates is that even groups that support them can influence the direction
of their campaign and force them to change their strategy. Baker and Magleby believe that
no reform will be meaningful unless it challenges independent sham issue ads and
changes disclosure requirements, thereby limiting the undue influence of special interests
(72-73). They believe rdorm is necessary and that competition is not sufficient to control
interest groups in campaigns.
Schneider (2002) takes a similar view of interest groups. His argument in a nutshell is
as follows:
X is good: Americans like X.
Special

interes~s

y, Z are against X.

Y and Z support the two political parties.
Therefore, contrary to the preferences of most Americans, the parties do not support X.
Solution: eliminate y, Z influence in the Democratic Parry, and at least one party will
be responsive to the people and pass X.
According to this view, interest groups merely represent the narrow interests of a select few
that seek their own benefit at the expense of the average voter. Clawson et al. (1998) agree
and assert that corruption persists in the system even among those interest groups that
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follow the rules. They equate contributions to a candidate with gifts subject to the "norm
of reciptocity"-a feeling of obligation to return favors or gifts for flVors or gifts received
(34). If nothing else, contributions limit the uncertainty that a given representative will
vote or act on a certain issue important to the donor. They divide corporate donors into
two broad categories: pragmatic and ideological. The former aim to achieve short-term,
specific goals, and the latter are more concerned with the ideological composition
of a given branch of the government. They assert that "bener than 80 percent are pragmatic, given parrerns in PAC donations" (39). They conclude that donations are given
primarily to establish personal connecrions, to grant access, and to promote a feeling of
obligation in the donee.
Others disagree with the assertions above and instead argue that interest groups
promote rather than limit citizen participation and represent broad rather than narrow
interests. James Bopp, lead counsel for National Right to Life, asserts that they are the best,
if not the only, form of participation through which the citizen of "average means" can
influence the political process. Besides, interest groups do not seek "undue" influence
because they seek only to support those who already share their beliefs (2003). This is a
view of interest groups more in line with Bauer et al.'s (1963) assertion, which says
that interest groups act more like "service bureaus" than pressure groups. Bauer concludes that lobbyists spend most of their time working with political friends rather than
enemies and therefore miss out on opportunities to sway those in the middle (350). In a
study of late 1950s and early 1960s trade legislation, rather than out-and-out corruption,
he finds in these instances that interest groups often work as "service bureaus" in that they
give logistical and informational support to those that further their causes and spread
the word about legislation to the general public. Though Bauer does not dismiss entirely
their ability to exert pressure, he disagrees that it is their primary focus. Instead, each group
seeks to help out its friends (which for purposes of this essay includes election efforts as
well as support once they are in oftlce), and since there are often groups lined up on both
sides of an issue, the result is a stalemate (398).
Evidence. Another list ftom PoliticalMoneyLine (2003), though it varies in money
totals and sources, contains essentially the same players. An examination of the two lists
shows that the supporting interest groups line up predictably for each candidate-business,
finance, and pro-life groups for the Republican and lawyers, labor, and pro-choice groups
for the Democrar. The biggest interest group donors for both candidates were those that
had an electoral motive-the candidates' political friends. This confIrms the more pluralist
view of parties put forth by Bopp and Bauer et al. above. In addition to the campaign
contributions listed above, interest groups also engaged in the air and ground wars. Labor
unions expended great resources in attempts to mobilize about 600,000 voters for Carnahan
(Kropf et al. 2003, 5). Issue groups on both sides of the abortion debate, senior
groups, business groups, and environmental groups sent our mailers in behalf of
their preferred candidate (7).
Direct contributions are not the only way for interest groups to participate, however.
They may also spend money on issue advocacy. According to nationaljournal.com (2003),
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Figure 3 Top Fifteen Hard Money Contributors to Talent and Carnahan.
TALENT:

CARNAHAN:

Finance, Insurance, Real Estate (5935,901)
Business ($916,819)
Miscellaneous ($738,769)
Ideology, Single Issue (Pro-life) ($561,639)
Health ($546,281)
Construction ($386,745)
Agribusiness ($350,957)
Health Professionals ($318,248)
Energy, Natural Resources ($304,857)
Insurance ($205,266)
Commercial Banking ($141,427)
Oil, Gas ($130,950)
Pharmaceuticals ($114,300)
Accountants ($66,050)
Gun Rights (521,000)

Lawyers, lobbyists (SI,222,954)
Lawyers, firms ($1,088,601)
Ideology, Single Issue (Pro-abortion)
($1,795,371)
Miscellaneous ($810,679)
Finance, Insurance (5670,175)
Labor ($464,650)
Communications, Electronics ($417,289)
Health ($374,690)
Health Professionals ($208,000)
Entertainment ($188,714)
Education ($151,800)
Lobbyists ($134,353)
Telephone, Utilities ($75,600)
Computers, Internet ($68,345)
Gun Control ($10,300)

Source: Center f(H Responsive Politics. 2003. Opensecrets.org. At <http://ww\V.opensecrets.org/>

the Sierra Club and anti-abortion groups weighed ill for Carnahan, and seniors' groups
advocating tax cuts favored Talent. A number of groups, whose composition is so similar
to those listed above as to render a separate listing unnecessary, also engaged in independent
expenditures. Independent expenditures must be disclosed but do not count against contribution limits. Magleby and Beal (2002) assert that interest groups "now exploit all the
means of communication open to them" in attempts to influence elections, including
those at issue here (93). Though independent expenditures are far surpassed by soft money
(and hard money for that matter), the authors assert that independent expenditures can
significantly affect election olltcomes-the more a candidate has, the greater chance
he or she has to win. According to PoliticalMoneyLine, $656,707 was spent for
Carnahan or against Talent, and $494,501 was spent for Talent or against Carnahan (2003).
Magleby and Beal are wrong in this particular case. The money spent on behalf of the
winner was substa'ntially less than that spent for the loser, which occurrence indicates that
spending was not effective. Kropf et al. (2003) estimate that advertisement spending
from interest groups for Talent or against Carnahan ($456,000) was signitlcantly less than
those for Carnahan or against Talent ($718,000) (17). Carnahan had the edge again and
still did not win. Overall, there was a lot of money and effort spent by interest groups on
both sides in a number of ways, but it did not seem to make much of a difference.
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RESULTS AND SUMMARY
It is impossible to run for federal office in the United States without a great deal of money,
especially if the race is extremely competitive, as it was in Missouri in 2002. But big
spending by no means guaranrees a victory. Carnahan, Talent, the Democratic Party, the
Republican Party, and a myriad of interest groups on both sides raised and spent incredible
sums, but each side canceled the other out in each case. Candidate spending seemed to
reach a point of little-to-no marginal returns, if it had an effect at all. Perhaps it is the case
that presidential popularity and personal campaigning tipped the scales for Talent (Kropf
et al. 2003, 10), or the Republicans were berter able to get out the vote; whatever it was,
it does not seem to have been money.
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS AND NORMATIVE CONCERNS:
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THIS HEenON HAD BEEN RUN UNDER •••

?

Campaign finance laws have changed since the 2002 election cycle, and a number of
reforms are possible in the future. To determine the possible effect of these reforms on
the 2002 Missouri Senate race, I will perform some counterElCtual analysis and address the
normative implications of three proposed regimes: full public financing, a completely open
system, and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) with all restrictions upheld by
the Supreme Court.
rldl Public Financing. Schneider (2002) proposes a system of full public financing for
elections, alleging that such a system would minimize corruption and make representatives
more responsible to constituents. What would have been different in the 2002 Missouri
Senate race had it been run under a fully public-financed regime? The parties seem to have
chosen their respective candidates long before the primary, so there would have been no
difference there. Candidate spending would have been completely equal (assuming Carnahan and Talent each spent all they received). Given the preceding results, spending
cancelled out anyway, and since Talent was already well known statewide, he would have
not gained an advantage from such spending limits. The parties and interest groups would
have adjusted their strategies to fit whatever limits the system imposed. If, for example, any
media relating directly or indirectly to the race had been outlawed within a couple of
months of the election, they would have concentrated their efforts on the latest date
possible. If those avenues were not available at all, then they would focus so enrirely on
newspapers, magazines, and so forth, that even the most strict campaign finance systems
would not be able to limit, even with a narrow interpretation of the First Amendment.
Perhaps the media would then resemble nineteenth-centUlY America~ media, .which was
considerably more partisan. It could also be that such a regime would force part.les to focus
more on mobilization and party building. The candidates would also have exerCised greater
control over their campaign messages. Given the closeness of the race, however, the
outcome would not likely have changed, because it depended on non-monetary factors.
A number of concerns arise even though the result would most likely have been the
same under such a regime and would have had the added benefits of controlling for
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corruption as well as the appearance of corruption. For example, the First Amendment
freeJoms of petition and speech could be at risk. If individuals and groups did not have
the right to air concerns about policies and candidates that could have any discernable
impact (whether direct or indirect) on federal elections, then that would raise serious concerns about free participation in a democracy. Also, such a system could actually increase
the potential for corruption. If interested money will always flow into the system, then
bribery and graft could increase as a result of full public financing (Smith 2001, 194).
Finally, since freedom of the press is still protected under this system, power would be more
concentrated in the hands of media elites, lessening the avenues for participation by
"citizens of average means" (Smith 2001, 197-98; Bopp 2003).
A Completely Opl'll System. Smith (2001) proposes the polar opposite of Schneider. His
solution is to open the floodgates and allow the money to How where it may, only requiring
full disclosure from all groups and individuals. Smirh argues that campaign finance laws
merely change the ways that parties, candidates, and interest groups spend their money.
This idea that money will How into politics regardless of regulation was confirmed in the
Supreme Court's recent ruling on McConnell v. FEC (2003). An open regime might actually increase the amount of control that candidates could exercise over their own campaigns
in that they could coordinate more with those who agree with them and plan a broader
strategy than is now possible. Such a system would not likely have changed the outcome
of the 2002 Missouri Senate race, but it would have perhaps benefited it by promoting
more participation and decreasing the complexity of the current system, thereby increasing
competitiveness by making it possible for candidates to enter the fray without a team of
legal and accountancy experts to keep track of all the subtleties of current laws. A drawback of such a system is the possible institutionalization of perceived corruption,
which institutionalization could further decrease trust and participation in the system
(Schneider 2002).
BCRA 2002 with All Restrictions Upheld. In 2002, Congress passed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, which is the Iatesr amendment to existing campaign finance law.
Other than raising contribution limits (from $1000 to $2000 per election cycle), its major
focus is to address soft money and issue advocacy. Under the act, soft money will be
banned entirely and issue advocacy will be more limited both by stricter definition of it
and stricter regulation of the time before an election during which they could be run
(thirty days before the primary, sixty days before the general election). If these restrictions
were to have appried to the 2002 Missouri Senate race, what would have been different?
First, the air war would have been conducted quite differently by the parties and interest
groups, in that it would have been more limited. Any advertisements mentioning the
names of candidates at all would have to be run a month or two before the primary and
general elections. Also, most of the campaign advertisements were "electioneering" in
nature, in that they did not bllunder the hard money requirements because they did not
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. Perhaps they would have focused
more on the ground war in news editorials, direct mailings, and telephone campaigns.
Expenditures by the parties would have been more focLlsed on party building activities and
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gerting out the vote (GOIV) drives, which most likely would have favored the Democrats,
though it is uncl~ar how much. Democrats traditionally outnumber Republicans in big
cities, and voter mobilization efforts would have been easier in the large population centers
of St. Louis and Kansas City. It is more difficult for Republicans to mobilize because their
support comes largely ftom rural areas, and GOTV efforts are much less efficient in rural
areas than in more populous ones. Since mobilization seems to have been key in this race,
it could have tipped the scales in favor of Jean Carnahan, if under SCRA the Democrats
would have spcnt more on such activities.
Blit the Democrats did not spare any expense to mohilize in 2002. Their COTV
efforts, according to Ktopf et aI., were "unprecedented" (2003, ')). They. had poll checkers,
poll runners, sandwich makers, volunteer cab drivers, callers, and "pull teams" that would
search out those who had not voted yet (5). And the Republican's efforts were equally
impressive-when they came up short on volunteers, they hired to fill the gap (5). Therefore, though the paths that the moncy took would have been differcnt undcr BCRA, it
would not have changed the outcome of the election. This conclusion is in line with
research by Flowers et al. (2003) that even if all voters would have turned out on
election day, the result would have been the same.
Implicatiom,/or Campaign Finance in Geneml. Ultimately, the desirability of campaign
finance reform depends upon an individual's value judgments. What is more important,
freedom or equality? If equality, then government would secm to have a role in "leveling
the playing field" to encourage and allow for broad participation in elections; if freedom,
then government should largely step Ollt of the way and let the chips fall. The former, ironically, could actually hurt broad participation by limiting the scope and means of participation available, but could also increase accountability by reducing the influence of money
in elections. Even then, would the perceived corruption merely shift more to the lawmaking
process? The larter would allow a widcr range of options for participation, but could
increase the perception of corruption in elections unless stringent disclosure requirements
were put in place.
For the author, the results of this case study have definite normative implications. It
does not seem that money has a corrupting influence in elections, and since regulation
often implies restrictions on speech, then SCRA and other reforms would seem not only
to be ineffective but also damaging. It seems that limits on soft money, issue advocacy,
expenditures, and the like would have merely changed the avenues that money would have
taken, not its influence. Though it is conceded that soft money limits could have impacted
the outcome in Missouri, is it right to systematically favor Democrats by limiting such
expenditures? Ideology would certainly affcct the answer to that, but if we scek a system
that promotes competition and participation while controlling for corruption, more
regulation does not seem to be the answer, and the cutrent system most likely will not
"fix" much at all while it will unnecessarily infringe on First Amendment rights to
political speech when they marter the most.
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THE PRECEDENT OF A PRESIDENT:

Theodore Roosevelt and
Environmental Conservation
Hilary Jan Izatt

ABSTRACT

Thr legacy olPrrsident Theodor{' RooselJ('lt is one ofexpansion and great political prowess. Rooselielt's
characteristic /ligor allowed him to pursue even the most obscure issues in the realm of politics.
BeCllllS{, the president had a firm cOnlJiction concerning the cause of conser1'atioll, he managed to
C01llH')'

its importtUw' and bring it out olobscuri~y. Though Rooseuelt used every pr{'sidential role to

filYt},er his enl'iromnental policies, the most important to him were the expanding roles ofchiefexecutive and legislati/J(" leader. W'hile conserlJation was uirtual{y unknown to presidents before Roosevelt,
it became (/ matter pertinent to the presidential (lgendas that followed.

W

hen President William McKinley was assassinated in 1901, the nation was unsure
of the role the succeeding president would pursue. Theodore Roosevelt was chiefly
known for his peculiar mannerisms and background filled with epic adventure and legislative
prowess. "Roosevelt literally created the character he lived out, and then lived within it
until he finally became his own creation" (Brands 1997). Such was the nature of his presidency.
Specifically, R()osevelt's love for the environment led him to actively pursue an agenda
of conservation. This active approach to environmental conservation set a precedent for the
issue to become an influential factor in presidential politics.
Overall, the legacy of President Theodore Roosevelt is one of expansion and great
political prowess. Roosevelt's characteristic vigor in the realm of politics allowed him to
pursue even the most obscure issues. As president, Roosevelt had a firm commitment
to the cause of conservation, and he managed to convey the issue's importance and bring
it out of obscurity. Conservation was largely unknown to the presidents before Roosevelt,
but it became pertinent to the presidential agendas that followed.
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THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS CHIEF EXECUTNE

In their book, The American Presidt'lllJ and the Social Agel/cli[, Byron W Daynes and
Glen Sussman describe four specific presidential roles impacting presidents' social agendas.
They define a role as "the set of expectations by political elites and the citizenry that define the scope of presidential responsibilities within a given policy area" (2001, 5). Specitically, the role of chief executive would appear "on the surface" to be the most powerful
presidential role. However, as history has revealed, a president tlnds it difficult to pursue a
social agenda tree from the influence of such factors as the bureaucracy (89). This was not
the case during Theodore Roosevelt's administration. In fact, Roosevelt showed that the
executive role, if strategically used, can largely be the most powerful role despite a controlling
bureaucracy. Roosevelt took advantage of the Framers' "vague manner" of granting these
administrative powers and expanded the role of the executive to include everything not
specifically prohibited in the Constitution (89). His efforts at conservation are a prime
example of how he expanded the role.
Of all the roles assumed by Roosevelt's presidency, chief executive is perhaps most significant. It was in this role that the president exercised his personal convictions of political
and environmental stewardship most expli'citly. Furthermore, when his legislative actions
fell short he was able to compensate by assuming a strong executive role. Factors such as
personal convictions, appointments, and executive orders shaped the Roosevelt Administration and are useful tools in assessing this role.
Roosevelt's personal commitment to the calise of environmental conservation stemmed
primarily from his conception of the stewardship theory accompanied by a deep respect
and love for the environment (Miller 1992, 36-39). The stewardship theory of government describes the role of the president as a "strong" and "assertive" one that is "conti ned
only at points specifically prohibited by law" (University of Western Michigan 2003). This
philosophy helped to shape him as an executive leader. In his autobiography, Roosevelt
describes the influcnce of such philosophical underpinnings:
My View was that every executive officer ... was a steward of the people bound
actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself
with the negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin .... My belief
was that it was not only his right by this duty to do anything that the needs of the
nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.
(1958,197)
President Roosevelt used the prospect of a strong executive to expand presidential
powers. As he incorporated his commitment to the stewardship philosophy into his role as
executivc, he spared no time in bringing the environment into his political agenda.
For example, when Roosevelt took office, he alluded to the problem of the environment in a significant part of his inaugural address. In doing so, he also alluded to his sense
of stewardship that would become a significant underpinning to his administration: "They
[the American founders] did their work; they left us the splendid heritage we now enjoy.
We in our turn have an assured confidence that we shall be able to leave this heritage
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un wasted and enlarged to our children and our children's children" (Roosevelt 1905). This
philosophy would eventually lead him to vigorously pursue his ideas on sustainable development and environmental preservation.
A perfect example of the signifIcance of this role is Roosevelt's use of the appointment
power. Roosevelt's involvement in conservation was greatly influenced by his appointment oflong-time friend and leading conservationist Giaord Pinchot as chief of the Division
of forestry (Smith 1971, 6). l'inchot not only held the same beliefs of stewardship and
sustainable development as the president, he was able to convince the president conservation
was a politically pertinent issue. Unsurpisingly, the environmental policy that followed
Pinchot's appointment was marked by his interest in forestry as well as by his firm belief
in sustainable development. For instance, in 1905, Roosevelt, along with the influential
Pinchot, instigated a legislative act that would transfer the nation's forest reserves to the
Department of Agriculture (U .S. Congress, House and Senate, 1905). It was exclusively
from this act that Pinchot exercised most of his influence as chief.
Perhaps Pinchot's most visible role was his involvement in numerous commissions,
conventions, and conferences wherein Roosevelt made it a point to always include him.
First and most evident was the Keep Commission, organized in 1905 with the specific purpose of attending to the restructuring of the executive. Roosevelt set a precedent for future
administrations, particularly that of his cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, by instigating
a "substantial reorganization of the executive branch" (Miller 2001, 342-43). The efforts
of the Keep Commission were preceded by a 1905 meeting at which Pinchot instilled
within the president the need for complete reorganization as an effort to compensate for
the weaknesses of the bureaucracy. The ultimate goal was to make conservation efforts
easier to pursue. The commission's mandate asserted the need to "investigate ... what
changes are needed to place the conduct of the executive business of rhe Government in all
its branches on the most economical and effective basis" (342). To combat the problems of
a "bloated bureaucracy," the commission created a centralized procurement office and a
clear form of centralized managemenr and decision-making (342-43). Such recommendations were acknowledged by an appreciative president, who noted in his autobiography
that they "resulted in a promulgation of a set of working principles for the transaction of
public business which are as sound today as they were when the committee finished its
work" (1958, 13'5). Perhaps the commission's most significant contribution was the
launching ofa precedent that would eventually empower and expand the presidency, Most
importantly though, the path to conservation was made substantially easier.
In addition, Roosevelt appointed Pinchot to the Public Lands Commission dealing
specifIcally with conservation dl(Hts in the Western lands. In his address to the 58th Congress, Roosevelt outlined the need for such a commission: "In order that definite information may be available for the use of the Congress, I have appointed a commission, .. to
report at the earliest practicable moment upon the condition, operation, and effect of the
present land laws and on the use, condition, disposal, and settlement of the public lands
. , . especially on what changes are needed" (Roosevelt 1903, 7). The president proceeded
to name Pinchot as a driving force who helped him see the need for the commission. What
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is more, Pinchot was the only person explicitly mentioned in the address to be part of the
commiSSIOn.
Finally, Pinchot was a significant force in Roosevelt's organization and instigation of
numerous additional commissions and conferences such as the Conference of Governors,
at which Roosevelt, acting on Pinchot's advice, sought to provide a "catalyst" for the compilation of various state laws and viewpoints into a single "unified structure" (Clepper
1966, 26). The conference dealt with a wide range of environmental issues and most
importantly signified Roosevelt's expansionary nature by including more than simply governors. Among the invited guests were members of the Supreme Court, representatives of
major scientific and conservation groups, members of Congress, and specific leaders
of U.S. industry and commerce (Bennett 1983, 18). This is perhaps one of the most
significant examples of Roosevelt's dealings with the dispersal of powers through federalism.
While much of the conservation effort took place on the federal stage, Roosevelt saw the
need to incorporate all levels of government in an effort to get the most accomplished.
Moreover, Roosevelt saw it as vital to gain some sort of a consensus from all facets of the
nation's leadership (18).
Table 1.1 Pinchot's Role in Shaping the Roosevelt Administration and Agenda
Commissions and Conferences
Keep Commission
Conference of Governors
National Conservation Commission
Public Land Commission
North American Conservation Conference
Four of seven total study commissions
Other Contributions
Created Division of Forest Service
Centralized ptocurement office under the Keep Commission
First national inventory of natural resources
Influenced numerous executive orders dealing with conservation
Source: Theodore Roosevelt A<soci3tion. n.d. Conservationist: The life of Theodore Roosevelt.
At <www.theodoreroosevelr.org/life/conservation.htm>.

Another example of Roosevelt's expansionary and unilateral approach relates to the
North American Conservation Conference. While this event will be discussed in greater
detail later, it is important here to signif)· Roosevelt's unilateral tendencies. The conference
was organized to address the issue of conservation on a larger international scale. Following
an attempt to gain congressional support of the conference, Roosevelt realized that
Congressional cooperation could not be obtained. He thus independently convened the
North American Conservation Conference in 1909 without congressional support. Pinchot was selected as executive chair of the committee, assuming a highly influential role.
Roosevelt's emphasis on conservation is indicated through the total number of study commissions and conventions specifically organized for that cause. Out of a total of seven, four
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were organized to examine various aspects of conservation (Theodore Roosevelt Association 2003). Herein Roosevelt also invoked his stewardship philosophy of sustainable development. In a message to the Deep Waterway Convention, Roosevelt indicated the pressing
need for his breakthrough unilateral executive role in terms of the conservation effort:
"Conservation of natural resources is the fundamental problem. Unless we solve that
problem it will avail us little to solve all orhers" (1907).
Roosevelt used executive orders concerning the environment primarily to secure land
for national monuments, parks, and reservations. Following the advice ofPinchot, Roosevelt
issued an executive order prior to the Fulton Agricultural Bill of 1907. As a result, 16 million acres of timberland were put under the control of the Forest Service, protected from
the private sector. Roosevelt recalled this event: "They [Congress] discovered that sixteen
million acres of timberland had been saved for the people by purring them in the National
Forests before the land grabbers could get at them .... Opponents turned handsprings ...
and dire were their threats against the Executive" (1913, 130). Ultimately, Roosevelt was
able to increase the forest reserves of the United States by 400 percent, expanding the
acreage from 43 million to an unprecedented 195 million (Theodore Roosevelt Association 2003).
In addition to preserving the national forests, Roosevelt also used the role of chief
executive to set aside a total of fifty-one federal bird reservations over a span of six years
(Theodore Roosevelt Association 2003). Beginning with Pelican Island in Florida, he
issued official declarations for all fifty-one reservations in a quick, sporadic fashion. While
Roosevelt was governor of New York, he had suggested the need for such reservations but
was constrained in implementing them on a larger scale. Thus, when Roosevelt assumed
the presidency, he had enough power and was finally in a position to do something more
about the situation (Cutright 1956).
The first bird reservation came from citizens' appeals. Roosevelt answered by posing the
question, "Is there any law that will prevent me from declaring Pelican Island a Federal Bird
Reservation?" When the citizen leaders answered "no," Roosevelt replied, "Very well then,
I declare it" (Roosevelt 19L3, 145).
Finally, Roosevelt used his expanded executive role to order the securing of national
monuments. With the aid of the American Antiquities Act of 1906, Roosevelt was able to
establish a total of eighteen national monuments. No other president has matched his
record (Theodore Roosevelt Association 2003).
Table 1.2 Results of President Roosevelt's Expanded Executive Role Compared to
Previous Situations
After T.R.
Before T.R.
o
51
Bird Reserves
o
18
National Monuments
43 million acres
194 million acres
Forest Reserves
Source: Theodore Roosevelt Association. n.d. Conservationist: The life o[Theodore Roosevelt.
At<www.theodoreroosevelt.orgllife/conservation.htIll>.
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While Roosevelt's actions as chief executive were met with substantial opposition, he
was, nonetheless, successful. Moreover, this particular role was by tar his most influential
in terms of conservation. Equipped with a philosophy justifYing his expansive tendencies,
Roosevelt pursued an agenda unprecedented for his time. As a result of his enterprising
actions, the environment has become a pertinent issue to presidential politics.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS A LEGISLATIVE LEADER

Presidential scholars Edward Corwin and Louis Koenig state that "virtually all presidents who have made a major impact on American history have done so in great degree as
legislative leaders" (1956). This role is traditionally considered the direCt relationship that
a president cultivates with Congress concerning an active policy-making agenda. The
degree ro which a president is successful in office is largely determined by his success at initiating and passing legislation. Roosevelt's role as legislative leader is an important example
of how a president can leave his mark through the auspices of legislation. While Daynes
and Sussman suggest the legislative leader as one of any president's weaker roles (200 1),
Roosevelt proved that in the right hands it could be a role of "lasting consequence."
In an effort to propagate environmental conservation, Roosevelt pursued a robust legislative agenda while garnering enough support to become a successful legislative leader.
Roosevelt's legislative activities during his presidency were derived hom a sense of political
expediency, concerning the current environmental situation, that motivated him to use the
role of legislative leader to pursue the cause of conservation.
When Roosevelt assumed office, the quality of the environment was decreasing, as
conservation was unfamiliar among most Americans. Environmental conservation had
taken a backseat to the great industrial developments of the day. Consequently, Roosevelt
considered the nation's natural resources to be threatened by total exhaustion and felt that
intervention was necessary. In the manuscript "Origins of American Conservation," the Natura! Resources Council of America describe the situation of natural resources at the
inception of Roosevelt's administration. They note that most of the destruction and depletion of resources rook place during the latter part of the nineteenth century and continued
into the twentieth century. "Forest devastation, fishery decline, wildlife extirpation, and
wasteful exploitation were generally rampant .... The federal government did little to try
to stop the trend ... which was helped along by a lack of a national policy" (Clepper 1966,
8). The situation warranted the attention of Roosevelt and justified his legislative agenda.
The most useful tools for assessing a president's relationship with Congress are his State
of the Union addresses. Daynes argues that the State of the Union Address is perhaps the
most significant formal interaction a president has with Congress (1999, 272). It is during
this speech that a president lays out his plan for legislation in a formal attempt at nurturing a strong relationship with Congress. Issues that are of greatest concern ro a president
will be mentioned in detail during the State of the Union. A successful president will be
able to set forth his policy-making agenda while simultaneously gaining more congressional support. Roosevelt demonstrated a concern for the environment, a concern largely
unfamiliar to most legislators, in his first State of the Union Address. The conservation
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emphasis of this speech was an unparralleled approach to environmental politics. The message enabled Roosevelt to assume the role of legislative leader in terms of environmental
conservation early in his presidency.
In this first State of the Union, Roosevelt paid significant attention ro the need for
"wise forest protection" as providing an assurance of "larger and more certain supplies"
(1909). He described the practicality of preservation: "It is a means to increase and sustain
the resources of our country and the industries which depend upon them, ... [Tlhe preservation of our forests is an imperative business necessity." Roosevelt also described his
preservation plan to unite in purpose the Bureau of forestry, the General Land Office, and
the United States Geological Survey, in an effort to prevent "diffusion of responsibility."
Finally, he foreshadowed what would probably be one ufhis must noteworthy achievements,
the Reclamation Act of 1902. "Our aim," he noted, "should be not simply to reclaim the
largest area of land and provide homes for the largest number of people, bur to create for this
new industry the best pussible social and industrial conditiuns" (Roosevelt 1909).
The issue of conservation was a prominent issue il~ all eight of Roosevelt's State of the
Union addresses. As Table 2.1 indicates, the number of words dedicated to conservation in
each address ranged from 8.3S to 4,146, dwarfing the number in previuus presidents'
addresses. Those preceding Roosevelt mentioned the environment only in passing, if at all
(Clepper 1966, 8). The fact that Roosevelt's State of the Union addresses conveyed the
importance of conservatiun set anuther precedent for future presidencies. However, those
presidents who followed devoted much less to conservation in their individual State of the
Union addresses. For example, President Clinton is the most recent environmentally
minded president; huwever, conservation touk lip unly SS to 243 words in his State of the
Union addresses.
Table 2.1 Theodore Roosevelt's Total Use of Environmental Words in State of the Union
Addresses.
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In terms of his record as legislative leader, Theodore Roosevelt succeeded for the most
part. He was able to gather the necessary support for large-scale environmental legislation
while simultaneously using the presidential veto power to insure there was no deviation in
legislation that would alter his idea of environmental preservation.
Perhaps the most significant and encompassing piece of legislation Roosevelt passed
through Congress was the Newlands Reclamation Act of 1902 (U.S. Congress, House and
Senate 1902). Not more than a year after he was sworn in as president, Roosevelt, along
with Pinchot, supported this legislation that previously had been doomed to failure. The
act gave incredible control of irrigation of arid lands to the federal government, set up
a federal irrigation project, and ultimately cultivated Western development. Though the
legislation gave the federal government significant power over the environment, it was met
with firm opposition fi·om within the federal government. Specifically, Speaker of the
House and member of Roosevelt's party, Joseph Gurney Cannon publicly opposed
the president's efforts. Roosevelt attempted to gain the support of the Speaker in an
unprecedented manner by drafting a personal letter to him. He wrote, "I do not believe
that I have ever before written to an individual legislator in favor of an individual bill, but
I break through my rule to ask you as earnestly as I can not to oppose the Irrigation measure .
. . . I cannot too strongly express my feelings upon this matter" (1902). However, the letter was not successful in swaying the Speaker's vore. Cannon continued to vocally contest
Roosevelt's efforts.
Despite Cannon's strong opposition, Roosevelt's firm commitment to the bill produced
enough support among Republicans and Democrats alike that it eventually passed. As a
result, numerous projects were able to sustain the intended federal irrigation program
(Reclamation Service 1903,42). What is more, the act potentially allowed for 100,000,000
acres of arid lands to be reclaimed for storage purposes (72). This marked the beginning of
governmental concern with the environment in terms of legislation.
In addition to the Reclamation Act of 1902, Roosevelt exhibited a similar legislative
prowess in relation to the American Antiquities Act of 1906. Successful lobbying efforts
again allowed Roosevelt to instigate and pass a very important piece oflegislation. The act
granted unparalleled presidential power, allowing the protection of lands for the preservation of historic or scientific sites (U.S. Congress, House and Senate 1906). Its intent was
not only to further the cause of conservation, but also to expand the role of the executive
as well. While it specifically enabled the president to protect "any historic or prehistoric
ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity," it became an indication of the transfer of
power from Congress to the president (1906). This shift in power would essentially overshadow twentieth-century politics (White House Historical Association 2003). Consequently, Devil's Tower, Wyoming, was declared the first national monument (Theodore
Roosevelt Association 2003). Seventeen other national monuments would be designated
during Roosevelt's administration alone. Furthermore, as Table 2.2 indicates, several presidents following Roosevelt used the Antiquities Act to expand the country's national reservations, parks, and monuments. Of these, Bill Clinton's use of the Antiquities Act was the
most exhaustive. This recent use indicates the Act's continued prominence in American
politics and, in general, Roosevelt's contributions to contemporary conservation.
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Table 2.2. Usage of the Antiquities Act by Presidents Following Roosevelt
William Howard Taft
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Source: National Parks Service. n.d. Monument proclamations under the Antiquities Act.
At dlllp:llwww.cr.nps.gov/history/hisnps/NPSHistory/rnonurnenrs.htmNationai>.

While the Reclamation and Antiquities Acts were Roosevelt's most successful legislative
accomplishments, the president was able to do other things to advance the cause of
the environment. For instance, he doubled the number of national parks and added land
to those already in existence. His viewpoint on sustainable development to preserve the
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environment was made clear in his seventh State of the Union Address. He stated, "Optimism
is a good characteristic, but if carried to an excess, it becomes foolishness. We are prone to
speak of the resources of this country as inexhaustible; this is not so" (Roosevelt 2003).
Roosevelt also used the role oflegislative leader to veto a number of bills that failed to
correspond with his intended conservation goals. Only a strong legislative leader like Roosevelt would have been able to pass a large-scale environmental legislation package while
concurrently making use of the veto power to pursue his environmental agenda. Generally,
Table 2.3. Results of Roosevelt's Legislative Efforts
Reclamation Projects
Salt River, Arizona - 1903
Milk River, Montana - 1903
Newlands, Nevada - 1903
North Pl.ltte, Nebraska and Wyoming - 1903
Uncompahgre, Colorado - 1903
Belle Fourche, South Dakota - 1904
Lower Yellowstone, Montana and North
Dakota - 1904
Minidoka, Idaho - 1904
Shoshone, Wyoming - 1904
Yuma, Arizona and California - 1904
Boise, Idaho and Oregon - 1905
Huntley, MontallJ - 1905
Klamath, California and Oregon - 1905
Rio Grande, New Mexico - 1905
Car15bad, New Mexico - 1905
Okanogan, Washington - 1905
Strawberry Valley, Utah - 1905
Umatilla, Oregon - 1905
Yakima, Washington - 1905
Sun River, Montana - 1906
Orland, California - 1907
Wheeler, Colorado - 1908
Mount Olympus, Washington - 1909

National Parks
Cr.1ter Lake National Park, Oregon - 19C2
Wind Cave National Park,
SOUlh Dakota - 1903
Sullys Hill, North Dakota - 19C4
Platt National Park, Oklahoma - 1906
Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado - 1906
National Monuments
Devil's Tower, Wyoming - 1906
El Morro, New Mexico - 1906
Montezuma Castle, Arizona - 1906
Petrified Forest, ArizollJ - 1906
Chaco Canyon, New Mexico - 1907
Lassen Peak, California - 1907
Cinder Cone, California - 1907
Gila Cliff Dwellings, New Mexico - 1907
Tonto, Arizona - 1907
Muir Woods, California - 1908
Grand Canyon, Arizona - 1908
Pinnacles, California - 1908
Jewel Cave, South Dakota - 1908
Natural Bridges, Utah - 1908
l.ewis and Clark, Mont.ma - 1908
Tumaeacori, Arizona - 1908

Note: National monuments were specifically addressed through the Americ.llI AntIquities Act.
Source: Theodore Roosevelt Association n.d. Conservationist: The life of Theodore Roosevelt.
At <www.theodoreroosevelt.org/life/conservation.htIll>.

Roosevelt used the veto to expand his executive role. Of forty-two presidents, in fact, Roosevelt comes in seventh in terms of presidential vetoes cast (United States House of Representatives 2003). More specifically, though, Roosevelt used the veto as a tool for keeping
environmental conservation out of the private sector. In 1903, Roosevelt vetoed
a bill that would have allowed a private power firm to build a large-scale dam on the Tennessee River in Muscle Shoals, Alabama (Roosevelt 1903). This veto, in particular, confirmed a principle of national ownership and also protected the future commencement site
of the Tennessee Valley Authority. In his address to Congress, Roosevelt stressed the importance of innovative resource preservation being protected from the dangers of privatization,
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arguing that private ownership of such efforts would not be for the good of the entire public. He indicated, "I think it is desirable that the entire subject ... should be considered in
a comprehensive way and that a general polic)' ... should be adopted under which these
valuable rights will not be ... given away, but will be disposed of after full competition in
such a way as shall best conserve the public interests" (I903). The president was sympathetic to other legislation that prevented the private sector from controlling the environment. For instance, the General Dam Act of 1906 specifically oudined the regulations for
widespread hydroelectric dam construction on a federal level (U .5. Congress, House and
Senate 1906). While Roosevelt did not instigate this legislation, he saw that the generality
of the bill indicated a strong federal role, one that would combat the threat of interference
in the environment on the part of the private sector. Thus, he supported the bill by not
exercising his veto power.
As Table 2.3 suggests, President Roosevelt's legislative efforts were quite extensive. Roosevelt actively sought to expand the role of the executive branch by nurturing a healthy
relationship with Congress. While he frequendy met with opposition from within his own
party, Roosevelt was successful more often than not at gaining just enough support to pursue his environmental agenda. As a result, large-scale legislation was enacted and the role
of the president as legislative leader was forever strengthened. Moreover, the issue of the
environment gained more attention in succeeding presidencies.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS CHIEF DIPLOMAT/COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

In terms of general authority· and resources, the role of chief diplomat/commander-inchief is primarily the strongest role (Daynes and Sussman 2001,6, 123). The power that
this role usually exhibits is largely unchecked as the president is "designated as the sole
organ of communication with foreign nations" as well as serving as a "civilian authority
while presiding over a vast defense establishment" (J 20). While Theodore Roosevelt was
an effective diplomat and commander-in-chief in other areas, such as his "big stick" foreign policy, he utilized these roles minimally in terms of his conservation efforts.
The issue of the environment was unfamiliar to the American public when Roosevelt
came into office. So it is not surprising that conservation was essentially unknown on an
international scale. Often he found conservation to be an uphill battle on the domestic
front. Pursuing the issue internationally was even more complex. Roosevelt felt that conservation should extend beyond U.S. borders, and he tried to confront this problem as best
he could. Probably the sale example of his efforts was the convening of the North American Conservation Conference in 1909. With the mandate that conservation was of the
utmost importance and should become "worldwide in its scope," the conference became
the first international conference to consider this issue (Pinchot 1940,8-10). In his address
at the opening of the conference, Roosevelt stated the importance of conservation on an
international scale:
In international relations the great feature of the growth of the last century has
been the gradual recognition of the ['lct that iIlStead of its being normally to the interest of each nation to see another depress, it is normally to the interest of each nation
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to see the others elevated .... I believe that the movement that you this day initiate is
one of the utmost importance to the hemisphere and may become of the utmost
importance to the world at large (Roosevelt 1909).

This initial conference was to be the forerunner to future worldwide conferences. Delegates from Mexico and Canada joined the Unitt:d Statt:s in mutually pursuing consnvation
as an international priority. Mutual interests with regard to torests, water, land, mineral,
and game conservation were conceptualized as boundary-less. Moreover, delegates discussed
the need for cooperation over threats such as pollution and public health crises. At the close
of the conference, the delegates issued a plea to the world that a similar eHort needed to be
made on a wider international scale (Bennett 1983, 18).
America was moving into a new age wherein international relations net:ded ro flourish
and national prestige was vital. EHorts that focused on COllServation were a primary element of such aims. Pinchot described the situation: "Natural life everywhere is built on
the foundation of natural resources. Throughout human hisrory, the t:xhaustion of those
resources and the need for new supplies have been among the greatest causes of war" (Pinchot 1940, 9). However, environmental goals for the Conference were never reached.
Though Secretary of State Elihu Root stated that preliminary measures had been taken to
invite representation from thirty nations to a future conference, the prospective conference
suffered a bitter defeat at the hands of President William Howard 'raft, Roosevelt's successor,
who apparently "killed the plan" (Pinchot 1940, 10).
Roosevelt's international diplomatic eHorts were more indirect than direct in nature.
Other than the aforementioned conference, he took virtually no action internationally.
However, the administration's success should be measured by the fact that it was the first
to advocate conservation as an international concern. Even today, Theodore Roosevelt's
environmental vision has been noted in contemporary efforts to respond to global concerns.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS OPINION/PARTY LEADER

Compared to the other presidential roles, the president often exerts the It:ast amount
of power as opinion/party leader (Daynes and Sussman 2001,6). The role serves two functions as the president seeks to maintain the support of his party while also gaining enough
public support to be reelected. In the pursuit of these functions, a prt:sidenr seeks to find
those social issues that "generate public support for his own program, for his adminisrration, and for his party" (25). As a result, presidents tend to emphasize those social issues
that facilitate both functions. Howt:vt:r, some issues that facilitate one function and
obstruct the other must be addressed nonetheless. Daynes and Sussman describe this
potential difficulry, "Once these issues become politicized by whatever means, however, a
president finds it difficult to avoid them" (32). Thus, there is always a large possibilty of
conflict between the two functions. Conservation was not widely accepted during Roosevelt's era and his role as opinion/party leader was largely suggestive of that.
Roosevelt's const:rvation agt:nda was oftentimes a unilateral effort that ignored party
lines and attracted strong opposition to his agenda. During this time period the political
climate across the nation was underlined by the Progressive ideology. Roosevelt was a firm
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believer in this ideology, and, as a result, his stance on conservation reflected his party's
platform only on occasion. In many instances, Roosevelt chose Progressivism over the
Republican Party platform.
The issue of conservation was unfamiliar to most Americans until the Roosevelt
Administration placed it on the public agenda. Public opinion concerning conservation
was derived primarly from the president's actions, as Roosevelt's actions lacked an executive precedent. Indeed, Roosevelt's role in conservation molded public opinion rather than
acting on its behalf As a result, it is often difficult to determine precisely what the public
felt about conservation.
As party leader, Roosevelt sought to remedy social ills through conservation. In fact,
the Progressive Party's platform dedicates an entire section to the importance of land and
resources: "The land, including all the natural sources of wealth, is the heritage of the
people, and should not be monopolized for speculative purposes" (Scott 1959,691). Furthermore, progressive ideology, as defined by the Roosevelt administration, emphasized the
need for development and preservation as well as the prevention oflarge-scale privatization
of environmental interests (Roosevelt 1907).
While evidence supporting Roosevelt in this role is lacking, there are numerous
instances when the president's actions went beyond party lines. His role as opinion/party
leader was more moderate than strong. As discussed earlier, the president used the role of
legislative leader to encourage passage of the Newlands Reclamation Act without full
backing of the party leadership. This instance was perhaps the most blatant example of
Roosevelt disregarding his party's wishes and pursuing a unilateral approach to conservation.
Although the legislation ultimately passed, Roosevelt had to pay the price by assuming a
weaker party leader role.
As public opinion leader, Roosevelt mentioned the significance of public opinion to
show his support of it. For instance, in his message "On Conservation," he specifically
declares public opinion was swayed as a result of the administration's efforts (Roosevelt
1904). Similar suggestions appear in his State of the Union addresses.
[n addition to advocating public opinion in speeches, Roosevelt responded to public
grievances in many presidential actions. One example of this is his reservation of
Pelican Island as the first of fifty-one bird reservations. This event gave Roosevelt the
opportunity to exhibit his expanded executive role in terms of reserving public lands. For
some time, ornithologists had been making an effort to protect birds on Pelican Island,
where birds had' been subjected to hunters' guns. As a last resort, these ornithologists
appealed directly to the president and successfully saw him designate Pelican Island a protected bird refuge (Theodore Roosevelt Association).
A good indicator of Roosevelt's weak postion as party leader was the amount of political
cartoons of the time period that featured him. Specifically, when Roosevelt advocated the
non-privatization of public lands and natural resources, a number of political cartoons
attacked the president's motivation. As depicted in the cartoons, oftentimes the public
saw Roosevelt as merely a mouthpiece for the radical conservationist Gifford Pinchot
(McCutcheon 1910, 136-39).
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Roosevelt's opinion/parry leader role can also be measured by the 1904 election results.
Roosevelt assumed the presidency upon President McKinley's assassination. As a result, he
was not bound by specific election promises as most presidents are during their first term.
Rather, when Roosevelt ran for election in 1904 he relied on specific legislative accomplishments during his first term to secure the support of the public. Most states that supported Roosevelt's reelection were Western states who had been subject to much of his
legislation. Ultimately, conservation oriented legislation like the Newlands Reclamation
Act, while initially controversial, passed into law and apparently helped Roosevelt garner
enogh public support to be reelected.
The issue of conservation was virtually non-existent in American politics until Roosevelt incorporated it into his social agenda. As the first president to focus on conservation,

Table 4.1 Geographical Support and Vote Breakdown of the 1904 Presidential
Election

Roosevelt (Rep)
Parker (Oem)
Presidential
Candidate
Theodore Roosevelt
Alton B. Parker

Party

Popular
Vote

Republican 7,623.486
Democrat 5,077,911

%

Electoral
Vote

Running Mate

56.4
37.6

336
140

Charles W. Fairbanks
Henry G. Davis

Source: United States Department of the Interior. Presidential Elections 1789-2000.
At < http://nationalatlas.gov/ electionsprint.html > .

public opinion concerning Roosevelt's actions was based solely on those actions' results
without comparison to the actions of past presidents. Consequently, measuring Roosevelt's
ability to lead opinion in comparison to that of other, previous presidents is difficult.
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Roosevelt's role as party leader was hamstrung by his adoption of an agenda largely
independent of the Republican Party's official platform. The conflict between party and
personal belief becomes quite clear when we consider the Progressive ideology that he
devoutly adhered to. While Roosevelt was certainly a member of the Republican Party
during his presidency, he had a progressive mind-set that put him in a position to help
form the Progressive Parry of 19 I 2 after Taft's election to the presidency (Roosevelt 19 13).
While Roosevelt's role as opinion/parry leader was relatively weak as a Republican, if
considered under the auspices of Progressive ideology and the eventual Progressive Parry, it
was quite strong.
CONCLUSION

Environmental policy was affected by all four of Theodore Roosevelt's presidential
roles. However, two of the the four roles were of greater influente. In terms of Roosevelt's
environmental work, the roles that are customarily the strongest were really the weakest
(Daynes and Sussman 2001). The role of commander-in-chief, usuaIly viewed as the source
for the most presidential power, was almost nonexistent in Roosevelt's environmental
presidency. While Roosevelt exercised this role mostly in terms of foreign policy and international relations, it had little, if any significance, on conservation. His accomplishments
as chief diplomat were also limited.
On the other hand, Roosevelt's role as chief executive proved to be his most important
regarding environmental policy. He left a legacy of an active president preserving and protecting the environment, an issue that would have otherwise been obscure. Moreover, he
set a precedent for environmental issues to become leading factors in presidential politics.
Roosevelt helped prove that a strong personal commitment to a cause could lead a
president to pursue an issue even at the risk of marginalizing his own political parry. Roosevelt also showed that subjecting himself to a certain philosophy could guide all facets of
a presidency. He was able to expand the presidential function to include everything not
explicitly limited by the Constitution. Furthermore, he applied this philosophy to traditionally significant policies such as foreign relations as well as to policies thought to be
more insignificant, like the environment. It seems as though Roosevelt did not differentiate
between the two; rather, he valued the environment equally.
Following rhe Roosevelt era, the issue of the environment became largely dormant
under President Taft, who did not find the issue pertinent to his agenda. It was not until
Franklin D. Roosevelt's election that the environment again became an active issue. Building
on the work of Theodore Roosevelt, ED.R. was able to further the cause of conservation
and attach an importance to environmental issues that continued throughout his and
subsequent presidencies. Without Theodore Roosevelt's instigation of the conservation
cause near the beginning of the twentieth century, the issue of the environment might not
be nearly as significant in modern politics.
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LEGAL INDETERMINACY, POLITICS,
AND THE SUPREME COURT:

Critical Legal Studies and
Lawrence v. Texas

Tavlor M. Dix

magine a man who holds up a gas station and steals all the money in the drawer and
safe. Or, suppose a man is caught driving while severely inebriated. Lastly, consider a university student who is caught cheating on a final exam. The Western legal worldview which
gives our society security and predictability dictates that the three people in the above
examples should all be punished for their actions; they broke the law-in these cases written
statutes that declare: "If one shall commit A then punishment B will follow-and common
sense, based on the myriad legal experiences that one appropriates through life, says that
the perpetrators should not profit from their crimes. Not only should they not profit,
but society should also reprove them and, through such reprobation, deter them and
society at large from committing the same crimes in the future.
However, not all legal cases are as clear-cut as the previously cited examples seem to be.
\v'hile some interpretations of civil and criminal laws are straightforward and preclude any
protracted debate about their correctness, conflicting statutes and principles can often muddy
the water. For example, if a doctor is prosecuted for assisting his patients in committing
suicide, two principles naturally clash.' Furthermore, similar situations are found in legal
situations involving the separation of church and state and in those times in which one's
actions are taken by one group to be an expression of free speech, while another group
simultaneously takes the same actions as displays of oppression and offense. Suddenly,
abstract principles that our society holds as important are conflicting with a strict interpretation of the statutes. This is not to say that the people in the first examples should be
exonerated without question; they committed wrongdoings and should receive some sort
of punishment. But should certain principles-aiding those in need, promoting equality
and fighting oppression, and striving to educate people from all levels of society-convince
judges to mitigate their punishments?
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Many noted legal theorists claim that a nation's legal system is rarely defined by those
cases that never go to court; in these cases, conflicts are not resolved and overarching
principles are not outlined. Rather, the cases that are adjudicated and decided upon by the
judiciary often define the nature of a nation's legal system. But how are these cases decided,
and what does this say about our modern legal system? What guidelines does the judiciary
follow in the adjudicative process? It is possible that judges an: bound by metaphysical
principles, common agreement, economic utility, or the weight of precedent to make certain decisions. Legal determinism, as this point of view is known, states that, given a certain
case, an external causal chain uses its force to bind the judiciary-thereby controlling the
human decision process.
One modern school of thought rejects the legal deterministic viewpoint and argues that
any appeal to metaphysical principles carries inherent problems. In the twentieth century,
legal realism gave way ro the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, which attacked the
foundation of every prevailing legal theory and claimed that the modern legal process is
intrinsically indeterministic. Not only did the CLS school argue for the indeterminacy of
law, but it also asserted that the legal scene was nothing more than a mere extension of the
political battleground. This essay will exaniine the primary tenets of CLS theory and will
argue, through a study of modern Supreme Court cases, that law is intrinsically indeterminate
and that the modern judicial system is primarily an extension of the political debate.
THE SHAPE OF

CLS

As noted above, the CLS movement was, in its largest scope, a reaction to the idea of legal
determinism that comprised the mainstream of legal thought. Both H.L.A. Hart and
Ronald Dworkin argue that, although law could be open to interpretation at its fringes, the
great majority oflegal cases were closed to interpretation. That is, such cases are primarily
fixed in their outcomes either by a "soundest theory" or by some other method. Such
theorists believe in some form of objectivity surrounding legal adjudication. The CLS
school, however, rejects this notion of objectivity by attacking its metaphysical and epistemological foundations. Roberto Unger attacks those who still uphold the Platonic world
of forms and who claim to have access to an absolute knowledge of the essences of right
and wrong (1975, 130). Because no metaphysical categories are thus preset, any attempt
to describe and understand the world (be it linguistically, scientifically, etc.) can be only
partial, and Unger uses this starring point to make one realize that the way in which we
categorize the world is wholly self-determined (130-31). The implications of Unger's
writings for legal validity are far reaching and destructive; they remove all connection between
laws and reality because "reality is put together by the mind" (I 30). Unger finds fault with
the prevailing legal theories because they are all bound by theory-based concepts-theories
that have internal contradictions that produce paradoxes. Unger does not deny that
theories are beneficial for producing knowledge, but he claims that this knowledge is never
complete. Because theoretical underpinnings always comain some form of incoherence,
total understanding is never possible.
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The metaphysical problems presented by Unger inductively lead to equally important
epistemological problems that demand a response from legal determinists. The chief
among these problems surfaces when a case is presented in which different rules or principles
conflict. The facts of any case may leave room for two different phenomenological appeals
that may invariably demand twu diHerent decisiuns. In criticism of Hart's theories Andrew
Altman argues that in such cases one cannot know which rule is the "correct rule" to use
as the foundational standard (1999, 122). In reaction to Dworkin's claim that one can
ubjectively adjudicate because uf principles that will differentiate between competing rules,
Altman emphatically denies that one can discover any semblance of a "metaptinciple for
assigning weights" among competing rules (133).
Brian Leiter takes the metaphysical and epistemolugical foundations laid by Unger and
Altman and uses them to expand the phenomenological implications of CLS thought. He
agrees that determinism, or "mechanical jurisprudence," cannot hold and that no specific
set uf background conditiuns and rules can produce a causally predetermined uutcome
(Leiter, 275). Keeping in line with realist and CLS tradition, l.eiter argues that law is not
a knowable body of concrete knowledge, existing separate from man and waiting to be
tapped. Instead, law is the creatiun of judicial actiun; law is what judges say it is. In short,
the foundation of law is empirical rather than metaphysical (264).
Leiter argues that realists and proponents of CLS thought agree on two theses. First,
"The law is rationally indeterminate locally nut globally." Second, "The law is causally
indeterminate in the cases where it is rationally indeterminate" (265). The fIrst of these
theses attacks the efficacy of precedence in adjudication because it asserts that no set of
precunditions can demand a certain outcome. This view holds that there are too many conflicting, yet equally legitimate ways of interpreting the sources (statutes, precedent,
principles, etc.) and the facts of any case, thus allowing judges to draw a host of different
conclusions from the same facts. This thesis destroys the value of precedent because
t()rmer cases were not decided mechanically, and precedent, therefore, "can be interpreted
to stand for more than one rule, and so justifY more than one outcome" (266), The second
thesis is merely the logical extension of the first. If the law is rationally indeterminate on some
point, and legal reasons justify more than one decision, then we must look at extra-legal
sources to determine why a judge decided in some particular way (267). The move to
describe law from an extra-legal standpoint results in a normative theory
of law that can only describe what happens. It lacks the power to prescribe what ought
to happen.
What, then, i, law, if not a knowable set of rules that can be used in a predictive fashion? Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz said that war is nothing more than
an extension of politics on the battlefield, and Altman takes the same position with law.
For the CLS school, law is a patchwork of ideologies, pieced together for the benefit of
political parties and special interest groups (Altman 1999, 134). "In other words," Altman
writes, "the spectrum of ideological controversy in politics is reproduced in the law" (134).
Before considering a court case that demonstrates the validity ofCLS theory, I will first show
how the presupposition that law is an extension of political maneuvering dearly infects the
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decisions of those who control the interplay between the highest levels of executive and
judicial power in our country.
THE POlITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL NOMINEES

Given the prevailing philosophical streams of the twentieth century, one should not be
surprised to observe the erosion oflegal philosophy's metaphysicalundcrpinnings. Existentialism, deconstruction ism, and other continental schools of thought all question man's
ability to have absolute knowledge of any concept or category. These philosophies have
caused society to perceive reality in terms other than absolutistic and causal. Instead, reality
is seen in subjective terms of individual power, ambitions, and financial rewards. Against
this backdrop, the structure of our legal system appears to be a vehicle for the realization
of personal and collective political goals.
In tact, the public and the upper echelons of political power both realize that our
nation's courts can be used to formalize political ideologies as law, and this realization has
become more pronounced in the past half century. Not since the nineteenth century, when
the Senate took a far more active role in appointing federal judges, have presidents had to
personally fight, having the real possibility of defeat looming on the horizon, to have their
nominations pass congressional review. Indeed, President Lyndon B. Johnson was the first
president since the pre-Depression era to have a nominee fail to gain senatorial approval.
Johnson anempted to have Abe Fortas elevated to the position of chief justice, bur the
Republicans refused to consider the nomination because Fortas's views were too similar
to those of his predecessor, Earl \XTarren, whose views were particularly damagilig to
Republican ideologies, Ftom this moment, when the modern politicization of judicial
nominees began, political ideologies have dominated the formation process of our nation's
judiciary. Democrats vowed revenge after the Forras fiasco, and they exacted their revenge
by blocking the appointment of Clement Haynsworth, one of Nixon's proteges. As Senator
Gale McGhee, a Democrat, then conceded: "Had there been no Fortas affair ... a man of
Justice Haynsworrh's attainments ... undoubtedly would have been contlrmed" (qtd. in
Shenkman 2001 ),' However, this act only provoked the Nixon Administration to continue the
political games by "tlnd[ingl a good federal judge further south and further to the right
[than Haynsworthl" (Shenkman 2001).
Vying for political ideological supremacy in Washington, far from subsiding, has only
increased in intensity and has aided greatly to the dividing and polarizing of the political
parties. Each believes that "packing" the Court will provide future political dividends.'
However, Washington will likely not admit that it is playing this game, even though any
casual observer can easily note otherwise. For example, take the senatorial furor that has
surrounded President Bush's most recent federal nominees. Filibustering, used by Democratic
senators solely to block judges that they expect to adjudicate in one specific way (tied, of
course, to political affiliation), proves that politicians assume judges are not restrained by
metaphysical principles, but are rather merely pawns of the larger political organizations.
This view casts the Supreme Court of the United States, the one institution vested with the
power to defend and uphold the Constitution and the rule oflaw, as nothing more than an
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extension of the political battleground on which major policy issues are driven by money,
prestige, and pott:ntial votes rather than on a strict interpretation of the law.
The Democrats are not the only group that falls into this camp. Recently, the
Republicans were accused of believing that "judging is an apolitical task only as long as
judges do the right thing by administration lights," even though the Bush Administration
argued that "nominees should not be stalled because of politics and that senators should
confirm qualified judges who will observe the law, irrespective of ideological differences"
("Editorial" 2002). It seems as though the right hand hypocritically calls for apolitical
adjudication, while the left hand otTers federal support to those judges who decide in favor
with the Republican agenda. No real assent to a cognitively tenable body of legal knowledge
is made, and the actions of politicians and judges alike betray that sociological, political, and
personal reasons drive the adj udication process towards rulings that, given the same facts
and rule but viewed by an absolutely external and objective judge (an obvious impossibility),
might not be made otherwise. Is this not one of the key claims of the CLS school of
thought? This state of affairs destroys the notion that the highest Court of the land is a
mere bystander in the dialectic evolution of American culture. Rather, the Court is active
in writing and rewriting laws to fit certain political ideologies, liberal and conservative
alike.
LAWRENCE V. TEXAS

We will now examine a recent case to analyze the remaining tenets of CLS theory. Is
the modern American legal system both rationally and causally indeterminate? Does the
judiciary pick and choose which rules and principles have precedence in a given case?
Does the judiciary act, in defiance of constitutional precedent, as a legislative body?
Finally, is the court really an additional battleground for political supremacy? A review of
Lawrence v. lexas, a case decided in June 2003, will answer these questions.
Lawrence v. Texas considers the case of two men who were caught having consensual
sexual relations, a violation of Texas law at the time. To rule in this case, the Supreme Court
drew on rules and principles outlined in three previous cases: Roe v. Wade, Bowers v. Hardwick,
and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. In Roe, as many know, the
Court gave womell a fundamental right to control every aspect of their pregnancies by
extending federal protection to those who choose to abort their unborn children. Bowers,
ruled in 1986, stares that a Georgia law classifYing sodomy as a criminal act is constitutionally permissible. The ruling in Lflu'renee effectively overturned any precedent set in Bowers.
Casey, ruled in 1992, at heart, reaffirms the holding that the state can not interfere with
the abortion of unborn children, even to the point of striking down provisions that require
spousal consent to abortions. The manner in which the Supreme Court interpreted the
three cases in the Lawrence decision serves as evidence for both the indeterminacy of law
and for the supreme role that political ideology plays in modern adjudication. We will first
examine rational legal indeterminacy.
First, the violation of personal privacy is offered as one of the primary reasons for striking
down the Texas sodomy law in Lawrence (Kennedy 2003). However, beginning with Roe,
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the line of thinking that grants an inalienable right to privacy to all American citizens
is faulty. The right to privaL)' is nut a fundamental right granted by the Constitutiun but is
rather a contrived right produced by the Court, and the Bowers decision upholds this view.
The majority opinion in Bowers pointed out that the Supreme Court rests on dangerous
grounds when it discuvers "new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Process
Clause .... The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language ...
of the Cunstitution" (White 1986). Justices can choose either to sec the right as fundamental or not. In either case, conflicting rules are present from the beginning, and the
justices must reach outside of the law to further defend any legal position. One's personal
political leanings would provide the most rational basis for defending ur attacking this right
to privacy, which only strengthens the CLS standpoint that law is fundamentally rationally
indeterminate.
Second, a clause written by Sandra Day O'Connor was used as key defense in the
Lawrence decision. In her majority opinion in CtlSe}, Justice O'Connor wrote that everyone
has "the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life" (O'Connor 1992). Using this reasuning, the majority decided
that two consenting adults have the right to decide on the nature of their relationship,
and the State has nu right to interfere in that creative process. However, one can obviously
use the above reasoning to defend nearly any claim abuut civil rights, criminal actions,
actions demanded by religion, and general statements on the nature of reality and
humankind. In the same vein, Anthony Kennedy wrote in his Lawrence opinion: 'As the
Cunstitutiun endures, persuns in every generation can invoke its principle in their uwn search
for greater freedom" (Kennedy 2003). Can anyone who clings to a formalist legal approach
hold that such an interpretation of the Constitution demands a certain course of action?
In essence, the above clauses allow fur any interpretatiun un nearly any subject resulting in
a state of affairs that offers no help to judges and only encourages them to seek extra-legal
sources to base adjudication on, once again showing the rational indeterminacy of law.
Third, Justice Kennedy shows yet another pusitiun in the Lawrence majority opinion
whereupon judges must seek extra-legal help to interpret a legal principle. Kennedy accepts
the principle that rulings should follow traditions that are deeply ingrained in the fabric of
our nation, as do the Justices who dissented, but this legal principle makes no definitive
statement as to how such rulings should be interpreted. The majority used certain
evidence to show that an aversion to sodomy between consenting adults was not an integral
part of American heritage, while the dissenting side used counterevidence to show that the
American public and political machine have always been opposed to such actions. Again,
extra-legal principles and historical evidence are needed to provide grounds for a legal ruling.
The point at issue is that both sides had to resort to historical evidence to interpret
a certain legal principle, and equal, yet diametrically opposed, conclusions were reached.
Even when presented with evidence that would show that sodomy was abhorred by the
constitutional framers and early Americans, Kennedy writes, "In all events we think
that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here" (Kennedy

Dix

109

2003). The Justice has introduced yet another extra-legal lens through which to view the
case as a whole. By narrowing the temporal requirement of honoring traditions, Kennedy
is able to manipulate the judicial outcome to fit his personal political opinions.
fourth, Kennedy criticizes the legal methodology used to support Bowers and later uses
the same legal principle to support Lfllvrence, which effectively overturned Bowers. He
writes the tollowing:

Bowers' rationale does not withstand carefi.t1 analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers
Justice Stevens came to these conclusions: "... first, the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." (Supreme Court 2003)
In short, the majority's view on morality should not be a deciding f.1Ctor in the constitutionality of statutes. Nonetheless, the Court majority then reorders its position and says
that Lawrence should be upheld because a majority of citizens has "an emerging awareness"
(Supreme Court 2003) that homosexual acts should not be criminalized. Kennedy is, in
essence, picking and choosing the times when one should allow the principles that form the
majority's opinion to be legalized. If the Bowers Court is not allowed to use an extra-legal
principle to support their case, why is Kennedy then justified in his decisions? It seems that
two mutually exclusive, yet equally rational, conclusions were reached,
Lastly, the Kennedy decision in Lawrence supports rational legal indeterminacy by
accusing the BOll'en Court of "[hJaving misapprehended the claim ofliberty" presented to
them in the 1986 case (Kennedy 2003). This case of rational indeterminacy is blatantly
obvious-the Justices themselves feel that they would have corne to a different conclusion
given the same f.1CtS. The root of this accusation lies in the EICt that Kennedy and his
supporters interpreted the legal definition of "liberty" differently than those who upheld
the Bowen case. Here we see how rationallcgal indeterminacy fuels judicial revisionism and
activism; judges believe their opinions and interpretations are more legally sound and impose
them, in the form of precedent (which is, itself, metaphysically groundless), on ensuing
generations.
Turning to causal legal indeterminacy, one can see that the plethora of conHicting rules
and principles, all subject to equal weight and interpretation, will never dictate a single
course of adjudicative action. In the Lawrence case, causal legal indeterminacy is most evidem when olle realizes the legal implications that stem from the majority's ruling, namely
the overturning of Bowers. In her opinion discussing the ruling in Casq, Justice O'Connor
wrote the tollowing:
(e) The Roe rule's limitation on state power could not be repudiated without serious
inequity to people who, for two decades of economic and social developments, have
organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event
that contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives. The Constitution serves human values, and while the effect of
reliance on Roe cannot be exactly measured, neither can the certain costs of overturning
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Roe for people who have ordered their thinking and living around that case be dismissed. (Pp. 855-56)
(i) Overruling Roe's central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under
stare decisis principles, bur would seriously weaken the Court's capacity (0 exercise the
judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule
of law. (Supreme COurt 1992)
In 1992, O'Connor and the rest of the majority were not willing to sacrifice the
integrity of the Court by overturning precedent decided less than two decades earlier. The
social repercussions would likely be undesirable, and a major cultural upheaval would be
expected should Roe be overturned. Additionally, they found the principle of stare decisisbasically, a respect for precedent-to be seemingly sacrosanct.
In his Lawrence dissention, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote,
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. ... " That was the Court's sententious response barely more than a decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe 1'.
Wade [in Casey]. The Court's response today ... is very different. ... I begin with the
Court's surprising readiness to reconsider a decision rendered a mere 17 years ago in
Bowers 1'. Hardwick. ... I do believe that we should be consistent [with precedent]
rather than manipulative in invoking the doctrine .... There [in Casq], when stare
decisis meant preservation of judicially invented abortion rights, the widespread criticism of Roe was strong reason to reaffirm it. (Scalia 2003)
Justice Scalia saw the hypocritical fa<,:ade that the Lawrence majority was acting under,
and his comments shed light on the causal legal indeterminacy that surrounded the COUrt
case. In one situation, the Court was reticent to overturn precedent because liberty found
"no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt." Yet in Lawrence, the Court had to rule on moral
rights dealing with sexuality and reproduction, and precedent was swiftly overturned
because of "an emerging awareness" in America's thinking on sex. Just one decade apart,
one ruling defended the sanctity of precedent, while the other erased precedent because of
its harm on "progressive" American social norms. Perhaps causal legal indeterminism's
greatest piece of evidence is Kennedy's statement that "Bowers was not correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today" (Supreme Court 2003). Given all the same rules,
principles, and background information, Kennedy would have decided contrary to the
majority in Bowers. Because adjudication is inherently indeterminate, no given set of
conditions can prescribe a singular judicial outcome.
In all of these examples, the reader should not see any imposition of valuative judgments.
I am not concerned with whether one interpretation is right and one is wrong. The crux of
the argument rests solely with whether a window exists for equally differing legal interpretations that forces Justices to look to extra-legal sources for adjudicative purposes. If it does,
then CLS theory has proven the rational indeterminacy oflaw. Similarly, I do not mean to
judge the correctness of any Court decision, but wish rather to show that, given the same
set of rules, principles, and conditions, judges will arrive at different decisions in different
cases. This displays the second tenet of CLS theory-the causal indeterminacy of law.
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LAw AND POLITICS
Lawrence clearly demonstrates both the rational and causal indeterminacy oflaw. After
removing the traditional adjudicative foundations, however, one must be prepared to
replace them with another superstructure. [f law is not a causal chain of following statutes,
then what is it? Turning again to the situation in Lmvrmce. the obvious answer seems
to agree with the CLS opinion that law is an extension of the battle between competing
political ideologies. Of course, one might not remove all uncertainty of political influence,
but the preponderance of evidence points towards it as the most dominant force that
manipulates the adjudicative process.
As explained above, the general public and many political leaders believe that law is
influenced by politics. The statements of the Justices themselves also betray this opinion.
The case in Lilwrence quickly became as much about the political rights ofa self-proclaimed
minority group as it did about the legality of a Texas sodomy law. Sandra Day O'Connor
explicitly stated that she ruled to strike the Texas law because doing so protected the rights
of a "politically unpopular group" (qtd. in Scalia 2003). It is well known that the homosexual issue is charged with political ramifications-something that was relatively lacking
twenty years ago-and that people are automatically labeled homophobic, intolerant, or
politically incorrect should they oppose giving any and every right to those who have
homosexual tendencies. Additionally, the Democratic Party has aligned itself with voters
who describe themselves as homosexual, and liberal judges are therefore disinclined to rule
unbvorably ror such voters.
Perhaps the most scathing political accusation directed towards those who compose the
majority in Lawrence comes from a fellow justice, Antonin Scalia. Finding no plausible
distinction between upholding a right to abortion (in Roe) and overruling the condemnation
of homosexuality (in Bowers), Justice Scalia concluded, "Today's opinion is the product of a
Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the
so-called homosexual agenda .... It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in
the culture war" (Scalia 2003). Judicial activism that takes a side on a hot political issue
undoubtedly reveals the political influence that partisan leaders and pladorms exert on the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION

One can easily provide counterexamples to those who subscribe to a formalistic theory of
law. Law, especially in those cases that actually reach the courtroom, is not mechanically
determined; judges are not compelled to always adjudicate in a given way; different outcomes, replete with supporting reasons and facts, are always probable in any given situation.
The very fact that the vast majority of federal rulings are not unanimous supports this
theory; different judges rule differently in spite of identical background circumstances and
applicable statutes. The CLS theory, when taken as a theory of adjudication, satisfactorily
explains this phenomenon. Its stress on the indeterminacy oflaw, both rational and causal,
illuminates the need for judges to reach out to extra-legal principles to formulate their rulings.
This essay has shown how the Supreme Court, in the case of Lawrence v. Texas, was forced

112

Legal Indeterminacy, Politics, and the Supreme Court

to look beyond the written law to justifY both the majority and minority opinions. Moreover, given the social and political conditions surrounding the ruling, one can confidently
assume that the legal ruling, in this case, was derived from the political battle raging outside
of the Court's chambers.
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ENDNOTES

l. In this case, principle one would be something like: "If person x helps in causing the
death of person y, then person x is guilty of murder." Principle two would read something
like: "If person x no longer has any desire to live, he is free to end his life." Naturally, the
two principles conflict.
2. The basic information in the preceding paragraph was gleaned from the body of his article.
3. "Packing"-a word used often by politicians and the media that betrays the fact that
Justices are merely tools of political advancement who serve the political bosses who
appointed them.
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